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AUSTRIA, GERMANY, AND RUSSIA.

The Berlin correspondent of the Argu « writing on June 30th, gives the following interesting account of the present position of a trail's in Europe : Last month’s row has borne its anticipated fruit. The Emperor of Austria, knowing the German fear of France to be chiefly occasioned, not by tlie ever increasing numbers of the French army, but by the apprehension of an Austria attack in the rear accompanying a French assault in front, has profited by the estrangement between Russia and Germany to effect a bona fide rapprochement towards the Czar. Yesterday, as the Russian Sovereign was wending his way home to his majestic capital, the Austrian Emperor, meeting him at a country station on the Bohemian frontier, spent six or seven hours in close confab with his illustrious friend in a railway carriage. When the two met they kissed each other in the sight of astonished Europe (journalistically represented of course), and when they parted they went through the same ceremony with considerable emphasis and gusto. The event is of such serious importance, and may bo destined to exercise such marked influence upon the course of the world’s affairs, that a word of comment may not be amiss hero. Since Austria was saved by Russia from the Magyar revolt, the obliged party has owed the other a grudge. Like his predecessors for a century prso, the Emperor Nicholas was Austria’s enemy in the East. When succouring Austria it was certainly not in a fit of generosity, but as he could not afford to irritate a Magyar Republic on the borders of his Polish despotism ho prudently interfered, not for the sake of the sovereign immediately benefited by the act but in his own undoubted interest. Of course he 1 was enough of a man and a sovereign not to show his real motive. Far from displaying any amicabie philanthropic weakness of the sort, he played the part of Austria’s benefactor with so much self-assertion and aplomb , that had he been a friend instead of a thoroughly selfish intercessor, Austrian flesh and blood could hardly have borne the infliction. As it was, the traditional hostility between the two dynasties and countries was terribly aggravated in consequence of the services rendered the one by the other. Five years after the humiliation inflicted upon the gallant Francis Joseph, the stern autocrat of the North, carried away by his ever increasu g pride, drifted into the Crimean war. Austria’s opportunity had now arrived. Though she did not actually invade Russia, the concentration of six corps d'armee on the Polish frontier placed an equal number of Russian troops hors de combat , and as this was the very force that might have saved Sebastopol, could it have been sent to the beleagured city, instead of lying detained on the Dneiper and Bug, the rage at St Petersburg against Vienna was far beyond anything said or felt against England or France. Vengeance upon ingrate Austria thus becoming a watchword at St Petersburg, the conforming party at whom these threads were aimed was only the more hardened in its wicked course, for, as the next move, the unfortunate Poles, so long the football of their stronger neighbours, were had in requisition to stir up the Russian portion of the subject nationality. Austria considerately made her own Poles believe in the speedy restoration of their ancient independence, and when the seed so industriously sown burst forth into crimson blossom, and u formidable rebellion at length broke out in Warsaw, such was the support given the rebels by the governors of the Austrian border provinces, that all the might and potency of the Czar were requisite to subdue the desperate riot. A few years later, Russia seized her favorable moment for retort. Germany having long been prevented by Austria from forming herself into a united commonwealth, eventually fell into the hands of the determined Bismarck, the self-avowed man of iron and blood, whose policy it suited to go in, if not for the whole, at least for a fraction of the national aspirations. War between Prussia, the leading state of Germany, and Austria, then became the order of the day ; but as Prussia was not half strong enough to engage in such a venture, ; if the Czar forbade and Napoleon were uupropitious, both these potentates had to be conciliated before the sword could be unsheathed. To have succeeded in this will always be Bismarck’s chief claim to diplomatic eminence. With that marvellous appreciation of character which is one and probably the highest of his qualities, Bismarck knew that the more indefinite the hints he dropped to Napoleon, the more extravagant would be the hopes of selfaggrandisement raised in that dreamy potentate. Napoleon, it is well-known, actually applauded the war which was to give him the formidable neighbour that ultimately proved his ruin. Bismarck not having offered to purchase his consent by a slice of German territory the French Emperor, expecting Austria to be strong enough to hold her own, never doubted that he would come in as arbiter, and get the Rhine for his pains. If Napoleon was induced to approve the Austro-Prussian tournament by what he meant to reap for himself, Russia—who did not aspire to German soil—was differently situated. A despotic and ambitious state, bent upon conquest in other directions, the division and consequent weakness of Germany was a fact which had long given her unqualified satisfaction. Splitup Germany, being contiguous to the im mense and firmly-knitted dominion of the Northern giant, by the very contrast between her disunion and the other’s concentrated strength, served as a foil to Russian selfesteem ; while if the day were once to dawn when the Turkish project might be resumed, the feebleness and disintegration of Germany would certainly not impede a scheme which a stronger neighbour might be tempted to object to. Actuated by these considerations, the Emperor Nicholas, as late as 1852, positively vetoed the unification of the Fatherland by Frederick William IV. There is no doubt that but for the experience of the Crimean war the like conduct would have been pursued by his sou and successor, when Prussia entered on her plan in 1866 ; but Austria having proved strong enough scr ously to embarrass Russia at the time of the siege ol Sebastopol, Alexander thought it good polity to acquiesce in the consolidation of Germany under Prussian auspices, or, what is the same thing, in the isolation and consequent weakening of Austria. A comparative glance at the opposite policies pursued by him and his father reveals the antagonism in which Alexander then found himself to Austria. After all, even though Austria’s half connection with Germany continued, the excess

