SUPREME COURT.

Globe, Volume III, Issue 237, 13 March 1875, Page 3

SUPREME COURT.

SITTINGS IN CHAHBERS. Friday, Harch 12. [Before His Honor Hr Justice Gresson,] His Honor sat in the Court Chambers at 11 a.m. RE THE GOODS OP WM SWALE, DECEASED, Hr G. W. Nalder applied for an order for leave to issue letters of administration in this matter to Elizabeth Swale, as widow, and Wm, Swale, as son of the deceased. His Honor made the order. RE WILL OF CHARLES PREBBLE, DECEASED. Mr Slater applied for an order for leave to issue probate to Henry Bromwich and John Edward Jacombs, as executors thereof. His Honor made the order. RE GOODS OP THOS. ROBERT O’CALLAGHAN, DECEASED. On the application of Hr G. Harper his Honor made an order enlarging time for filing inventory for two months. BE WILL OP JOHN M'CANDLISH, DECEASED. Hr Harper applied for an order issuing letters of administration, with will annexed, to Gilbert HcCandlish, as father of deceased. His Honor made the order. BE CHARLES FRANCIS SEARLE. On the application of the debtor in person his Honor made an order of adjudication, and fixed the first meeting of creditors for Monday, 22nd Harch, at 11 o’clock. GILMOUB V BRUCE. Hr Garrick appeared to apply for an order dissolving the injunction granted herein, dated Bth February, 1875. Mr Joynt, who appeared to oppose the application, asked for an adjournment of the case until Tuesday, Harch 23rd, as the affidavits filed were very voluminous. He also intended to move next Chamber day, that Mr Bruce be committed, as he had evaded the writ of attachment. GILMOUR V BRUCE. This case, which was a motion on attachment under the writ obtained by Hr Joynt for the plaintiff, stood over also until the 23rd Harch. Mr Garrick’s application for leave to plead and demur to the plaintiff’s declaration, also stood over until the same date. RE MIDDLETON AND MCQUADE. Mr Garrick applied in this case for an order of the Court, declaring the order of adjudication of the bankrupts’ obtained by several creditors null and void. On the application of Hr Joynt, the case stood over until Friday next, in order to allow of answering affidavits being filed. Another application in the same estate set down for Tuesday next, was also adjourned until the same date, BE BELCHER AND PAIRWEATHER. Mr Joynt applied for an order for leave to summon Hr Macfarlane, of Kaiapoi, to attend at the next bankruptcy sittings on the 18th instant, to give evidence in this case. Order made as prayed. RE WILL OP WM. MURPHY, DECEASED. Mr Bamford applied for probate to issue to George Bailey, of Eyreton, farmer, and Timothy Galvin, of Southbridge, as executors of the said will. • His Honor made the order as prayed, LUNATICS’ ACT, 1868, AND RE GEOFFREY PALMER WOOD, A LUNATIC PATIENT. Hr Cowlishaw applied for an order allowing Marmaduke Dixon, the committee of the above estate, leave to pay certain law costs as between solicitor and client. His Honor made the order as prayed. RE JAMES POLLAS. Hr J. S. Williams applied for an order of adjudication and fixing of first meeting of creditors. His Honor made the order, and fixed Monday, Harch 22nd, for first meeting of creditors, at noon. The Cab Cases. APPEALS FROM JUSTICE OP THE PEACE ACT, AND RE CONVICTION OP HARRY MUNYARD GOODYER. Mr Garrick applied for a rule nisi directed to George Lilly Hellish and Frederick Hobbs, calling upon them to show cause why they should not be prohibited from proceeding upon the conviction by the said George Lilly Hellish made on Ihe 10th day of Februarj against one Harry Munyard Goodyer, fo r unlawfully and maliciously breaking and throwing down a certain fence, contrary to the statute upon the following grounds 1. That the alleged fence was an unauthorised obstruction of a public cab-stand forming part of the public street or highway, and as the said H. M. Goodyer committed the said act complained of in the assertion of his right of free access to the cab-stand and passage over the public highway, the summary jurisdiction of the said G. L. Hellish was ousted. 2. That the alleged fence was not a fence within the meaning of the Act. 3. That no ownership or property in the fence was alleged or proved. 4. That the conviction erroneously finds the said alleged fence to be the property of the Christchurch City Council. 6. That there was no evidence given or tendered as to the amount or value of the injury done to the alleged fence. 6, That the conviction does not appropriate the penalty or direct in what way it is to be paid or applied, and it is impossible to determine the amount payable for the injury to the alleged fence. 7. That there was no information in writing charging the defendant with the said offence. The learned counsel proceeded to argue that in the first place the objection was that the summary jurisdiction was ousted, and this was clearly laid down in authorities, because it involved the establishment of a legal right. He contended that the offence charged did not come under the Malicious Injury to Property Act, because the Council had no right to enclose such portion of the public highway. Again, the Act stated that where any person was convicted under it the Justices were bound to assess the damage done, which amount should be paid to the party injured, then over and above this the Court could give beyond this amount for the use of her Majesty. This was not done, and therefore the conviction was bad, because it was peremptory that the Court should assess the damages due to the person whose property had been damaged. The next objection was that the evidence taken did not disclose any apportionment of the damage, which was also contrary to the Act. The last objection he had to urge against the conviction was that no written authority had been used for the arrest of the defendant. The conviction was upon an information for malicious destruction of the property of the City Council, which brought it under the 4th section of the Justice of the Peace Act relating to summary convictions, which laid it down that the information must be in writing. He contended that before the case could be heard the Justices must have a written information as the offence for which the defendant was convicted was

not the offence for which he was arrested. He was given into custody for malicious destruction of public property, and he was convicted for having destroyed the property of the Christchurch City Council. This his Honor would see was a totally different case, and came under another section. He thought, therefore, that he was entitled to a rule nisi for prohibition, the writ to be returnable at his Honor's convenience. His Honor said he would grant the rule nisi returnable on the 2nd April, or so soon thereafter as can be arranged. RE APPEALS FROM JUSTICES OP THE PEACE ACT, AND RE CONVICTION OP JAMES REID. Mr Garrick applied on behalf of the defendant for a rule nisi calling on G. L. Hellish and Edward Hughes to show cause why they should not be prohibited from further proceeding upon or in respect of the conviction by the said G. L. Hellish of the said James Reid made on the 19th February, 1875, for that he wilfully encumbered and obstructed the public thoroughfare by allowing a horse and vehicle to remain thereon contrary to the Canterbury Police Ordinance, 1858, clause 19th, section 4, upon the following grounds :—l. That it did not appear, and the evidence adduced upon the hearing of the said information did not shew, that the defendant had been guilty o f an obstruction of the said thoroughfare contrary to the said Ordinance. 2, That it was not proved that the defendant in any way whatever obstructed the said thoroughfare. 3. That the conviction does not show that the defendant unlawfully obstructed the said thoroughfare. 4. That the Canterbury Police Ordinance, 1858, is vitro, vires in purporting to alter the criminal law of New Zealand as to offences not punishable summarily. 6. That the said offence amounted to an indictable offence, and was not determinable summarily. His Honor granted a rule nisi returnable at same date as that in Goodyer’scaae. The Court then rose.