NEW ZEALAND AND POLYNESIA

Globe, Volume I, Issue 49, 27 July 1874, Page 4

NEW ZEALAND AND POLYNESIA

Erom the memoranda, &c, on the subject of the South Sea Islands, laid on the table of the House, we quote the following : SUGGESTED ACTION OF NEW ZEALAND IN RELATION TO POLYNESIA. I have never felt any desire to sec New Zealand constituted an independent State. On the contrary, it has been a hope I have long cherished, that the British possessions would, in the course of time, be consolidated into a mighty dominion, and the British Colonies become, not dependencies, but integral and inseparable parts of an empire owning a naval force so irresistible as to practically afford to its outlying portions full and ample security from the effects of any wars of other nations.

Still, I have not been able to disguise from myself, that were New Zealand independent, she would not have stayed her hand from attempting to civilise, and to attach to her peaceful connection, the islands of the Pacific: JMevv Zealand’s natural relations to the islands may, to some extent, be gauged from the fact that the country was peopled from the islands adjacent to Australia ; whilst so far as I am aware, there is no trace of the islanders having established themselves in any part of the island continent. It is remarkable how the prevailing winds make New Zealand and the islands mutually accessible. They proclaim New Zealand as the natural head-quarters of Polynesia,

It is singular how Polynesia is being divided. It would seem to those who think of the enterprise of Great Britain in earlier days, when colonisation, in the absem e of modern facilities, was infinitely more difficult than at present, that the country which 270 years ago acquired Barbadoes would not suffer the fertile islands of the Pacific to escape her. The late Admiral Washington, in a letter to the Colonial office, in 1850, wrote :“I have been much struck by the entire want, by Great Britain, of any advanced position in the Pacific Ocean, We have valuable possessions on either side, as at Yancouvers and Sydney, but not an islet or a rock in the 7000 miles of ocean that separate them. The Panama and Sydney mail communication is likely to be established, yet we have no island on which to place a coaling station and where we could insure fresh supplies .... and it may hereafter be found very inconvenient that England should be shut out from any station in the Pacific, and that an enemy should have possession of Tongatabu, where there is a good harbor, within a few hundred miles of the track of our homeward-bound gold ships from Sydney and Melbourne. Neither forts nor batteries would be necessary to hold the ground. A single cruising ship would suffice for all the wants of the islands. Coral reefs and the hearty good will of the natives would do the rest.” Meanwhile, the islands of the Pacific have been objects of attraction to other countries, Holland, Spain, and France, and recently the United States and Germany, have not disguised their interest in them. To these nations they have been attractive chiefly as convict and naval stations, excepting to Holland, which apparently regards them from a commercial point of view. Great Britain, which might look upon them from four stand points, —Ist. As naval stations. 2nd. As important to the preservation and safety of her Australian possessions. 3rd. In order to preserve them from becoming convict stations. 4th. On account of their commercial importance—has stood aloof. She is now, probably, on the point of taking some responsibility in respect to Fiji ; but it has, in many ways, been almost forced upon her. She is indifferent to the Navigator or Samoan Islands becoming an American dependency, although she knows they arc being so constituted because of the excellent harbor they possess, their commanding position, and their splendid capabilities.

On the other hand, Great Britain has entered on a herculean task, in undertaking the repression of slavery in the southern seas. This is a work which, under present conditions, will not grow less. The expense is not temporary. Let the islands continue as at present, and the repression of slavery in the south seas means such an inducement to those who arc successful in the trade so as to couple with the efforts to check slavery an encouragement to promote it, and make necessary large moans of repression. It is hopeless, however, to expect Great Britain to take possession of all unoccupied Polynesia ; and the problem which I have considered is—Can New Zealand do anything ? Politically, she cannot ; but she can do much if it be conceded that to such countries as these islands, the influences of civilisation and commerce will stand as substitutes, if not ultimately lead to the flag and the dominion. In fine, it seems to me that New Zealand may earn for reluctant Great Britain—without committing her to responsibilities she fears —a grand" island dominion; may, in the meanwhile, save the mother country much trouble, and danger, and risk. I speak, of course, of the danger and risk of expenditure. which weigh so much with the rulers of Great Britain ; and when the result is secured, and the commerce established, it may be recognised that New Zealand, the colony, has done a useful work for Great Britain, the Empire. In this work, all aid and countenance, or even tacit permission, have been denied to New Zealand.

The plan which I am about to develop arose in ray mind in this way ; Mr Coleman Phillips, who had aided in arranging for the establishment of a bank in Fiji, addressed to me a communication, in wliich he suggested the establishment of a company, which, like the East India Company, should endeavor politically and commercially to gain ascendancy in the Pacific Islands. I was much struck with the idea ; but when Mr Phillips asked me if I would advise him to go home to endeavor to float the company, I felt that he would have great difficulty in raising the capital. It then occurred to me, from the New Zealand point of view, from which I felt bound to look at it, that Mr Phillips’s project, supposing it matured, might or might not be worked in a manner calculated to be of much benefit to New Zealand.