of strength she derived from a tic of such questionable solidity was not much to boast of, while the moment that bond was severed, and Prussia enabled to form German- into a compact whole, a new state, with -li the principal elements of success, was civan d on the Russian frontiers. But Russian spile against Austria in those days knew no bounds, and though a large portion among I lie educated of his subj >cts hi lined the ufor quietly sitting by while Prussia revived Germany, Alexander 11. placidly endured a change which he might have easily prevented.

Austria was shaken in every limb by the catastrophe, Torn to pieces by the cow-taut conflict between her heterogeneous parts she had hoped to derive renewed strength from a future access of territory in Southern Germany, When this hope vanished, the world became a blank to the unlucky Francis Joseph. No move was considered too venturesome that promised to extricate him from the abyss into which he had fallen—no revenge was considered too cruel if it destroyed Prussia, the accouiplisher of the deed —if it injured Russia, the abettor. To compass both objects at the same time, Austria entered with France into what is known as the coalition of 1868. France, owing to the rapidity of the Prussian victory of 1866, not having been in a position to exact black mail from the ingenious Bismarck, thought herself ill-used, and grumbled accordingly. Her first idea was to arm, and second, to take by force what she had failed to secure in the previous instance. Her military preparations completed, she applied to Austria for help, and received a favourable reply. It being apprehended that Russia would not like to see Germany dismembered to the advantage of Austria, her own immediate adversary, the two chums agreed that the Czar’s attention should be diverted in another direction. While this country was attacked from the front, Russia was to be occupied in both front and rear. With this intent Austrian Poland was set on fire preparatory to the stirring up of rebellion in the Russian portion of the dismembered nationality, while an insurrection was artificially got up in Belgium, with a view to stir Russia up to interfere in the East. To crown all, underhand attempts were made to induce the Radical sect in Moscow and St Petersburg to run their heads against the granite wall of Czarish autocracy. The bomb was just bursting when one of the two conspirators found himself unexpectedly prevented from going on. The cxpulsio: ot Queen Isabella, and the conse-. quent establishment of a Republic in Spain, forcibly reminded Louis Napoleon of the commonwealth he had abolished before he could ascend his throne. Dreading the like thoughts to be passing through the minds of the French, the Emperor shrank from embarking in a foreign enterprise at a moment when grave domestic dangers might be at the door. Accordingly, counter orders were issued at Paris, and a letter expressing polite regret despatched to Vienna. Great was the consternation at the Austrian capital when the unpalatable news arrived. The idea of postponing action was disagreeable enough in itself, but the consciousness of having openly fomented rebellion against the Czar, Francis Joseph’s stern and powerful neighbor, was worse. The necessity of conciliating the irate sovereign on the other side of the frontier was so obvious that no loss of dignity seemed to weigh in comparison to the importance of the end in view. A special messenger,, invested with ths twofold rank of prince and adjutant-general to the Empe'or Francis Joseph, was sent to compliment and allay the irritation of the Czar. But the latter declined to be pacified. “ Tell your master,” ho said to the frightened emissary, “ that I should not have remained an indifferent spectator had his preparations been continued.” Two years later the shrewdness of the Emperor of Russia in looking upon Austria’s penitence as a temporary makeshift became apparent. The Emperor Napoleon, having recovered from his Spanish terror, resumed his German plan once more. He was urged on by Austrian promises of assistance in cabinet and field. Without dwelling on the stale story of 1870, I may content myself with despatching this part of the subject by the remark that twice in the course of that tremendous enmpaign Austria prepared to take the cudgels against Germany, and twice was prevented by the threats of the Czar. No one acquainted with the dispositions of leading persons at Vienna at that critical period will deny that had France won but a single victory, Austria would have kept her treaty engagements, and actively supported the fighting Gaul, but as far as Austria and Russia are corcerned, the result of it all was increased enmity between the two.

