The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” MONDAY. SEPTEMBER 18, 1939. THE PERFIDY OF RUSSIA

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20045, 18 September 1939, Page 6

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” MONDAY. SEPTEMBER 18, 1939. THE PERFIDY OF RUSSIA

To-day’s reports that Russian troops have invaded Poland will remove whatever lingering doubts there might have been regarding the attitude of tlie Soviet Government in the present war. Instead of carrying out her pledges to assist in the restraint of aggression, Russia, doubtless tempted by the prospect of easy spoils, has herself become an aggressor. Under the most flimsy of pretexts and in the most contemptible circumstances her huge army has been turned loose against a smaller Power which has already been rendered almost defenceless as a result of its gallant and

courageous stand against the Nazi hordes. In effect, the Soviet has played the part of an onlooker in a grim struggle between two other forces and then, when the weaker lias been virtually beaten to the ground, has rushed in, not to defend the oppressed as she had promised, but to oppress them still further. This procedure, so aptly described in the phrase, “kicking a man when he is down,” will doubtless be hailed as a triumph for the gallant Red Army. It is significant, however, that Russia still protests her continued neutrality towards the other belligerent Powers. This means that she does not want war with nations which are still capable of defending themselves but prefers to wait until opportunity offers another defenceless victim.

Since Russia had abandoned all her previously enunciated principles by entering into a pact with the Nazi regime against which her leaders had always declaimed so violently, it was hardly to be expected that her future conduct would be governed by the ethics to which we are ourselves accustomed. Last week German sources predicted that Russia would take military action within a few days “as a reprisal for Polish violation of the frontier.” This excuse, however, was not forthcoming and consequently tiie Soviet had to invent another, the pretext being that it was necessary to bring oppressed minorities under the “protection” of Russia. The similarity to the Nazi technique is immediately apparent, but it goes even furIher, because the Soviet note to the Polish Ambassador alleged that the Polish Government was incapable of controlling the country and that the treaty to which Russia had pledged ■herself was, therefore, invalidated. It is easy for Russia to make these charges, after she had stood idly by and watched Poland ravaged by the Nazi forces, but no one is likely to overlook the fact that the very methods the Soviet resented when adopted by the Nazis in other spheres have been resorted to by Russia herself when she saw the opportunity of

expanding her own territory at little risk to herself. In the light of the current developments it is now more easy to understand and appreciate the recent trend of Russian foreign policy. It is a reasonable inference that the Soviet decision to abandon the anti-aggression, or peace, bloc dates from the displacement of M, Litvinov as Foreign Commissar. M. Litvinov had for years been to the forefront in the compaign to end aggression and had spared no efforts to further that aim. He it-was who, in a notable speech at Geneva, coined the phrase, “peace is indivisible,” and had insisted that none of the major Powers could remain at peace while Europe was at war. His dismissal, or resignation, without any adequate explanation was a clear indication of some change in Soviet foreign policy, but few there were who could have believed that it was possible that Russia was likely to desert the ■ democracies and join foices with the world’s most notorious aggressor. It seems reasonably clear, however, that the bait of spoils in Poland had been offered to her and proved more attractive than the mere reward of virtue which was all she could have hoped to gain by continued adherence to the principles of nonaggression. It seems clear, also, that the discussions with Britain and France were a hollow mockery and that the Soviet had no real intention of effecting an agreement other than with Germany.

It was suggested during the talks in Moscow that Britain was the real stumbling block to an agreement, but Russia's subsequent conduct, apart from anything else, throws doubts on this view. The two chief reasons given by the Soviet itself were the objections of Poland to Russian troops crossing Polish territory and the difficulty of defining aggression. As to the first point, there can be no question that Poland was entitled to take a stand on such an issue and her fears have been proved to be justified by the present Russian invasion. On the question of defining aggression, it is significant that no such difficulties arose when it came to negotiating an agreement with the Nazis and it may be assumed that the reason was that in this case the agreement was for joint aggression instead of the prevention of it. The perfidy of Moscow is further revealed by the fact that even while negotiations with the Nazis were in train a British military mission was invited to Russia and that only a few days before the SovietGerman agreement was signed M. Molotov had expressed his confidence that the differences with France and Britain would soon be overcome. What effect Russia’s new role will have on the course of the war remains to be seen, but it is certain that it will not facilitate the task of preventing rule by force. There is, however, the consolation that neither Russia nor Germany, who have shown such flagrant disregard for principles and pledges, will hesitate to double-cross one another whenever the opportunity should occur.