The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, MONDAY, JAN. 12, 1942. CHINA STRIKES BACK

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 20661, 12 January 1942, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, MONDAY, JAN. 12, 1942. CHINA STRIKES BACK

It is oilji natural, perhaps, that in fortunes of war in the Pacific most attention should be directed towards the Japanese advances against British, American and Dutch territory. Apart from any other factor, it is here that the latest developments have occurred and here that so much appears to be at stake. Again, however, it must bn pointed out that whatever gains japan might make in Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, or the Philippines will avail her nothing unless she can actually defeat the strong combination of Powers arrayed against her —and that will require no mean feat of arms. Any cunning sneak thief can get away with the spoils for the time being, but the hardest part of his. task is to retain possession of them in the face of the forces of law and order. So it is with Japan. By the methods she has adopted she has secured some temporary successes, and may secure more., but she has as much chance of retaining her spoils as the criminal has of permanently defying the law. There is an old spying about giving a thief enough rope and he will hang himself. Japan is at present acquiring the rope and, in due course, it will be put to its proper purpose. In other words, what at present appear to be Japanese gains may yet prove to be the very things that will be the undoing of Japan. To appreciate this point it is necessary to turn from the operations in the Pacific proper to the activities in China. China was the first Power of the ABCD group to be involved in hostilities with Japan and because the war in China has been in progress for four and a-half years there is a tendency to take developments on the mainland as a matter of course and to focus attention on the other Pacific theatres. China, however, is destined to play an important part in deciding the war in the Pacific —far more important, perhaps, than is generally realised. Contrary to general expectations, the Pacific war has become a land war —although transport by sea inevitably,is a vital factor—and in the operations on land China can play a greater psift than all the other Allied Powers together. She is playing this part to the full at the present time. Indeed, one of «the encouraging features of the new alliance was the speed with which the Chinese forces came into action for the purpose of relieving the Japanese pressure in other directions.: Japan certainly cannot afford to ignore China, her original enemy. It follows, however, that the more regard she is compelled to pay to the operations on the mainland the fewer forces she will have available for her adventures, further afield in other spheres. That the Chinese army is anything but a negligible force is clear from its successful resistance to the Japanese. True, it has been compelled «o surrender a good dbal of territory ■f-even as the Russians have done more recently—but it has never lost Its cohesion or its striking force. On the contrary it has steadily been creating a modern army that has been patiently waiting its chance to strike back. That chance came when Japan became preoccupied in other directions. Over a 2000-mile front the Chinese went into action, offensives being launched from Mongolia in the north to Burma in the south. Last week’s battle for Changsha is an indication of what the Chinese can do. Confronted by a Japanese force 50 per cent, larger than

their own they have annihilated three-fifths,- or more than 70,000 of the attacking forces. For the fourth time this key Chinese city has survived a Chinese onslaught, and for the second time, at least, the Japanese have walked into a carefully prepared trap and suffered one of the most severe reverses of recent years. Japan cannot afford to ignore this drain on her fighting power, especially as it comes just at the time when all her strength is required, but, what is even more important, she cannot afford to abandon her costly operations in China. . t The Japanese campaigns in Hong Kong, the Philippines, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies have met with unexpectedly stubborn resistance from comparatively small forces; the Japanese themselves have boasted that the odds in Malaya were thirty to one in their favour. So far they have made relatively little progress although they had the advantages of surprise, of numerical superiority, and of almost unchallenged possession of the south China Sea. The element of surprise has already disappeared and supremacy at sea is likely to be challenged in the very near future. To maintain her numerical superiority Japan will almost inevitably have to call on forces at present in China or destined to fill the gaps on the mainland. This is the problem which China now presents to her. Just at the moment wheri Japan has so many other commitments, China is probably approaching the zenith of her power. If Japan is to succeed in her southward drive she must weaken her forces in China—it would be absurd to suggest that she has not used every effort to subjugate the Chinese —and if she shows any weakening in China the Chinese may be depended upon to take full advantage of it. There are indications that China is at last coming into her own, that she is about to reap the reward of her courageous resistance, and victory for her will mean victory for her allies and the defeat of the Japanese.