The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED "THE TIMES.” TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1939 DEADLOCK IN MOSCOW

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20094, 14 November 1939, Page 6

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED "THE TIMES.” TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1939 DEADLOCK IN MOSCOW

Tlic report tlnU the negotiations between Finland and Russia have reached a deadlock and that the Finnish delegation is leaving Moscow with scant hopes of the discussions being

renewed does not come as a surprise. Finland has made it clear from the

outset that she was not prepared to

be a second Czechoslovakia —to make a compromise which would ultimately result in her complete subservience to the Soviet —while Russia has insisted on the acceptance of her “minimum demands.’’ This question opens up issues that extend far beyond the relationship between the two countries directly concerned, for it involves precisely the same principle for which Europe is now at war—whether the smaller States of the world are to retain their independence or to be continually at the mercy of would-be aggressors with expansionist aims. Certainly Finland is placed in an extremely difficult position and the stand made by the Government has required no small degree of courage. A country with only 4,000,000 population has virtually defied the Soviet which has a population of nearly 180,000,000 and which has not hesitated to make dire threats as to what opposition to its demands would involve. It now remains to be seen whether Russia will complete her fall from grace by carrying these threats into effect.

There are one or two points in connection with the Kremlin negotiations that should be clearly understood. The first and most important is that the present status of Finland has been freely and expressly accepted and guaranteed by a treaty signed by the Soviet Government. There has never been any suggestion of a grievance or of arbitrarily-fixed boundaries as was the case with Poland or Czechoslovakia; in fact, the most important Russian demands are not for boundary revision but for the concession of territory that is not even contiguous to Russia. Nor has Finland any minority problem such as characterised the position in Europe. On the contrary, her people are 90 per cent Finnish and with the exception of a handful of refugees the balance are Swedish. Internal conditions in Finland cannot possibly provide an excuse for foreign intervention, because, although she is not by any means a wealthy country, Finland has been remarkably progressive and is financially stable, and has, in fact, earned distinction by being the only country in the world to continue the regular payment of her war debts. In these circumstances, it is obvious that the Soviet in making its demands is actuated by some ulterior motive.

Just what that motive is remains somewhat obscure. It might arise from distrust of her present ally, Germany, and a consequent desire to improve the defences of the Baltic, but if this is the case action should be governed by mutual agreement with the States concerned and not by coercion. There has been nothing said however, to suggest that defence i: the real objective. On the othei hand there have been repeated references by the Soviet to its “demands’’ against Finland and the official Soviet news agency talks glibly about “the Kremlin’s minimum proposals for expansion in the Baltic.’’ It has been similar proposals for expansion ii other spheres that have plunged the world into war and it is difficult to find any difference in principle between the methods of Russia and those of Germany. The demands of Russia, incidentally, require that Finland should surrender her only harbour in the north and her chief harbour in the south and also permit the establishment of a Russian naval base on the west coast, which is far removed from Soviet territory. In effect, Finland is expected to submit to her territory being virtually surrounded by Soviet military forces.

Finland has made it abundantly clear that she is prepared to make considerable sacrifices in order to appease the Russian demands for Baltic expansion and she has actually agreed to two-thirds of the Soviet proposals. She is not willing, however, to completely sacrifice her independence and this would inevitably be involved if she accepted the Russian demands in toto. The Soviet, on the other hand, it is reported to-day, will be satisfied only with the acceptance in full of her “minimum demands.’’ “Otherwise,” it is asserted, "the Soviet will find ways and means of obtaining what she requires." What those ways and means are, is left to the imagination, but it is impossible to forget M. Molotov's warning that if the demands were rejected it would be harmful both to Finland and to peace, or the official Soviet newspaper’s statement that Russia would sweep aside any obstacle in her path. To-day, Finland is in the path of Russia, yet it may be doubted whether the Soviet will have the courage to sweep her aside. Rather is it to be expected that she will conduct what has come to be known as a “war of nerves”; that she will keep Finland in a state of tension and fear, hoping that the heavy cost of mobilisation and the disruption of her economic life will bring about a collapse, Finland, in consequence, has the hardest part ahead of her and her future will be watched with much sympathy and anxiety.