The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES." THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1939. AFFIXING THE WAR GUILT

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20054, 28 September 1939, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES." THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1939. AFFIXING THE WAR GUILT

One of the most striking features of the present war has been the use of the propaganda weapon. In particular, radio broadcasting, used for the first time in war, lias played a prominent part, the stations of the belligerent nations being on the air almost continuously and delivering their messages in every important language. Those who have made a point of studying and comparing the methods of the rival Powers can hardy fail to have been impressed with the calm and dispassionate statements broadcast from the British and French stations in contrast to the vituperative and somewhat clumsy efforts of the Germans. The chief aim of Germany at the moment seems to be to lay the blame for the war on the head of England and in order to bolster up an obviously weak case it has been necessary to recall incidents dating bade to the American revolution, the Indian mutiny, and the Boer War. This sort of thing might impress the people of Germany—although even that is to be doubted—but it is not likely to have much influence on those who, in the absence of rigid censorship and State control of publicity, have been fully informed of events of recent years. They know that the cause of the present war does not belong to happenings of a century or more ago but lies in the conduct of Germany in the past few years.

The immediate casus belli was the German invasion of Poland and on this particular point the public cannot be too well informed. The facts are fully set out in the White Papers issued by the British Government which have been rightly described as historic documents. From these papers there are several facts which emerge most clearly and which deserve to be emphasised. The first, perhaps, is the clear indication which was given by Great Britain of her intentions in the event of Germany continuing her policy of aggression. The point is important because it has been said that had Britain’s attitude been made clear in 1914 there would have been no war. On this occasion there was no room for misunderstanding, for it is now revealed that, in addition to repeated utterances by British Ministers, Herr Hitler and his advisers were directly and personally informed that Britain would stand by Poland. Herr Hitler went so far as to inform the British Ambassador that Germany had nothing to lose by war and that if it were to come he would prefer it now to five or ten years later. It can be said, therefore, that Germany invaded Poland with the full knowledge that her action would not involve only a local war but a conflict in which Britain and France would take a stand for the principles which they had so clearly lai4 down.

The second point which demands some consideration is the German contention that Britain, by her undertaking of assistance, had encouraged Polish resistance to the German demands. The answer to this is contained in the White Paper which recalls that Poland had rejected the German demands on March 26 whereas the British guarantee was not given until March 31. The German attempt to confuse the sequence of these events is an indication of the pains that are being taken in Germany to place the responsibility of the war on Britain. Far more important, however, were the diplomatic discussions immediately prior to the outbreak of war. Germany contended that she was prepared to negotiate a settlement with Poland, but the White Paper disclosures, apart from the facts made available at the time, show clearly what a strange conception she had of the meaning of negotiation. It is true that proposals had been prepared for submission t.o a Polish delegate upon his arrival in Berlin, but it is clear, also, that these proposals were never actually presented to the Polish Government or its representative in Berlin, and that Poland was never, in fact, given an opportunity of considering the conditions upon which Germany would agree to refrain from aggression.

It is this point to which the utmost importance attaches, for it clearly indicates the German methods and the German procedure. It was intended that Poland should send a plenipotentiary to Berlin, not to negotiate a settlement of the dispute, but to receive an ultimatum. The terms of this ultimatum were subsequently broadcast, and it was argued that because no one had arrived from Poland to receive them the proposals had been rejected. Support for this view is contained in recent history. In February of last year the Austrian Prime Minister went to Germany to “negotiate a settlement,” but was confronted with an ultimatum which resulted in the absorption of his country by the Reich. A few months later the same procedure was followed in regard to Czechoslovakia. In the light of these experiences it was clear

to Poland last month that Germany had no intention of negotiating but intended merely to present demands for acceptance or rejection. Had she sincerely desired to effect a peaceful settlement she would have submitted her proposals through the ordinary diplomatic channels or accepted Britain’s olfer of mediation, and (lie very

fact that she spurned this course is the clearest, possible indication that she was determined to enforce on the people of Poland the same form of dictation and dictatorship that has characterised the life of Germany itself under the Nazi regime.