THE PROGRESS OF EVENTS IN SPAIN.

Globe, Volume III, Issue 250, 31 March 1875, Page 4

THE PROGRESS OF EVENTS IN SPAIN.

{From the Spectator.)

The more we hear of the Counter-revolu-tion in Spain, the less reason do we see for expecting from it an immediately beneficial result on the fortunes of that unhappy kingdom. That the Revolution has been bloodless is true, more bloodless even than that of 1868, and no doubt this may indicate increasing moderation in the parties, but then it may and probably does also indicate increasing political lassitude in the country. That the Army has acknowledged Alphonso XII everywhere, and with a certain enthusiasm, is evident, and that the propertied classes are not displeased may be accepted on the evidence of the Funds, which rose in Madrid five per cent, or more than a clear third upon their value in hard cash, which was previously only twelve. But the Army is the only body which is at all enthusiastic, and the success of the Army will only increase its disposition to regard itself as the State, and to make pronunciamientos, which the Monarchy, like the Republic, implicitly sanctions by raising Martinez Campos at once to the rank of Lieutenant-General. That isamostdaDgerous result of a Restoration even in Spain, where the army does in some sort represent the people. The cities have remained quiet, but accounts [from Madrid, Barcelona, and Granada, all unite in saying that the quiet was due mainly to the dread of the military garrisons. The peasantry appear to be profoundly apathetic, and though a Government can get on very well with mere acquiescence from its subjects, still acquiescence soon becomes hatred when sacrifices are demanded. There is no sign whatever that the Carlists ,are about to submit. They may, for their strength is among the clergy, and the Vatican is decidedly,Alphonsist; but they say they will not, and say it with some vigour. Don Carlos is no more friendly to Alphonso than to Serrano, the Navarrese and Biscayans are as devoted as ever to their chiefs and their

provincialisms, and no leader of note, not even Dorregaray, can yet be shown to have submitted. Alphonso may yet have to fight for his throne, as his mother had, and to fight with means reduced by nearly three years of war. The Ministry, again, though determined men, indicate by their first acts that they are unable to rise above the old devices of Spanish politics. They have issued no general amnesty; they have made promises of some kind to the slave-owning interest in Cuba; and on several points they appear disposed to carry out plans which will conciliate no one heartily. They talk of the Constitutional Monarchy, but their first act on gaining power was to suppress all Opposition newspapers; their second, to suspend trial by jury throughout Spain; their third, to place Madrid under a Commission superseding the old municipality; and their fourth, if a recent telegram is true, to tell Castelar that he at least must quit the country for a time. These are not constitutional acts, or even acts under a state of siege, but violent and arbitrary exertions of dictatorial authority. As regards the Church, they appear to'be either uncertain, or disposed to conciliate, not by fair treatment, but by the worst kind of concessions. They have evidently cautioned the priests not to resume their ecclesiastical dress, lest the mob should be offended—that is, they refuse to protect the priests in the exercise of a clear right—yet they have suppressed the two Evangelical papers of Spain simply for teaching Protestantism. We are not objecting to their assumption of a momentary Dictatorship. There was nothing else for them to do, at least until their King arrived; but they should have used it to enforce respect for the laws, not to substitute for them fitful and useless acts of power. There is not even clerical policy in silencing obscure Protestant journals, while scepticism is preached openly in every cafe. They have not been bloodthirsty at all, but they have been violent and revolutionary; and we very much doubt whether their idea is not to revert to the Isabellino regime—that is, to govern from day to day and hand to mouth by the aid of Generals well paid for their aid, of heavy garrisons, and of a Cortes reduced by one means or other to quiescence. There will be, in fact, if present indications are accurate, a nominal Kingship and a country governed by a minute Cabal.

The evil of Spain is that it seems to obtain neither of the two powers either of which can make a country great. There is, of course, a chance that the Kingship may be real, or at least thus far real, that Alphonso, when once in Madrid, may himself pick out a good Mayor of the Palace, a Bismarck on whom he can rely, but the chance is a very small one. The King can know little of Spanish generals or statesmen. Even allowing thnt his cosmopolitan training has precociously developed his powers, it must have, diminished his knowledge of things and persons in Spain, and he has to act on the most serious matters before he has time to acquire any. He has to put down Carlism, to face the Cortes, to propose a new Constitution or establish an old one, to resettle the affairs of his House, to sanction plans for filling his treasury, to arrange a modus Vivendi with the Church, all at once, without waiting either for experience, or for many councillors, or for comparisons of advice. The probability that he can do any of these things is very slight, and if he can do there all it will be a miracle, more especially when surrounded, as he will be, by a female Court intent above all things on intriguing for his favor. What lad of seventeen ever was fit for such a position ? Mr Disraeli gives us in " Coningsby " a long list of boys who have done wonders, but they have not as boys personally governed States, or been opposed to difficulties which have overtaxed a generation lof politicians. It is a boy who is King of Spain, a very good boy, perhaps, but one who has never given any sign of exceptional or brilliant precocity of genius. Kings' frieDds are ready enough to praise a King, but nothing comes out about Alphonso except that he is vivacious, that he is an adept in manly sports, that he speaks three or four languages, and that he is simple and pleasant in manners. His situation is peculiarly unfortunate in two respects. The very best chance for the new King would be his marriage to an able woman, but there can be little doubt that he is barred from this, and that the adhesion of the cadet branch of the Spanish Bourbons has been gained by some promise to marry some daughter of the Duke de Montpensier, still a child. As it happens, also, one member of his House could help him, for theDuked'Aumale could, as Premier or private adviser, govern Spain; but it is very doubtful if Spanish feeling would allow the King to accept, even informally, the advice of one who, though a Bourbon, is a foreigner.

On the other hand, the Cortes will he summoned, for without it there will be no money, and there is a chance, of course, of the election of a Cortes who could govern, or force selected Ministers to govern well, but it is very remote and unsatisfactory. The Cortes never seem to be able to obtain a foothold in Spain. Pavia turned out a Parliament elected by universal suffrage without the smallest difficulty, and none of Isabella's Parliaments, in whatever method elected, were able to acquire substantial power. The explanation has always been that the Cortes can be nominated by the Minister of the Interior, but that fact of itself shows that in Spain the Cortes have no real strength. No Minister of the Interior, even in France, can pack a Parliament against the will of ardent or interested electors. The truth appears to be that the Spaniards outside Castile are still provincials, do not honestly care about the composition of the Government at Madrid, and when their provincial interests are not in question only sigh to be let alone. But this is the very thing a strong Cortes would not be able to do. The Chambers must tax, must legislate, must settle somehow or other that fundamental grievance, the Military law; and must do all these things for the whole country and in a painful way, a way requiring sacrifices which only patriotism will endure. That such patriotism can be evoked in Spain is clear from the example of the Carlists, who in Navarre and Biscay are both fighting and paying like men in earnest; but then it is patriotism for the province, not for the Empire, which the Carlist peasantry display. They want their King to win, provided he can win without their crossing the Bbro, which, in the nature of things, as settled by the geography of Spain, he cannot do. A perfectly free Parliament in Spain would be a thoroughly Red one, the Reds being active and interested, as we saw when a free Parliament dismissed Castelar, the best Republican in Spain, for

being too " reactionary" ; and a nominee one would be powerlesß, while in the Italian alternative, a free Parliament elected by a narrowly-restricted suffrage, we have but little confidence.