The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES." GISBORNE, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1939 TURKEY TAKES A STAND

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20073, 20 October 1939, Page 6

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES." GISBORNE, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1939 TURKEY TAKES A STAND

To-day’s announcement that an agreement of mutual assistance between Great Britain, France, and Turkey has been signed finally disposes ol all speculation regarding the outcome of the negotiations between Turkey and Russia. Turkey has kept, faith with the Allies, as she insisted all along that she would do, and has resisted the blandishments, or threats, of the Soviet. This development is important for more reasons than one. Most striking, perhaps, is the evidence that one of the smaller Powers, at least, is prepared to fulfil its obligations and honour its pledges, despite Die pressure that has undoubtedly been brought to bear against it. A second point is that the march of Stalin's Tsarist imperialism has been effectively halted, unless he is prepared lo accompany it by force, and this he shows no inclination to do Thirdly, a not insignificant contribution has been made to the Allied cause, firstly, because the Balkan bloc has been materially consolidated through Turkish action and, secondly, because the ability and willingness of Russia to aid Germany must be considerably impaired. Finally, and not by any means the least important aspect, will be the psychological effect of this support for the Allies and of the firm stand that has been taken against attempted domination.

The basis of the discussions between Russia and Turkey has not been disclosed, but it is obvious that the Soviet, having already shown scant regard for its own pledges, endeavoured to persuade Turkey to be equally unfaithful. This is indicated by the official Turkish statement that the Russian proposals were unacceptable because they would involve the repudiation of prior commitments tc Britain and France. It seems probable that the Soviet suggestion was that Turkey should close the Dardanelles to the Allies, thus making it impossible for them to fulfil their guarantees to Rumania. Russia would then have been in a position to proceed further with her imperialistic policy by agreeing with Bulgaria for the partition of Rumania. For Turkey to have accepted the Soviet plan would have involved dishonouring not only the obligations to the Allies, but also the Balkan pact under which she has given undertakings to Rumania. More than this, such an agreement would have facilitated the Russian advance through the Dardanelles and the creation of a sphere of influence which Russia would have undoubtedly used at the opportune time for an advance on the Mediterranean itself. As it is, control of the Dardanelles and of the Black Sea virtually remains in Allied hands and a period has been called to the Soviet’s plans for aggression. In the circumstances, Russia is putting the best face she can on her defeat, but the Turkish pact with the Allies must be a bitter blow to her aspirations.

The Allied satisfaction at the signing of this agreement arises as much from its negativing of Russian and German hopes as from its positive benefits. There had, of course, been a previous agreement for co-operation but there were natural fears lest this should be undermined as a result of Soviet pressure. Official circles have been less perturbed than the general public, a fact that is now explained by the announcement that the new agreement was completed three weeks ago and only awaited signature. The signatures have now been affixed, and the Allies and Turkey are now bound together for a period of 15 years in what is, in effect, a pact of mutual assistance in the eastern Mediterranean, Such an agreement is the more binding because, apart from the goodwill on either side, there are mutual interests to protect. The Allies are assisted because a solid Balkan bloc, of which Turkey is the keystone, will prevent either a German or a Russian advance into the Mediterranean and because they will now hold the doorway to the Black Sea. On the other hand, Turkey gains the protection of the British and French fleets against any revival of the old Russian aims against Constantinople and against her possible isolation in the event of a collapse of the Balkan bloc and the danger of pressure from three sides—from Russia, the Balkans, and Italy. That Turkey has been able to resist Russian pressure without forfeiting Russian friendship, which is of considerable value to her, is at once a tribute to her diplomacy and evidence of Russian weakness. Soviet foreign policy remains somewhat enigmatical, but it seems to he reasonably clear that, while she is only too willing to grab the spoils if someone else will do the fighting for her, she is most anxious to avoid being embroiled in war herself. Any dictator who goes to war faces the danger of revolution in his own country, and the danger of revolution is probably just as great in Russia as in Germany, more particularly since there have always been differences of opinion in the Red Army over the

very policy which Stalin is now pur- i suing. It is obvious that Russia was j not prepared to fight Id enforce the ! demands which were made against j Turkey, and this raises the important; question of whether she would risk ; a war to secure her aims in the Baltic, j This issue is a vital one at the moment for the Scandinavian Powers who are ; conferring in regard to the Soviet's | claims against Finland. It has been j assumed that Finland could , not resist I Russian aggression, but a firmer note i has emerged from the Stockholm conference, at which the President of j Finland asserted that his country ; would not sacrifice its independence. . This determination will doubtless be j strengthened by the knowledge that j Turkey has successfully called Rus- j sia’s bluff, and it is possible that the j Turkish stand will usher in a new era j insofar as the attitude of neutrals is j concerned.