JAPAN'S STRATEGY

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 20875, 29 August 1942, Page 5

JAPAN'S STRATEGY

NEW LANDING SQLOMONS COUNTER POSSIBILITIES REVIEWED {By Telegraph—Press Assn. —Copyright.) (Special Australian Correspondent.) (3.15 a.m;) SYDNEY, Aug. 28. “The Japanese attempt to take Milne Bay, in New Guinea, cannot be divorced from the action in the Solomons,” writes the Sydney Morning Herald’s war correspondent. “If our forces in the Solomons go on to other successes and recapture the whole gzoup, Milne Bay would be useless tr. the Japanese and any garrison they might establish there would be cut oil'. On the other hand, if they successfully countered our move in the Solomons, the possession of, Milne Bay would add tremendously to the strength'of their grip in the southwest Pacific.” ■ 'However, it is by no means certain that the enemy will succeed in taking Milne Bay. Even should they gain an initial success they will have difficulty in holding it without strong air protection. There are no topographical obstacles, excepting lakes and rivers between Milne Bay and Port Moresby along the southern New Guinea coast. . Restricted Forces The scale of land fighling at present taking place at Milne Bay is not known, but it is expected here that the next 48 hours will decide “whether the Japanese have sent a boy to do a man’s job.” The general picture of the newest enemy expedition suggests that the .restricted forces landing at Milne Bay might be intended. to “soften” the area for a larger invasion force at a later date. The threat to Port.Moresby, now emphasised; (.would then become grave. The., "difficulty of dislodging the Japanese once they have landed is pointed out by the Sydney Daily Telegraph, which says: “Invariably once they hit the cover of the jungle the Japanese are difficult to root out. They have proved this in the Kokoda area. Their, limpet-like regard for even minor gains makes them hard even for a superior force .to dislodge.” The advantages of Milne Bay to the enemy are assessed as being, firstly, a gain in pos'fion for the Solomons struggle, which the Japanese must expect to grow in intensity; secondly, to ensure control of Torres Strait, discounting the protective value of Port Moresby to the Allies; and, thirdly, to place long-range enemy planes, both land-based and water craft, within close striking distance of the Australian mainland. Japan Saving “Face" “Face” is not the least important of Japan’s reasons for seeking a quick naval decision in the Solomons and for the fresh offensive moves, declares Major Fielding Eliot, the New York Herald-Tribune military commentator, analysing Japan’s motives for counterattacking. He says that our successful attack 'in the Solomons undoubtedly had a great effect on all Oriental people, among whom Japanese propaganda has been busy representing that Japanese invincibility is superior to all Westerners. Further, Japanese needs in theatres, such as a contemplated attack oh Russia or India, may call for a quick reversal of the situation in the Solomons. “The Japanese niay feel that our lodgment in the Solomons, obviously only the first step of an offensive directed against enemy bases in New Guinea and New Britain, must be eliminated before they have a free hand for a major effort elsewhere,” he says. “If the Japanese have decided to risk the whole or a major part of their fleet in an attempt to recover the lost ground in the Solomons, their .decision has been reached after carefully weighing all the factors.”