The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, TUESDAY, OCT, 13, 1942. TURN OF THE TIDE

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 20913, 13 October 1942, Page 2

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, TUESDAY, OCT, 13, 1942. TURN OF THE TIDE

In his comment at -Edinburgh on the recent speeches of the Nazi leaders, Mr. Churchiil directs attention to the fact that there was apparent in each ca?e an undercurrent of fear. It might almost be ssjjd that the dominant note was one- of anxiety for there was plainly discernible a tendency to whistle in order to keep the courage up. It might have been that the long silence at the Wilhelmstrasse 'Was due to 'the necessity of waiting for something to talk about, but the time came when explanations were so imperative that speech could not longer be delayed. Mr. Churchill’s analysis of those speeches serves to focus attention on their many weak points and to underline the evidences of concern in Germany at the progress, or lack of progress, in the conduct of the war. The plain fact is that Hitler and his cohorts have little, at the moment, of which to boast and they have been compelled, therefore, to create a smoke-screen in an endeavour to conceal the miscarriage of their plans. A similar aim can be discerned in the ill-treatment of prisoners of war, in the stern measures that have been taken against the peoples of the occupied territories, and in-, the threats that have been levelled against the German people themselves. These signs are all straws in the wind.

The Nazi plans have gone sadly awry. Until the last few weeks they were able to maintain the initiative in several important spheres; they had made a phenomenal advance in Russia, they had scored a spectacular victory in North Africa, and their submarine campaign was achieving an alarming measure of success. What is the position to-day? It is much too soon, of course, to be carried away by excessive optimism, but it does not seem premature to suggest that the tide has definitely turned. On the Russian front —which still remains the most important—the Germans have been halted and are threatened with the advent of winter before they have captured even the first of their major objectives of the present campaign. They have suffered losses Which are clearly disturbing to the people at home and they have secured nothing in compensation for them. Their armies are still held down in the vast expanse of Russia, compelled to fight on a long front, no point of which is really secure, and denied the spoils of which they are so urgently in need. The German leaders have sought to cover up the position by a good deal of grandiose talk of the production on the home front and in occupied territory, but no amount of talk can conceal the very real anxiety regarding the question of supplies. In Egypt, the second claw of the pincers designed in Berlin to close on the Caucasus and Asia Minor, there is a similar story. It has not been possible to consolidate the gains mnde a few months ago. On the contrary, there is evidence of growing German anxiety and increasing Allied confidence. The latter springs largely from the notable successes which have been achieved in air attacks on German lines of communications and the clear proof of Allied supremacy in the air generally in this theatre. A further instance is given to-day in the report of the losses suffered by the Axis forces in the large-scale raid on Malta, in which they lost 15 machines against one by the Allies. Incidentally. this raid may indicate other possible developments in the Mediterranean or may be a measure of the anxiety Malta is to the Axis. In recent weeks there has been a paucity of news of the Battle of the Atlantic, but this is a case where no news is good news. A few weeks ago, Germany, no doubt perturbed at the lack of U-boat successes, was constrained to manufacture a story about the sinking of a troop convoy. The fact that she is compelled to manufacture fictitious claims of this description is, perhaps, the best evidence that in the Atlantic, too, the tide is running against her. Germany is on the eve of her fourth winter of war. The point is significant, /*.

for she had planned for a short war and knew that she, would have to rely largely on h&r reserve stocks of many essential commodities. Such offensive power as she still retains has lost its sting. Her main armies in Russia are exhausted and there is more than a suspicion that the supplies and reinforcements upon which they are dependent have been gravely depleted. The question now arises, therefore, as to whether she can recover the initiative. And what of the other side. British policy all along has been to prepare for a long war, to build up her production, and to conserve he'?’ energies until she can strike with telling effect. She still has to reach the peak of her power—without allowing for the enormous growth of American production—while that of Germany is already on the wane. So far. her offensive operations have largely been confined to attacks from the air —and even now there is scant recognition of the part these attacks are playing in crippling German production and distribution and in undermining the morale of the German people. They are only a foretaste of Allied offensive power, of the turning of the • tide which will sweep everything before it in the relentless march to victory.