The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, WEDNESDAY, OCT, 14, 1942. SOLOMONS BATTLE?

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 20914, 14 October 1942, Page 2

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, WEDNESDAY, OCT, 14, 1942. SOLOMONS BATTLE?

Once again there comes a report from a roundabout source that a naval battle is in progress in the Solomons region. Last week, similar news came from the Rome radio which purported to relay a Japanese account of-severe Allied losses. This story, however, turned out to be a recapitulation of the events of early in August, when the Japanese were so thoroughly routed and driven from their strong 1 - holds iri the Solomons. Now it is the Paris radio which asserts that the rival naval forces have been engaged and adds that the i-esult's will be announced soon. This later report may, of course, be correct, but if so it seems strange that Tokio should consider it necessary to first release the news through pro-Axis sources. That there is some motive behind this propaganda is certain, but' just what jt is is a matter of conjecture. It may be an attempt by Japan to convince her Axis partners that she is still active in the Pacific, it may be designed to give Allied peoples the impression that important news is being withheld from them, or it may be merely another variation of the popular Axis war of nerves. The fact remains, however, that sooner or later there must be a major naval engagement in the Pacific, unless Japan is going to give up the fight—which is not at all likely.

When the United States forces made their spectacular and successful attack on the Solomons it was pointed out ttfat this was a major development in the struggle for control of the southwest Pacific and that the operations in New Guinea and elsewhere were rendered incidental to it. At the same time, .it was emphasised that, while the action was evidence of American offensive power, it could not he assumed that the fate of the Solomons htid been finally ' decided. On the contrary, it was clear that the islands were of such enormous strategical importance that the Japanese would have to risk everything in an attempt to recapture them. That view still holds good 'and there are some indications of Allied anxiety in regard to the position. The Japanese have been able to land some reinforcements on Guadalcanar, the key island of the group since it possesses the only aerodrome, and this is regarded in some quarters as a threat to the Allied occupation. The Japanese, however, are not the only ones who are able to land forces in this area, and the advantage should rest with the Allies—for, in theory, at least, this is a case where possession should be three parts of the battle. To dislodge a firmly entrenched force from such a ppint as this would require large land, sea,"and air forces. The question again comes back to sea and air-power—factors which remain a matter of speculation on bejh sides. A belated report issued

to-day discloses Jhat in the original Solomons battle the United States lost three cruisers in addition’ to the loss of two destroyers and four transports previously ' This Joss is a heavy one, but it is far’ from' disastrous for a nation which is launching new ships at an almost incredible rate. It is infinitely less serious than the losses sustained by the Japanese who, in the same battle, had 36 ships either sunk or damaged, and who have not the same facilities for replacement. In the air, the position is obviously even more favourable to the Allies. They have the advantage of good land bases—and not only in the Solomons—and have at least some aircraft carriers. The Japanese, on the other hand, have lost most of thencarriers and some of their most valuable land bases ‘have been rendered untenable. The ratio of losses in the air has been almost fantastically in favour of' the Allies.' their strength and striking power'is clearly growing enormously, and they have maintained an incessant attack bn Japanese bases, shipping, and supplies. On the other hand, 1 the Japanese have virtually been driven from the air.

Certainly there is nothing in the known circumstances to warrant concern at the situation or the prospects in this areal' 'At' 1 the-same ’time, it would be foolish ,to regard the battle as won or to view the situation with Complacency. The strategic position as a whole demands that Japan should risk everything'tb regain her hold in the the Japanese, more than most people perhaps, are prepared to take risks. Sooner or later they must embark upon some bold adventure in an-'endeavour to recover their lost ground'-tlncl lost prestige. Its chance of success will probably depend upon itS" Very boldness; " the chance ofv defeating 'it * will depend upon' Aided preparedness to meet it. There is no reason: "to assume that those : preparations have- not been made; indeed, they are probably far more extensive than iS generally realised, for the Allibd cohVmahd knows full well Just how much is involved in this particular'struggle. For th? Ji me being at - any rate,- the Vest -of the Pacific simply does not count, for the Whole of Japan’s plans rest bn success in this particular sector. For'her, defeat here means the da'nger of defeat everywhere and for this reason she must risk everything in an attempt to secure a victory.' For the same reason, the Aljib's must be prepared to risk everything else Ho ensure success in a battle that might decide the outcome of the whole Pacific war.