The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED "THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, MONDAY OCTOBER 2, 1939. GERMANY AND RUSSIA

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20057, 2 October 1939, Page 6

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED "THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, MONDAY OCTOBER 2, 1939. GERMANY AND RUSSIA

Any review of the present war situation naturally turns largely on a consideration of the practical effect of the alliance between Germany and Russia, On the face of it, Germany s position would seem to be strengthened by the support of another large nation, but a closer study of the facts suggests that the pact, itself a sign of weakness, might prove to be a handicap. In the first place, both the Nazi and the Soviet Governments must lose caste with their own peoples as a consequence of their sacrifice of principles for expediency and gain, Signs have not been wanting in both countries of growing resentment against the domination of the respective dictators and the denial of freedom of thought to the people. These conditions have been tolerated mainly because of a belief that the leaders were actuated by high ideals, but to-day " those ideals have been abandoned. How, for instance, can Herr Hitler, the founder of the antiCorriintern pact, justify his new alliance with the Comintern? And how can M. Stalin satisfactorily explain his support for Nazi aggression when, only recently, he explained to his people that many of the Soviet army chiefs had been “liquidated” for allegedly negotiating with Germany? This aspect of the question strikes at fundamentals the importance of which can be appreciated by contemplating

the effect on the British public if Mr. Chamberlain, after all his denunciations of aggression, had signed a pact with Hitler. . More than ever before the peoples of Germany and Russia have reason to distrust their leaders; they stand convicted by their own actions. More than that, the two Governments have reason to distrust one another, and that distrust will inevitably discount whatever benefits might attach to the alliance. Germany, in particular, appears to have paid a heavy price for Soviet aid. Not only has she sacrificed a large part of Polish territory, including the industrial areas upon which she had been depending, but, in addition, she now finds that the Soviet has assumed control of the Baltic and largely thwarted whatever designs Germany may have had against the Balkans. The reactions of the Balkan States are difficult to judge at the moment, but it seems not improbable that their fears of German penetration and of an invasion of Communist doctrines will tend to unite them on the side of the Allies. Certain it is that Germany’s position in the Balkans has been weakened rather than strengthened. For her part, Russia, knowing from Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” that Germany’s ultimate plans are directed against Soviet territory, cannot feel entirely happy at sharing a frontier with Germany and she must know that should Hitler be successful in the west it would only be a matter of time before he returned to his original programme and turned against the Soviet.

This obviously uneasy partnership Will at least have the effect of keeping a large part of the German forces immobilised in the east, not only because of a fear that Russia might seek to grab more than her allotted share of the spoils, but also because of her anxiety lest the Soviet should take the opportunity to spread its insidious doctrines into the fertile territory across her new borders. This alliance is not a natural one, and for that reason neither party is likely to assist the other except from selfish

motives. In contrast to Britain and France, they will not make sacrifices in defence of principles; instead, they will sacrifice principles to achieve their own inglorious ends. Russia, clearly, is playing her own game, trying to rim with the hare and hunt

with the hound?, a point that is amply demonstrated by the fact that her alliance with Germany is accompanied by repeated assurances of her inten-

tions to remain neutral and to hold aloof from the European conflict. It is extremely unlikely that Russia will give military aid to Germany in any case, because it would conflict with her own immediate interests and her ultimate aims. More likely is it that she will encourage Germany to fight in the knowledge that she is doomed to ultimate defeat and in the hope that, once defeated, her people will more easily be persuaded to embrace the doctrine of communism.

Any assumption that Russia is able to give Germany substantial economic aid is ill-founded. Russia, despite her intensive reorganisation of industry in recent years, is still unable to produce sufficient to meet the needs of her own people and as an exporting nation does not rank at all among the great trading nations. Notwithstanding her vast area and her population of more than 170,000,000, her total trade is less than that of Denmark, Switzerland, or Sweden, and about on a par with, that of New Zealand. Clearly, therefore, she is not in a position to supply Germany with her vital needs, even if she desired to do so. If she had the supplies and the desire to make them available there would still be the enormous difficulty of transportation, since the only practical method of delivery would be by rail across the vast expanse of Soviet territory to the Baltic and then by sea to Germany. Finally, there is the further problem—and it applies to other countries with which Germany has trade agreements—of payment, which, as Germany has no gold, can only be made by the export of goods. Neither Russia nor any other country is likely to give Germany credit, and isince Germany’s whole industry is devoted to war effort it is improbable that she will be able to export goods with which to pay for the imports she so badly needs. Summing up the position, it is obvious that Germany has lost much by her alliance with •Russia and difficult to see that she gained anything at all.