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BID FOR VICTORY

PLANS OF THE NAZIS OFFENSIVE IN SPRING MASS-ATTACK PLAN LONDON, Dec. 20. When the German plan for an offensive on the Western Front fizzled out and the High Command rejected plans to invade Holland (this is now generally accepted), Britain settled down to a war of waiting until the spring, when it is expected that Herr Hitler will make a supreme bid for victory by a total offensive The horrors implied by a “total offensive," including mass air raids, were fully realised, but spring seemed remote and there was too much unfounded optimism regarding an early cracking-up of the Nazi regime. It is now thought that the offensive—depending on the weather— may come as early as February, with full strength employed simultaneously on land and sea and in the air, and the imminence of the turn of the year has brought sudden realisation, together with a disposition soberly to review the Allies’ capacity to take the strain. Germany’s Ominous Preparations In many quarters the outcome of this review is that everything depends on air power, regardless of whether the developments paramount y are naval, military • or aerial, and this resolves itself into an intensification of the battle of industries waged in the two of three intervening months. 1 ll is assumed that by the spring the Germans will have more than 220 divisions, with proportionate equipment—not to throw against the Maginot Line, but more likely to seize Holland for air bases, agriculture and shipping, Sweden for ironfields and Rumania for oil. It is considered that successful Allied counter-action will require more extensive air forces than at present Similarly; an intensification of submarine and mine warfare will require air power over and above tine fleet air arm.

Regarding the air war itself it is considerei unwise to assume that the Germans will not attempt some decisive employment of their whole air strength, in which they still have a numerical preponderance. They have been pausing to accumulate material and equip proportions of squadrons with new types of machines. Until the moment of the clash, both sides will grow stronger aerially each day. It is pointed out, therefore, that final conclusions in favour of the Allies are impossible until they have complete air supremacy, and that the fulfilment of this requirement depends on efforts in the battle of industries during the coming months. The editbr of the Observer, Mr. J. L. Garvin, who shares this view, states: “Nothing but the total organisation of democracy will do.”

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/GISH19391230.2.162

Bibliographic details

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20133, 30 December 1939, Page 14

Word Count
416

BID FOR VICTORY Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20133, 30 December 1939, Page 14

BID FOR VICTORY Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20133, 30 December 1939, Page 14

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