AMERICAN PLANES

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 20919, 20 October 1942, Page 3

AMERICAN PLANES

CRITICAL SURVEY HIGH CLASS BOMBERS FIGHTERS’ INFERIORITY (By Telegraph—Press Assn.—Copyright.) (11 a.m.) WASHINGTON, Oct. 19. Giving a warning that in the coming months battles may be lost and crushing defeats suffered, the Office of War Information, in a 10,000-word report to the public, designed to dispel the fog of confusion concerning the American planes, said the truth lies between the two extremes of adverse and favourable criticism. The report specifically said tnal the Curtiss P4O, Tomahawks, Bell P 39, Airacobras, and Psl Mustang standard fighters have many good points but are definitely inferior to the foreign types in high altitude combat. Improved types were in production but had not yet been tested in battle. The chief fault of the American fighters is the tardy and incomplete development of the Allison liquidcooled motor. For daylight precision bombing, the Flying Fortress Bl7’s and Liberator B24’s were unsurpassed. Our medium bombers, Mitchell B2s’s and Martin B26’s have no competitors. The latest Navy fighter, dive-bomber and torpedo types already in action are the best carrier planes in the world. The other types of patrol, reconnaissance, cargo transport and fire-spotters hre satisfactory in quality within their own fields. The report stressed that only results in battle provide valid standards of criticism. No full appraisal was possible until the war was won. Choice of Better Weapons The alternate superiority of the United States and Britain in various types gave the United Nations as a team a better choice of weapons than the enemy, the report declared. The United States aircraft industry and services were steadily developing specialised aircraft of high and, in some cases, sensational promise of battle performance. The report stated that the recent air victories, especially in the southwestern Pacific, may have resulted primarily from specialised tactical situations which will not always be so favourable. It contained a warning of possible coming defeats and said: “When we meet reverses and the pull to victory seems to grow long and hard, the Americans will do well if they indulge to the full their genius for critical sell-analysis.” While asserting that America had lagged in developing high-altitude fighter planes, the report said they were valuable weapons in Russia and North Africa, where they were needed at relatively low altitudes. The report pointed out that in China where the American Volunteer Group flew P4o’s, with the aid of excellent Chinese air-raid warning systems, they destroyed 218 Japanese planes v/ith the loss of 44 American, but in the February raid on Darwin eight out of 10 P4o’s were shot down by the Japanese, mostly because of the lack of warning. Likewise, in the Philippines, army craft were hampered because the air-raid warning system was disrupted by “fifth columnists” before it had once functioned. Lack of Warning Facilities Falling back continuously on inadequate fields and inadequate facilities all through the Japanese drive to the south-west Pacific, the P.4o’s performance was decidedly less than standard. Stressing the importance of an adequate warning system to the successful operation of combat planes the report said that as the battle of the Philippines wore southward, there was often none at all. “Furthermore, American fighter pilots lacked technical equipment and detectors to prepare for the enemy’s approach,” says the report. “Often the first notice came when the enemy planes were sighted. If our fighters were already in the air they had a fair chance' of getting up and battling with the enemy. More often they had to wait for the enemy to come down to them and then slug it out.” The air-raid wa.|;ing system employed in China by Brigadier-General Chennault’s Flying Tigers was one of the finest in the world. The report added that it must be repeated that all credit did not go to the pilots of the planes; a great part was due to the warning system. “In the vital European theatre, an appraisal of the P. 39 and P. 49 compels the conclusion that they are not right for operation under to-day s highaltitude tactics. In England two of the newer fighter types, the twinengined Lockheed P. 38 Lightning and the single-engined Republic P. 47 Thunderbolt are in production . and show great promise as high-altitude pursuit planes. Yet the public should be warned that neither plane is a complete answer to the fighter problem and probably no plane ever will be. Discussing supremacy within their own fields of the Flying Fortress and Liberator bombers, the report disputes the claims of superiority sometimes made for the Lancaster bomber, which carries a heavier bomb load because it is designed to fly lower and carry less gasoline. American planes stripped for the same job could easily increase their bomb-load. Liauid-Cooled Engine Lags While American air-cooled engines are generally regarded as the world peers, the report said the only liquidcooled engine of American design now in mass production and in general military use is the Allison. Its development, starting late, was carried out under great difficulties, and had not yet caught up with the opposite numbers of Britain's Rolls Royce and Germany’s Daimler Benz. In reaching for the ideal air force, the United States was hampered by the impossibility of anticipating the specific demands of war and also had been hamstrung by disagreement in its own fighting services as to the weight and power to be wielded by air power. Despite this, the United States went to the war with a well integrated air force, not all distributed with the maximum effect. “The prime specification for United States aeroplanes was the defence of our shores. This, more than, any other factor, explains our pre-occupation with long-range bombers. This practically explains the failure to develop a good interceptor capable of climbing rapidly at short notice. Our entry into the war without such valuable equipment is explicable only by failure to give consideration to the possibility of full American participation in aerial warfare overseas. Subsidiary explanations are the shortage of development funds in peace-time years and the prevalent public faith that the United States could avoid involvement in a foreign war. In the vast revision of ideas and of design since the war began in Europe, the United States owes a vast debt to the Allies, particularly to the British and the lessons they brought to America from the battlefields.