The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” WEDNESDAY. NOVEMBER 29, 1939. SOVIET AGGRESSION

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20107, 29 November 1939, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” WEDNESDAY. NOVEMBER 29, 1939. SOVIET AGGRESSION

Whether or not the most gloomy predictions regarding the intentions of Russia are fulfilled nothing can dispose of the fact that the Soviet is as unprincipled in dealing with her neighbours as Germany has been. Indeed, Russian policy is clearly patterned on that of the Nazis and appears to have a similar objective. Finland is in obvious danger of being a second Poland and the course of events lias been almost identical in

both cases. Russia and Finland, like Germany and Poland, had freely and willingly entered into a pact of nonaggression and until recently there

had been no cause for friction between the two countries. Russia, like Germany, had given definite and emphatic assurances that she had no territorial ambitions outside her own country. Then, following the joint rape of Poland by Germany and Russia, the Soviet made it clear that she had territorial ambitions'and she demanded and secured concessions from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the demands in each case being accompanied, after the Nazi style, by concentrations of troops on the borders. Coerced by these displays of force the smaller States had no alternative other than to capitulate or else suffer the fate of Poland, and the result today is that three formerly independent Baltic States are now under Soviet hegemony. Then came the turn of Finland, but

the Finns were made of sterner material and, while willing to make reasonable concessions in the interests of peace, were not prepared to sacrifice their independence. True to their Nazi exemplars, the Soviet leaders prefaced their campaign by unsubstantiated allegations regarding internal conditions in Finland and supported their demands by massing troops on the Finnish frontier. The Finnish delegation which went to Moscow carried out negotiations to the tune of broadcast threats as to the fate of their country in the event of the demands being rejected. The Finns stood firm and the negotiations were suspended indefinitely, but the Soviet made it clear that the last had not been Heard of the matter. Without any 'real military justification, troops were maintained on the frontier until an “incident” occurred and supplied the pretext for renewed demands of an intolerable nature, Again the parallel with German methods is striking, for this is exactly what hap-

pened in Poland and provided Germany with an excuse for a general invasion. Whether Russia will carry the procedure to the same lengths as Germany remains to be seen, but it is significant that to-day another leaf has been taken out of the Nazi book and the pact with Finland has been unilaterally denounced by the Soviet. The facts concerning the border incident may be difficult to ascertain, but. in the meantime, the probabilities are entitled to careful consideration. The Soviet note to Finland says “that the concentration of such large numbers of regular troops on the frontier is dangerous.’’ That, of course, is what Germany said to Poland, but Russia, like Germany, conveniently overlooks the fact that it was she herself who made the first troop movements and was the direct cause ol Finnish mobilisation. If the Finnish concentration is dangerous, surely it is obvious that that of Russia is Infinitely more so, not only because of the Soviet’s enormously greater numbers, but also because it is the Soviet and not Finland that is making demands and seeks to enforce them. Tne first test to be applied to the situation is this: What have the respective Powers to gain by these displays of force? Is it conceivable that a small country like Finland, with no ambition other than to live peacefully within her own borders, with a grim history in which she lias always been the victim and never the aggressor, is likely to make threats against such a powerful neighbour as Russia? What could bo her motive and what could she possibly hope to gain? Clearly she could gain nothing but would stand, inevitably, to lose all that she has always striven for. On tile other hand, the Russian motive is clear. She has demanded the cession of certain Finnish territory and her leaders have intimated that they will brush aside every obstacle that stands in the road. Today Finland is in the road and, consequently. Russia seeks an excuse for brushing her aside. To suggest that the Finnish concentration constitutes a threat to Russia is as absurd as to suggest that a mouse threatens the cat that is waiting patiently outside its hole; yet the whole Soviet case is based 6n the puerile allegation that Russia is threatened by Finland. Russia demands that the Finnish troops are to withdraw so far from the frontier, but apparently the Soviet's own | and much larger concentrations are to | remain. The Finnish reply is a reasonable one; they will withdraw in equal proportion and distance to the Russians. This step would remove

the danger of which the Soviet com-

plains and by its acceptance or otherwise the sincerity of Russia can be judged. In the meantime, however, the Soviet press and radio continue their offensive against Finland, public indignation is being artificially aroused, Russia threatens to administer “the lesson deserved,” and, as a final gesture, Soviet coastal batteries at the new base in Estonia, opposite Finland, have commenced practice. The portents are all too clear. Russia, having started on her campaign of aggression and aggrandisement, is seemingly bent on enforcing her claims against a smaller and weaker neighbour whose only offence is to be in the road of the Soviet goal.