But in human affairs, always when the climax has been reached, a change must supervene. When enmity was at its hottest, circumstances took a turn that in a very short time caused the belligerents to kiss and make that up. After theconclusion of peace between France and Germany, Austria was in a worse fix than ever. She had once before displayed inveterate antagonism to Russia and Prussia, and the ally upon whom she counted in the game had been utterly defeated. Venturesome as Vienna politicians have recently been made by the exigencies of their situation, the boldest could not conceal from themselves that to be at loggerheads with the two Northern Emperors while Franco was down, might involve a more prejudicial complication than the dilapidated monarch could well afford. It was plain that either Russia or Prussia had to be given a pledge of future amenability, and the Czar, having declined Austrian overtures a few years previously, this time the scale of friendship inclined towards Prussia. To fit his behaviour to the critical nature of the emergency, the Emperor of Austria now sent no adjutant to negotiate, but betook himself and suite to Berlin, and now occurred the cunning action of Russian diplomacy which has just brought in a complete change in the grouping ol the powers. It had suited the Czar to weaken Austria by conniving at her separation from Germany, but though he could not help contributing towards the rise of a German power by the act, he had no thought of allowing that power to attain so safe a state as might eventually enable it to interfere with his own designs. If Austria became friendly to Germany, the latter country had no reason to dread France, a proposition which plainly leads to the inference that France, knowing Germany to be a match for her, would have abandoned her designs upon the existence of the new commonwealth. To prevent Francis Joseph from throwing himself into the arms of his aged relative at Berlin was thus made the indispensable aim of Russian policy, and though this could bo accomplished only if the Czar