I then asked myself, was it not worth the while of New Zealand to secure the charge of the great work, by enabling the capital to be raised. What I have already written will suggest the answer the query met with in my mind. I recognised that New Zealand should make the effort, and the following is the course I advise :

A company to be formed, on the share capital of which New Zealand to give a guarantee of 5 per cent interest for fifty years. I estimate that this would secure the necessary capital with facility. The company to purchase, if procurable, the leading factories and estates already existent in the chief islands, and to establish others of its own ; to acquire laud, and assist suitable persons, with capital and means, on condition that the produce bo sold to the company at agreed prices ; to aid the missionaries to civilise and endeavor to encourage native industry by agreements with the chiefs.

I need not here more minutely particularise the nature of the company’s operations. I have described them in a memorandum to his Excellency, which is attached. It will be sufficient now to add that I propose the company should, by its immense resources, do all it can to develop, and to absorb, the trade and produce of the islands. I do not propose that the company should be more than a commercial one, and, therefore, it is no part of my proposition that it should confine its operations to the islands unannexod to foreign countries ; on the contrary, it seems to me, for example, that the company’s operations would be heartily welcomed by the French at Tahiti and New Caledonia.

The returns I propose New Zealand should exact for its guarantee arc certain conditions, such as— (a.) That the company should carry the produce of the islands to New Zealand, and should ship from New Zealand its sir plies to the Islands. (//.) lioyalty to be paid on all produce procured by the compai y from the and also a royalty on

supplies, other than those of New Zealand produce and manufacture sent to the Islands. (r.) The establishment of manufactories in New Zealand, to utilise the Island products, such as sugar refineries, cotton mills, paper mills, See. (d.) Affording encouragement to New Zealand product ions and manufactures, by shipping to the Islands—live stock, and such articles, produced or prepared in the colony, as grain, flour, preserved meats, beer, rope, fabrics of various kinds, glass, reduced iron, coal, agricultural machinery, biscuits, boots and shoes, butter, cheese, hams and bacon, fish dried and pickled, candles, soap, cordage, sawn timber, doors and sashes, shingles, and cotton and woollen fabrics, (e.) The establishment of steam communication constantly between the different Islands and New Zealand ports from North to South. I allude to these conditions sparingly, and do not state the relative importance I attach to them, because I am now dealing with th n matter from the twofold position of the two parties to the bargain. When a number of gentlemen place themselves in a position to negotiate, I shall be able to develop the view of the Government, as they will that of the company. As nearest to the work, I think the headquarters of the company should be in Auckland ; but its works, and factories, and steamers should be in all parts of the colony. It should have directors in all the provinces, who should possess a certain power of local action. They should periodically meet at some central place—say Wellington. |The managing director in the colony and at home should be appointed by the Government, to secure the fulfilment of the company’s obligations to the colony. I may add, I consider that Mr Phillips’s share in the project entitles him to substantial compensation. I can hardly be more explicit until, as representing the Government, I am able to treat with those who represent the company ; and for obvious reasons I abstain from setting forth the many already established businesses, connections, lands, and factories which I believe the company might, without difficulty, at once secure on favorable terms.

In conclusion, I may observe that I believe the company will be a great success; and that the shareholders, secure of five per cent as their minimum profit, may reasonably count on very much larger returns. On the other hand, it seems to me difficult to exaggerate the advantages to New Zealand, and through New Zealand to the empire, from this proposal. It will make New Zealand a great manufacturing and a great shipping country. It will stimulate the people of the colony to the exercise of that hardy enterprise which has done so much to build up the character of Great Britain and its people. The productions of the Islands, and the demand from the Islands for manufactures and supplies from temperate climates, must be borne in mind when it is attempted to realise the results.

The advantage to Great Britain of dealing with one powerful corporation, in lieu of with those who now ennoble or degrade the Island trade, is sufficiently apparent. Supposing the Government to make a satisfactory arrangement with a body of gentlemen determined to work out the concession, I think such arrangement might properly be submitted to Parliament for ratification. I attach copy of a memorandum on the subject, addressed to his Excellency some mouths since, Julius Vogel. Wellington, February 5, 1874.

I avail myself of your Excellency’s invitatatiou to put into written shape the representation I have had the honor to personally make to you on the subject of the South Sea Islands,

1. The unsettled state of the South Sea Islands, especially the uncertainty which hangs over their future, is calculated to cause considerable uneasiness to the neighbouring colonies. 2. Intimately identified as the future of these colonies will be with the Imperial country, of which I am of opinion it is their ambition to remain dependencies, they cannot regard without anxiety the disposition evinced by some foreign nations to establish a footing in their neighbourhood, amongst the islands of the South Pacific. 3. In New Zealand there is a strong feeling that the geograpical position of the colony, the prevailing winds, the shipping facilities, and other causes, ought to enable its inhabitants to develop large commercial relations with the Islands.

