The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1939. AMERICA AND THE WAR

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20050, 23 September 1939, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1939. AMERICA AND THE WAR

The inconsistency of United States foreign policy is again exemplified by the attitude of the President in regard to the Neutrality Act, which is to be debated by Congress next week. According to report, Mr. Roosevelt informed the party leaders at a preliminary conference that he was in favour of the complete repeal of the Act in preference to any modification of the existing law. In a subsequent speech to Congress he expressed regret that the Act was passed and that he had affixed his signature to it. Deferring to the opinion of the party leaders, however, instead of now proposing the repeal of the Act he has contented himself with advocating a modification of it insofar as it relates to thb embargo provisions. The effect of the President’s proposals will be to enable the United States, indirectly, to give invaluable assistance to Great Britain and France, and this, no doubt, is the real intention, notwithstanding the assertion that it was sought to place all belligerents on the same footing. The fact is that American public opinion is now definitely on the side of the Allies and since public

opinion cannot be ignored it is proposed to modify the existing law in order to enable munitions and materials to be supplied to Britain and France under certain conditions.

The Neutrality Act was passed in 1935 to deal with the pending conflict between Italy and Abyssinia and placed a complete embargo on the export of arms and munitions to belligerents. Now, however, Mr. Roosevelt contends, with much justification, that such an embargo is, in effect, a breach of neutrality because it ensures a land Power, which in this instance is Germany, that the maritime Powers opposing it will be denied the right to continue normal trade. In practice, the Neutrality Act makes the United States a passive ally of Germany, whereas the sympathies of the American people are with Britain and France. Germany has planned for war without depending on seaborne supplies, but an insular country like Britain could not possibly conduct a war without a maintenance of seaborne trade. It seems to have been overlooked, however, that similar conditions applied to the Abyssinian conflict, which was the cause of the Act being passed. Even more interesting is it to speculate as to what would have been the position had Japan actually declared war on China. Is it conceivable that Mr. Roosevelt would then have insisted that the United States should supply munitions to Japan because she is a sea Power?

The truth is, of course, that American policy must be adjusted from time to time to meet whatever circumstances might arise. The President remarked that American policy at the present time must be governed by the one single thought of keeping America out of war, but in the next breath he remarked that “we are affected to the core,” thus showing that “keeping out” of a war did not leave a country immune from its effects. What he did not say, but what may be inferred from his remarks, is that unless the United States gives Britain and France sufficient assistance to enable them to win the war America might have to intervene to save the democracies. This is the plain position, for unless Britain and France can stem the march of the Nazis the United States will most certainly be forced into the war as an active participant in order to protect her own vital interests. For America to persist in her attitude of strict neutrality would undoubtedly be, in Mi'. Roosevelt’s own words, “vitally dangerous to American peace, neutrality, and security.” The proposed modifications are unquestionably what the President describes as a “positive safety programme,” because, apart from the elimination of incidents and controversies, they will better enable the Allies to maintain the fight for the preservation of ideals and principles which mean just as much to the United States as to any other country. The practical effects of the proposals are indicated by the four points enumerated by Mr. Roosevelt. The first are of less importance since they merely impose restrictions on the activities of American shipping and ' American nationals, but the other two

would enable the United States to give to the Allies material assistance which, by the force of circumstances, would be denied to Germany. In effect, they establish what is known as the “cash-and-carry” principle as goods purchased by belligerents must be paid for before shipment and no credits can be given to belligerents, while under the first proposal American shipping would be debarred from carrying goods to countries engaged in war. In other words, American arms and munitions would be available to those countries which could pay for them and were in a position to provide ships for their transport. Clearly the proposals give the Allies an immense advantage. In the first place, as they have almost complete control of the seas there would be no difficulty in regard to shipping, whereas Germany has no ships available for the purpose; and, secondly, both Britain and America have huge gold reserves, some of them actually deposited in the United States, with which to supplement normal trade in payment for goods supplied. It would seem certain that the President’s proposals will meet with some opposition in Congress, but the probabilities are that they will be carried, if for no other reason than that to reject them would mean a serious blow to American trade and industry at a time when they can ill-afford further restrictions.