determined to take the recusant Francis Joseph to his own bosom, still the painful alternative had to bo faced as best it might. H-nee, no sooner did Austria give signs of an intention to join hands with Prussia, than, suddenly relenting towards his Vienna enemy, the Czar kindly extended to him, If not exactly his friendship, at least his gracious patronage. Thus befriended where she Find not hoped for either pity or protection, Austria was tempted to benefit by the opportunity, and preserve a doubtful attitude towards Germany. That this was the very thing Russia had in view is proved by the Czar’s attitude upon Germany’s trying to emerge from the embarrassing situation artfully created for herself. And here I must revett to last month’s account. Disquieted as much by the French military preparations as by the reviving defiance of the fickle Francis Joseph, Germany a few weeks ago threatened to break through the net of possibilities spinning around her. Then the Czar showed himself in his true colors. Pacific England counselled patience and peace, but interested Russia forbade war, Germany was not to be allowed to free herself from the trammels thrown around her by the Czar, her friend and ally. She was not to secure herself against foreign attack. She was to be permanently held in ''hcck bj Austria and France. What a commentary upon that glorious fiction of the three Emperors’ league. Russian diplomats are judicious, and not likely to deceive themselves as to the consequences of ..heir actions. They cannot but be conscious of the feelings awakened in their German friends by recent events. If the German Government had their suspicions as to the motives actuating the Czar in befriending Austria the moment Austria offered to be friendly to Prussia, nothing short of absolute conviction can be their state of mind now. The contingencies arising from this conviction Russia muse be prepared to face. If the amount of military resources is calculated she has no cause for alarm. If energy and intelligence are weighed in the balance she may perhaps have reason to think otherwise. To be sure, if Germany, to put a stop to a condition she thinks almost unendurable, were to go to war with France, and be taken in the rear by Russia and Austria at the same time, all vaunted strategy of her generals, all the willing devotion of her sous might avail her little in the unequal conflict. But the latest developments clearly point to the possibility of Germany’s some day making it up with France by withdrawing the shield she has so long and effectually held over Belgium—an event wh.ch would leave Russia and Austria alone to grapple with their neighbour. It is evidently with an eye to this possible evolution ot things that the Czar, having once unveiled his real sentiments towards Germany, thought it prudent to draw near and nearer to his new Austrian ally. The Austrian Emperor, as a matter of course, was ready to meet his Russian Majesty half way. He indeed cannot just yet partwith his Hungarian Cabinet, painfully friendly to Prussia as it is ; but Plough the Hungarians have a distinct presentiment that the defeat of Prussia would enable their beloved Sovereign to do away with their abominably liberal constitutions and hated predominance in domestic affairs, there is a way of keeping them in and yet prepare for their destruction. The Emperor of Austria has only to meet the Emperor of Russia in person and without witnesses, and every necessary arrangement may -he concentrated, and nobody be the wiser. For such a purpose a railway journey was an excellent thing, so yesterday’s trip from Comotan to Bodenbach came to pass. It will not lead to the Czar’s sanctioning Austria’s co-opera-tion with France against Germany, the strengthening of Austria being still less to his interest than the raising Germany above the danger of a Frauco-Austrian attack. But it is sure to encourage the Emperor of Austria to persist in an ambiguous attitude towards Germany, and pave the way for a real co-operation between him and the Czar should Germany ever become reconciled to France. As a finishing touch to the Czar’s recent intervention at Berlin, as an open and resolute manifestation of his design to go on with the’policy then and there inaugurated, the joint drive in the gilded car will not be forgotten in the history of this pregnant year.

The Gibraltar Chronicle of the 30th April publishes a letter from one of the members comprising the British mission to Fez, giving an account of the Emperor of Morocco’s initiation in the science of telegraphy. The telegraph apparatus, which was taken up by the mission as a present from the English Government to the Sultan, was exhibited at the close of his Excellency Sir John Drummond Hay’s first business interview with his Majesty. The New York correspondent of the Academy says “MrJ. W. Bouton, a book importer of this city, has recently sold a Bible, in the preparation of which Mr James Gibbs, of London, passed the greater part of his lifetime. This remarkable book contains the entire text of three or four rare editions of the Bible, and consists of sixty volumes. The text is carefully inlaid and illustrated by the insertion of upwards of 30,000 plates, original drawings in oil, water color, and pencil, specimens of early printed, rare, or curious Bibles, etchings, engravings on steel and copper, and mezzotints. The book, which is a library in itself, was sold for 10,000dol to a private collector in this state.” Most of the Prussian infantry regiment having now been armed with the Mausers rifle, the War Department at Berlin has ordered a supply of them to be issued to the schools for sub-officers at Potsdam, Biebrich, Julich, and Weissenfels. The cadet corps still uses the needle-gun, but it also will be armed with the Mauser when the whole of the infantry regiments have been provided with the new rifle. According to the original plan this was to be done by the end of the present year ; but, as the private factories with which contracts were made by the Government have fulfilled their engagements before the prescribed period, it will be possible to supply all the corps d'armee with the new rifle in time for the manoeuvres which arc to take place in the autumn. The supply of new guns for the field artillery has also made much progress. The second divisional regiment of each brigade is already armed with the 8.8-centimetre gun, and some of the first (corps) regiments of the brigades have been nrovided with new batteries, the horse divisions carrying the new light 7-58-centimetre gun. The old ammunition waggons have been altered so is to be used with the new batteries, and they have proved so well adapted for this purpose that it has been decided not to make any new waggons for the present. The whole of the field artillery is to be armed with the new guns by the Ist of October.

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/GLOBE18750901.2.15

Bibliographic details

Globe, Volume IV, Issue 381, 1 September 1875, Page 3

Word Count
3,433

AUSTRIA, GERMANY, AND RUSSIA. Globe, Volume IV, Issue 381, 1 September 1875, Page 3

AUSTRIA, GERMANY, AND RUSSIA. Globe, Volume IV, Issue 381, 1 September 1875, Page 3

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