4. The conditions to be met, appear to be —(«.,) To prevent, by anticipatory action, the establishment of European communities with lawless tendencies, such as have been displayed in Fiji. (h.) To develop the selfgoverning aptitudes of the Polynesian natives. (c.) To encourage them to labor, and to realise the advantages which labor confers, {cl. ) To stimulate the production of the islands. ( e .) Without bloodshed or embroilment with other nations, to gradually introduce a uniform Government organisation throughout Polynesia. 5. To stop the traffic in forced labor, more is required than mere force and vigilance. As long as Her Majesty’s vessels are engaged as at present, they no doubt offer a check to labor traffic ; but they also make the profits of the traffic larger, and thus evidently encourage it. To permanently stop forced labor, there must be opportunities available to free labor.

G. Your Excellency is aware that I have felt much interest in a proposal made by Mr Phillips, that a trading company should be formed in England, with the view of absorbing by its commercial power a large share of political control in the islands. The object proposed by Mr Phillips, excepting that of a chartered labor traffic, I approved ; and your Excellency, I believe, communicated the substance of Mr Phillips’s ideas to the Secretary of State. I ’havc since thought very carefully over the matter, and there are two points in respect to Sir Phillips’s proposal which seem to me to require serious consideration, and without providing for which I am not certain the proposed company might not lend itself to retard, instead of to advance, the civilisation of the islands. Those points are—(l.) That in order to obtain the necessary capital, every consideration besides that of the mere acquirement of profit might have to be abandoned. (3.) That Mr Phillips’s proposal does not provide that amount of direct and powerful Governmental control which in my opinion should be s'ipulated for, in the interest of the helpless Natives.

T iking all these cbcumstances into consider ition, and not f( rgetting that New Zealan 1, by assuming tin large responsibilities proposed, would have the right to the continge d advantages the island trade will confer,

I am inclined to recommend — (a). That New Zealand should encourage the formation of a powerful company to colonise the islands of the South Pacific, by offering a guarantee of five per cent for forty years on the share capital. ( h .) That the Government of New Zealand should appoint the managing director and secretary here and the managing director in London. (c.) The object of the company to be to civilise and settle the South Sea Islands by opening up profitable production and trade in connection with them. ( d .) The company to establish factories and plantations at different islands, and to acquire by purchase some already established. (<?.) To acquire lauds, and let the same on terms calculated to promote production. ( f .) To arrange with chiefs to cultivate produce, and to dispose of it on agreed terms, (y.) To supply live stock and merchandise to the Islands, (h.) To lend money and give assistance to settlers to establish plantations, (i.) To open up steam communication between the different Islands, and between them and New Zealand. (;'.) To discourage the removal of Islanders from their homes for labor purposes, by affording them occupation on their own Islands, or on Islands adjacent. The Government of New Zealand to stipulate, in return for guarantee: — (a,) That the company give facilities and reasonable pecuniary aid to the missionaries. (&.) That whilst affording inducements to free labor, the company abstain from employing forced labor. (c .) The company to own at least six steamers between the Islands, and between the Islands and New Zealand; and to fix the time so that New Zealand shall be in communication with the principal Islands at intervals of not more than a month. ( d .) The company to establish in New Zealand at least one cotton factory, at least one woollen factory, and at least one sugar refinery. ( c .) That all the produce the company obtain at the Islands, or which is obtained from the lands of the company, be forwarded to New Zealand, (f.) That all goods sent by the company to the Islands be shipped from New Zealand, (y.) That on all produce the company pay the Government of New Zealand five per cent, royalty, (h.) That on all goods shipped to the Islands, other than those the product or manufacture of New Zealand, the company pay a royalty of seven and a-half per cent. 7. The ultimate object which I have in view is, the establishment of the Polynesian Islands as one Dominion, with New Zealand the centre of Government; the Dominion, like Canada, to be a British dependency. 8. I venture to think that these proposals, if carried out, would save Great Britain large expense in connection with the repression of slavery, whilst the Imperial prestige in the South Pacific would be maintained. Julius Vogel, Christchurch, 22nd November, 1873.

After conferring with several gentlemen on the subject of this memorandum, I agreed with Mr Whitaker that he should act with a few promoters, and draw up the heads of an agreement, to be put into shape by the Attor-ney-General, if approved by the Cabinet, and then to be subject to the ratification of Parliament.

I conceded, after along discussion, the condition imposing a royalty on the shipments of the company. I substituted for it a condition binding the company to repay, out of profits, any payments made by the Government, and impounding all profits for that purpose; secondly, a power by which the Government can intervene in the case of the business of the company not being carried on efficiently. I agreed to this change, because I found that everyone to whom I had spoken was of opinion that the royalty would shut out the company from much business which might otherwise be profitable ; and because I believe, irrespective of the contingent advantages the colony will gain, that it is sufficiently secured against any loss arising from the guarantee, by the provision making such guarantee a lieu on future profits. Julius Vogel. Wellington, February 28, 1874.