THE LICENSING LAW.

Gisborne Times, Volume XXV, Issue 2065, 27 April 1907, Page 1

THE LICENSING LAW.

DEFINITION OF LICENSED PREMISES.

An appeal involving the question of what is included in the term

“licensed premises” "in heard by Mr Justice Cooper in Banco at Auckland.

Constable lleddek. of Thames, appealed from a decision of Mr. S Bush, S.M., in the case of the police v Victor Bowdler. who was charged with having been found on the licensed promises of the Cornwall Aims Hotel when such premises were required by law to be*closed. Mr. Tole, for the appellant, said the respondent admitted having been i-i the yaid of the hotel. It was denied that lie was there for the purpose of committing a breach of the Licensing Act. ’Pile Magistrate dis missed the case upon the ground that the yard w.as not included in the definition of “licensed premises” under the licensing law, and that the house was all that was specified in a license. Mr. Tole argued that the Magistrate was obviously wrong, for although the Act of 190-1 dealt with licensed premises, but gave no definition, lie overlooked the fact that the Licensing Act of .1881 gave a clear definition as to what ‘‘licensed premises” meant, showing that a yard was included. His Honor said he need not go further that the New Zealand statutes to allow the appeal. He agreed with Mr. Tole that the Act of 1881. and its definition of “licensed premises” implied. That definition included “every room, building, closet, cellar, skittle ground, stable, outhouse, or any other place whatsoever appertaining to such house or place. When a license was issued bv the Li . censing Committee, it included necessarily all matters which were referred to in the definition of section 4 of the Act of 1881. It would be absurd to say that if an innkeeper iicrniitte.il drunkenness in his yard or stable that lie would not he liable under the Licensing Act. He referred the matter hack to the Magistrate, with a direction that the ground of dismissal was wrong in law, hut that, if the Magistrate was satisfied that the respondent was upon the premises with a reasonable e.x•.u.isp, then lie ought to dismiss the prosecution. Seeing that tlie respondent had not opposed the appeal, he would not allow costs.