The Gisborne Times PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1907. THE CRUISE OF THE AM.EWICAN MEET.

Gisborne Times, Volume XXV, Issue 2055, 5 December 1907, Page 2

The Gisborne Times PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1907. THE CRUISE OF THE AM.EWICAN MEET.

Lt lias generally been considered that the action of President Roosevelt iu arranging for a cruise of the American fleet to Pacific waters avas a direct result- of the conflict between the Californians and the Japanese. Few accepted very seriously the assurance of the President that it was intended merely as a training voyage, a statement which could easily be taken as the kind of diplomatic utterance with which the high officials of modern nations profess to veil their actual intentions. However, there is another besides the popular side to the question, and the London “Spectator” presents "in a plausible manner the view that- it is by accident and not by design 'that the United States warships will be in Pacific waters at a time when relations between that nation and Japan are somewhat strained. Our contemporary says :

T,o begin with, there is'no doubt that Mr. Roosevelt has long comtemplated tj)is cruise to the Pacific. He had thought of it before the Asiatic labor crisis became acute. V llien we speak of Mr. Roosevelt as having contemplated it, we do not forget itha.t every decision in naval affairs -must come from the Navy Depantliient, and that this very cruise was recommended by the Naval War. College a year -ago; but Mr. Roosevelt himself is. so notoriously tho head and front of American naval policy that it is not an impropriety ito look upon him as the final cause of an important step of this sort. Mr. Roosevelt wants a larger Navy, because he considers it to- he Hie logical consequence of the choice the United States made when she ome-r----•ged from her seclusion and began to play her pant as a great and active influence in lyorld-politics. ’V 1 1 h - out a Navy,” we may imagine him saying, “we have no material power of argument for good.” No-w, Mr. RiooseveLt sees that when a Navy of some sort (tho size not yet hoing postulated) lias lie-como an admitted need, two things are essential from tho point of view of those who, like himself, wish to have a largo instead of a small Navy. First, the Fleet must ho a sea-going Fleet, because there never yet was an efficient navy in the history of -the world that did not keen the seas for long periods, whereas there have been plenty of inefficient navies that spent long periods in harbor; and secondly, the Fleet must impress itself upon the imagination of the American people. The people cannot be expected to nay eagerly for something that has not- become to them either am attraction or an obviously necessary weapon. For a combined purpose, them, the voyage round the Horn was chosen. It was chosen because it is, if wo may put it bo,- one of the most arduous and picturesque voyages that a fleet, ill •being can undertake, and also because it lends in the end to an American coast which has always received much less attention from the Navy than the Atlantic coast has received. We would not allow more weight to the fact of the destination than to the character of the voyage itself. After all, Mr. Roosevelt ought to know the purpose of the cruise better than anyone, and he clearly stated in his recent speech •at St. Louis that it was intended as a sea-going training. The Fleet, ho said, “after visiting our home waters in the Pacific, will return to our home waters in the Atlantic.” All ove-r America people will follow- the movements of the Fleet; they a learn something of the intricate details of coaling and commissariat work under warlike conditions; and, in a word, tlieir attention will be aroused. -Next time Mr. Roosevelt or his representatives appeal to the country for new battleships, they will do so to people whose minds -have been influenced one way or the other. The naval programme will not have stood still. We are sure t-liat, apart from procuring the 'effieienev of -the existing hleet, that is the aim which Mr. Roosevelt lias hi .mind. He has a policy which projects itself far into tlie future, but .it is an entire misreading of it to suppose that it is aimed narrowly and definitely at any single Power. It is, i-.u brief, a policy, not a threat. Of course, if the Mikado’s advisors can be per'suaded to take 'a similarly generous view of President Roosevelt’s intentions, the cruise will amount to nothing more than a very interesting naval voyage, the

progress of which will he keenly watched iii all pants of the world. On the other hand there must he reckoned with the Opposition party in Japanese politics and the “yellow” •press of America, both of which are doing their best to inflame the popular minds in order to prejudice the positions ol Lhoso in power. Given a certain set of circumstances it takes lititle to rouse a people to a condition where they will demand war, and if Japan's finances were in better shape than is actually the .ease, all the assurances in. the world of tlio innocence of the American navy's cruise would probably not prevent the little yellow nation Irons accepting it as a direct challenge to >i trial of strength.