The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES" GISBORNE, TUESDAY, OCT. 20, 1942. PACIFIC CONFLICT

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 20919, 20 October 1942, Page 2

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES" GISBORNE, TUESDAY, OCT. 20, 1942. PACIFIC CONFLICT

Because the principal operations in the Pacific are at the moment concentrated in the Solomons area there is a tendency to take a narrow view of the conflict. This is natural and understandable. .In the first place, most of the current ne\vs . is : focused on this particular, -.theatre and, secondly, so much emphasis has been placed upon the vital importance of the Solomons to Pacific strategy as a whole. It is imperatively ’ necessary, however, if anything like a correct picture is to be obtained that the situation should be viewed in the widest perspective. The week-end appears to have brought with it a spasm of the “jitters” in regard to the Solomons. Just why, it is difficult' to see, because there is nothing apparent in the factual situation to occasion increased anxiety,, although, of course, concern must continue to be felt until the whole Pacific position takes a more favourable turn for the Allies. So far, nothing has occurred in the Solomons area that was not expected; indeed, the most unexpected thing is that Japanese action has been so long delayed. In August they were deprived of their most valuable base in the southern Pacific. It was inevitable that they should attempt to recapture it and it is that attempt which is now being launched with a great deal of vigour. The importance of the Solomons has been stressed, but it should be remembered that they are far more vital to the Japanese than to the Allies." Without then}, the Japanese not only cannot continue their advance but they are also threatened with an Allied offensive. They age a keypoint in Japan’s whole Pacific campaign. The main object of the Allied occupation—apart from the value of tpe islands as a jumping-off place—is to deny the use of the base to the enemy. Already they have deprived him of it for more than two months—and two months in a war in which time is such an important factor is a valuable gain. If the worst comes to the worst and the islands are again lost—and there Is as yet no reason to anticipate that—even their temporary occupation will have been a valuable Allied success. In the meantime, the Allies retain t'heir somewhat precarious hold on the islands. The Jap- ’ anpse, however, are making a prodigious concentration of force in this area and it is possible that if they are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices the venture will succeed. Whether such a result would justify the cost, however, is another matter. Meanwhile, despite the strength of the opposition, the Allies seem to be 'holding their own and it will be time enough to despair when the tables are turned. Now to look for a moment at the broader aspect of the situation. The Solomon Islands, vital though they may be, are only a few small specks in the vast Pacific Ocean. In order to concentrate their attack on these islands the Japanese have been compelled to abandon nearly every other venture in their vast battle area. They are withdrawing from New Guinea, retreating in China, and at least are on the defensive in the Aleutians and are threatened with an Allied offensive in Burma. The Japanese threat is now confined to the Solomons, but the Japanese ar§ threatened at almost every point on the vast perimeter of the circle in which they are confined. It is almost incredible, if they elect to sacrifice everything else in order to concentrate, against the Solomons, that they should not succeed, but what would it profit them to gain the Solomons at heavy cost and at the price. of losses elsewhere? There are some gains in war which can be too costly to be justified—the Solomons might be one of them—but again the point emerges that the Solomons , are so vital to the Japanese that they cannot afford to count the cost; for it hqs been rightly said that unless the Japanese can recapture this base they are faced with the prospect of losing the whole Pacific war. The Japanese are concentrating everything on the Solomons. What of the Allies? It would not be correct to say that they regard the Solomons as a minor issue, but it is true that they view it as only one of the many fronts in the Pacific. In the south Pacific alone the Allies are maintaining a heavy air offensive against every Japanese base within reach and are almost daily inflicting heavy loss on the enemy. They are attacking him from the air in Burma, in China, and in the Aleutians as well. Japan’s attack, is confined to the Solomons. The inference Is obvious. Already the Allied striking power is greater than that of the Japanese who are largely compelled to concentrate on 'defending their gains. And what of sea-power, in regard to which there has been a studied silence? It would be unwise, perhaps, to build too many immediate hopes on the invisible American fleet, but there is one point that deserves to be emphasised: There has not been one word to suggest that an American warship 'has been in action since the first Solornons battle early in August. On the other hand, there is concrete evidence that the Japanese navy has suffered heavy damage from air attack in the intervening months. This means that the balance of naval power is shifting moire and more in favour of the Allies and in the final analysis it is naval power which will decide the war in the Pacific,