The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, SATURDAY, OCT. 14. 1939 RUSSIAN MANOEUVRES

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20068, 14 October 1939, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, SATURDAY, OCT. 14. 1939 RUSSIAN MANOEUVRES

The fact that the United Slates has deemed it necessary to make diplomatic representations to Moscow regarding the Soviet’s intentions towards Finland is expressive of the general concern that is felt at the expansionist policy now being adopted by Russia. Three small Baltic States in turn have been compelled to submit to Soviet pressure, concessions of an important military and economic nature having been secured from Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. Now an attempt is being made to deal with the more important State of Finland. It would be useless to pretend that these negotiations have been entered into voluntarily. The Soviet has again taken a leaf from Hitler’s book. Even as the heads of Austria and Czechoslovakia were summoned to Berehtesgaden to receive the German demands, representative Baltic statesmen have been “requested” to call at the Kremlin to hear the parts which M. Stalin expects them to play. It is not without significance that in each case, again following the German example, the “invitations” were preceded by the mustering of Soviet forces on the borders of the countries concerned. So far, this policy of international blackmail has succeeded, but there are indications that Finland is more likely than her small neighbours to resist the Russian threats. The reason for the Soviet demands against Finland is less apparent than was the case in the other countries which were able to concede Russia ice-free ports which might be regarded as vital to her economic life. It can hardly be suggested that there is a Russian minority in Finland that requires Soviet “protection,” as was the excuse in Poland, nor does Finland occupy an important strategic position in the Baltic. For centuries, however, she has been a centre of unrest of external origin. Her early history was marked by struggles against the Swedes and for 600 years she was under Swedish domination. Then she became the battleground of struggles between Russia and Sweden, and it was not until early in the last century that she gained a measure of autonomy. Her independence was preserved for nearly a century, but at the beginning of the present century she was deprived of her autonomy and became virtually a Russian province. When the revolution broke out ii> Russia in 1917, Finland recovered all her former rights, but with the triumph of bolshevism, and divided against herself, she was forced into a grim struggle from which she emerged triumphant. Since then, the history of the country has been one of almost uninterrupted progress and development. The attitude of Russia in regard to Finland is as much a mystery as her foreign policy generally, but everything points to the view that, in defiance of the assurances she has previously given, she has embarked on a far-reaching policy of expansion. Already she has secured virtual control of the Baltic, wringing concessions from her weaker neighbours by massing an array of force against them. Now she admits that her forces on the Turkish and Iranian frontiers are being reinforced, these moves suggesting that she is planning moves to the south as well as the north. Her activity in this direction is nothing new, since it merely follows the policy planned by Peter the Great more than 200 years ago. The interesting aspect, however, is that Russia under a Communist dictator apparently differs little from Russia under Die most imperialistic of the Tsai’s. There is the same ambition and lust for aggrandisement and the same abuse of dictatorial power. How far the Soviet will insist in its-’demands on Finland and the extent to which other Powers, notably Sweden, will be involved, remains to be seen, but from Russia's own point of view her greatest danger appears to lie in the diversification of her activities —in the Baltic, in eastern Europe, on the Black Sea, and in the Far East —and in the consequent multiplication of the States which may ultimately be opposed to her. Not the least interesting aspect for speculation is the part which Germany is playing in these manoeuvres. Already she has clearly surrendered control of the Baltic to Russia, and it

is difficult to believe that this was willingly conceded under the RussoGerman pact. It is possible, of course, that there was a division of spoils, as iri the case of Poland, and that Russia was given the Baltic Slates while Germany was to have those of Scandinavia upon whose exports she is so vitally dependent at the present time and from whom she

has already demanded something more than mere neutrality. From the German point of view, however, this would be an extremely short-sighted

policy; because, in the ultimate conflict between Russia and Germany, which Hitler himself regards as inevitable, Russia would have an important strategic advantage and Germany would be much more vulnerable than before. It is possible that the true German feeling is being expressed in the reported sympathy for Finland, not only because Finland has always been regarded as one of the bulwarks against communism, but also because of traditional friendship. In the civil war of 1916, the Finnish revolutionaries, supported by Russia, were only overthrown as a result of the assistance of Germany, and, although Hitler seems capable of almost any volte face, it is hard to credit that lie would willingly sacrifice Finland to the bolsheviks. The truth, perhaps, is that Hitler is not able to exert his own will but has to accept the dictation of his new partner.