The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, WEDNESDAY, OCT, 25, 1939. HITLER’S CHAGRIN

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20077, 25 October 1939, Page 6

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, WEDNESDAY, OCT, 25, 1939. HITLER’S CHAGRIN

While it is necessary that undue importance should not be attached to speculative reports regarding developments in Berlin, sufficient of a concrete and substantiated nature emerges to indicate that Herr Hitler is confronted with an extremely difficult situation. This does not mean that he has reached the end of his tether, but it. 'does suggest that he may shortly have to alter his tactics. Again it should he emphasised that Hitler cannot remain inactive. Having conquered Poland, his next step was lo endeavour to secure peace on a basis that would leave him in possession of the spoils. Disappointed in this and finding at the same time that the ring

is rapidly closing round Germany he lias been compelled to seek the advice of his diplomats and State governors. The Ambassadors to Rome, 'Moscow, and Angora were recalled in order to learn the feelings of the Governments upon wiiose support ho had to some extent relied and the conference of Nazi leaders was designed to give him a closer insight into the feelings of his own people. What transpired at these discussions, and the result of them, must remain a matter of conjecture, but since Germany has been betrayed by Russia, ignored by Italy, and deserted by Turkey, and since Hitler must produce results to appease his own people, it may be taken for granted that the atmosphere in Berlin has been far from congenial.

| Once again it is made clear that Hitler’s fatal mistake was in placing reliance on Russia as an ally. Whatever may lie the terms of the secret clauses of the Russo-German treaty it is certain that Hitler has been sadly disappointed and that he has not re-

i ceived the assistance he had been led jto expect. It seems likely that Stalin regarded pledges as lightly as did Hitler and that he had no compunction ;in betraying tlie man who believed he had secured a real ally. Both dieiln tors appear to subscribe to the ! Machiavellian dictum that no ruler is ! bound lo keep his word when the circumstances in which lie gave it have changed, and when it is no longer in his interests to do so. Thus it is that Stalin not only refuses military aid to Germany but also goes behind Hitler’s hack to make trade agreements with Germany’s enemies. It may be I doubted whether Stalin ever gave | Hitler assurances of military aid, but it would be absurd to suggest that Hitler was such a poor diplomat as to enter into an alliance from which he stood to gain nothing. Since he has. gained nothing, other than the elimination of Russia as an actual opponent, the inference is that he lias been, as was predicted, double-crossed. In these circumstances, the Allies can, perhaps, congratulate themselves that it was not they who were saddled with such an unreliable partner as the Soviet.

Hitler is going to be placed in an extremely difficult position as a result of Soviet action. In the first place there seems to be little prospect of Germany securing supplies of war materials from Russia, a view that is reinforced by to-day’s report that the recent shipment of Soviet gold has noi gone to Germany but to Holland. More complicated still will be the effect of other trade agreements with Russia. The Soviet has contracted, for instance, to supply timber to Great Britain and manganese to the United States. Will Germany attack the ships, presumably Russian, in which these cargoes are carried, and, if so how long is her alliance with Russia likely to last? If she gives preferential treatment to Soviet vessels she will, incidentally, be assisting the Allies by facilitating their foreign trade, and, perhaps more important, she will run the risk of alienating other neutrals who are entitled to demand the same consideration as if given to Russia. The influence ol neutral countries is far from negligible. It will not have escaped their notice that their losses at sea are solely due to German action and that their shipping has had to look to Britain and France for protection Already, therefore, their natural sympathies are with the Allies and Germany can ill-afford to offend them further.

The more the position is studied, the more does it appear that the RussoGerman alliance was a blessing in disguise for the Allies. As an ally. Russia could not have been relied upon, but as an ally of Germany she is continually gathering support, direct and indirect, for Britain and France. In the first place, the alliance drove a wedge into the Rome-Berlin-Tokio axis, effectively depriving Germany of her two partners. More than that it will greatly facilitate the alignment of other Powers. Any pact between the democracies and the Soviet dictatorship would necessarily have been an uneasy and a weak one and its illogicality would have reacted detrimentally to the Allies. Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Baltic States, for instance, always distrusted the Soviet, and events have proved that there was every reason for their attitude. More important, perhaps, is the attitude of the United States. An alliance between Russia and the democracies would have made America more reluctant than ever to assist the Allies, firstly because of the aversion to communism and dictatorship, and, secondly, because the Allies would have appeared, at least, to be less in need of assistance. As it is, a complete alliance of the democracies, including the United States, is not an impossibility and Hitler’s chagrin will he complete if it ultimately proves that in making a friend of Russia he has made on enemy of America,