The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1939. SOVIET INTERVENTION

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20046, 19 September 1939, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1939. SOVIET INTERVENTION

The intervention of Russia in the role of an aggressor in the European conflict has naturally given rise to a great deal of speculation as to the possible future -trend of events. In this connection tlie warning from London against excessive speculative interpretations of the significance of the move is timely, because it is clear that many factors, some of them most conflicting, have to be taken into account. It now seems certain, however, that the action of the Soviet, in direct breach ol its pact with Poland, will remove any possibility of further resistance by Poland to the invader. Indeed, it may be doubled whether Poland could have held on much longer in any case or whether anything could have been gained by continuing the heroic struggle against overwhelming odds. The opposition offered by the Poles to the invader was less strong than had been expected, but this can be explained by the fact that Germany, even while ostensibly offering peaceful negotiations, was strenuously preparing for war. These preparations cave her an enormous advantage when she struck and, combined with the vast superiority of her equipment, made it inevitable that Poland, unable to receive material assistance from her allies, should be confronted with the utmost difficulties.

The invasion of the Red Army has placed the issue beyond doubt, but this development is of far less importance to the Polish campaign itself than to the situation generally. In particular, interest will attach to the disclosure of the British and French reactions to this latest move which will be made by Mr. Chamberlain when the House of Commons meets to-morrow. It is important to note, however, that it has already been stated in London that the Soviet move did not take Britain and France by surprise, but that ever since the conclusion of the pact between Germany and Russia, it had been regarded as a possibility. The question that naturally presents itself is whether, now that its immediate objective has been obtained, the Nazi Government will sue for peace with Britain and France, and, if so, what will be the reaction to such a move. Hitler has already suggested that peace would follow the conquest of Poland, but, on the other hand, as early as August 22 Mr. Chamberlain, in a letter to Hitler, stated that “it would be a dangerous illusion to think that if war once started it would come to an early end, even if a success on one front . . . should have been secured.” That statement almost seems to have anticipated the situation that exists to-day. If, by any chance, peace were obtainable at the present time would the world be any better off? The menace of Hitlerism would not only continue to exist but would be seriously aggravated since there would be a stronger temptation than ever before to continue the Nazi aggression. This is the paramount fact that will require to be taken into account in considering any peace overtures. Britain and France are not by any means the only Powers concerned in the latest development and in any future negotiations. Japan and Italy, in particular, have a vital interest in the position. As former partners of Germany in the anti-Comintern pact they will naturally attempt to assess the significance and scope of Germany’s alliance with the Soviet. Japan, for instance, must ask herself whether, now that Russia has ostensibly secured herself against attack on her western frontier, the Soviet will not, perhaps, seek to enforce her political doctrines in the east and, pact or no pact, increase her assistance to China. The intrusion of Russia must also cause other neutral countries to reconsider their position, notably the small States on the Baltic which have long been perturbed at the activities of the Soviet, and the larger ones in the Balkans which may be seriously affected if Russia persists in her new role of an aggressor instead of subscribing to the peace front. Not the least anxious of the Powers at this change in Russian foreign policy is probably Germany herself, even though she may have been responsible for it. It is pertinent to recall that both Germany and Russia have broken solemn pledges to suit their own ambitions and it is not at all improbable that at some future date they will break their pledges to one another. The present alliance, perhaps, is the most unholy that has ever been established and, since it is founded on nothing more concrete than temporary expediency, its lasting qualities are open to doubt. Russia and Germany have nothing in common except a desire to seize territory belonging to a weaker State, but, on the other hand, there is a strong natural conflict of interests between the two. For years, Germany lias posed as the arch-enemy of communism; what can she now think when the Moscow radio station proclaims that the conquest of Poland means that “the road is open for the triumph of the Communist creed?" Russia, in turn, has been the home of opposition to the Nazi regime and all that it represents; how can sire now justify her flagrant volte face? It is true that the implications of the change in Soviet policy make possible the widest conjectures, not the least | interesting of which is the chance that Germany, by negotiating the pact with

the Soviet and encouraging Russia to aggression, may have created a Frankenstein monster which might bring about her own destruction.