GERMAN WAR MACHINE

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20039, 11 September 1939, Page 7

GERMAN WAR MACHINE

LAND AND AIR STRENGTH RAPIDITY OF MOBILISATION THEORY OF SUDDEN BLOW Germany has so constructed her war machine that the transition from peace to war will be rapid and will interfere with the normal life of the community to the minimum. The rapidity of her mobilisation and cc.isequent striking has for its object overwhelming the opposing Power before the latter can bring its full forces into the field.

To this end she has maintained the greater part of her forces on a war footing. There are 49 first-line infantry divisions of 15,200 men each, three cavalry divisions and four armoured divisions. In addition, there are 38 reserve divisions whose assembly into the active force is a matter of comparatively few hours. Recent Creation Similarly, her air force is credited with having the greatest first-line strength in the world. Various estimates have been given of the total, but sources which may be considered reliable believe that the first-line air force comprises 4000 machines of all types, with 4000 in immediate reserve. Estimates of Germany’s productive capacity to replace losses range from 500 to 1000 machines a month. Practically the whole of Germany’s armed forces are a new creation since Herr Hitler took charge. After the war of 1914-18, Germany was limited to an army of 100,000 long-service men and was not permitted to have an air force. One effect of the longservice army was that most of the men received very thorough training except in the larger armaments, in which Germany was also restricted. These made a good nucleus of officers and non-commissioned officers on which Hitler has constructed the new army of approximately 1.000,000 men. Weakness in Officers Nevertheless, some observers assert that there is a very definite weakness created- -by a shortage of regimental officers between the ranks of captain and lieutenant-colonel. They also point out that she has not the reserves of officers and non-commissioned officers which were available for the armies of 1914-18. While it would toe foolish to underestimate the capacity of the German High Command and the ability of the rank and file,’ it is possible that intense propaganda has caused many people to err in the other direction. German army plans for the conquest of neighbouring States provide, as they have generally dene, for a timetable war. They can point to successes achieved by this means, but the rigidity of the system is a weakness ■in that it does not allow for the human factor. Failure in France A classic example of failure was the breakdown of the plan for the subjugation of France in the first. few weeks in 1914. The German training manuals lay particular emphasis on the development of initiative, especially on the part of regimental officers, and it may be that the .training of the past few years has overcome the tendency to adhere strictly to the letter of orders and time-tables prepared in advance. A thought that strikes terror in the civilian mind is that /the massed might of the German air force may be released in one tremendous onslaught that often has been prophesied by Field-Marshal Goering. This theory of the knock-out blow in the first round is not a new one, but should Goering turn his prophecy into practice he will break new ground in tactics. Air defence measures in these times are so strong that it seems impossible that the attacking aeroplanes will escape unscathed; rather they suggest that the casualties will be extremely heavy. Moreover, there will be a number of objectives t,o be attacked simultaneously, which would necessitate some division of forces. On these grounds, it is suggested that while air raids may toe intense, they will not be one mighty hit and smash effort. Should the onslaught be repulsed with substantial loss, Germany would deprive herself of any superiority she may have in the air.