The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1939. NOT HOPELESS.

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20039, 11 September 1939, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1939. NOT HOPELESS.

It would bo quite wrong for anyone to suggest that, because heavily-armed Nazi armies to-day occupy such a large portion of Poland, the power of our eastern ally to continue her resistance to invasion is almost completely broken. That Germany has secured such a solid footing in Poland is, without doubt, disconcerting. There are, however, various important factors which require to be taken into consideration, if a correct estimate of the position is to be reached. It is patent that Poland took upon herself a stupendous task when she decided—and, rightly, too —that her national honour, as well as the threat to her independence, demanded that she should join in calling a halt to Germany’s plan of Nazifying her smaller neighbours. The Poles had, of course, never claimed to possess armed forces as numerous and as highly mechanised as Germany’s and, in view of the fact that .huge German armies stood massed on their northern, western and southern frontiers, unprecedented courage was required on their part to join in a struggle which might easily result, for them, in her temporary loss of nationhood. What is now also noteworthy is that, although the Polish armies have had to make a series of glorious retreats, they have not been swept back in disorder. , If the reverse had been the position, the Nazis would, from the outset, have indulged in loud boastings that her armies had inflicted very heavy casualties upon the Polish forces; that they had captured an immense number of Polish prisoners; and that they had secured enormous quantities of Polish war equipment. But none of these claims could, honestly, be made by Germany. All that Herr Hitler and his fellow war lords have been able to brag about is that some of Poland’s chief centres and some of her main sources of raw materials have fallen into guilt-stained and blood-besmirched Nazi hands.

In no circumstances could Poland have kept up an unyielding resistance against huge German armies operating on three fronts with an aggregate length of IGOO miles. Poland had, therefore, to adopt a sound strategic ‘principle—that of falling back so that she would require to defend only a single, and much shortened, front. No really decisive battle has yet been fought; the Polish armies are practically intact, and considerable Polish reserves are still available to throw into the fray. Whether the real Polish capital held out or fell has, all along, been quite beside the main issue. Until now, the good weather has, unquestionably, helped the Nazi armies, as also has the circumstance that they have, so far, had only level terrains to advance across. As a result of the further Polish withdrawals during the week-end —movements described as very masterly, as well as most successful, in the face of the heaviest armed forces ever used in war’s lengthy history—the enemy has been drawn still more deeply into Poland. It would now seem that, if the gallant Poles can hold out for a few weeks, they will then secure an ally in the shape of autumn rains which will afford them even more immediate and more helpful aid than it may be within the power of their western allies to provide meantime. But, in the end, Poland will find freedom. Herr Hitler’s fond hope that he would speedily conquer Poland, and that Britain and France would, then, stand aloof was only one of (if the most important) a number of sorry miscalculations that he made. Again, it has been made plain to the German nation that, if Poland should be conquered, such a condition of things would make the great western democracies all the more resolute in their determination not to let up until Nazi methods and Nazi rule have been completely overthrown. Not a great deal of attention should be paid to the suggestion from Berlin that Poland will have no option but to surrender unconditionally very shortly. Germany’s wanton invasion of Poland may, on the other hand, prove to be far from over, bar the shouting. If any early autumn rains should be experienced, wet conditions would, assuredly, hamper Germany’s mobility and would be all in favour of the lighter-armed Poles. In the near future, Poland’s main problem is almost certain to be that of augmenting her supplies of war implements and of munitions. Without adequate war equipment, no nation—no matter how brave and how determined—could continue a sustained resistance, far less carry out a strong offensive. Only from two neighbours—Soviet Russia and Rumania—is help in that important direction possible, but whether extensive sales of war materials are being made to Poland by either or both of them remains to be seen. Perhaps no other aspect of the struggle will be more widely discussed to L day than the report that Soviet Russia has begun mobilising on the Russo-Poland frontier. The explanation that has been offered for the step is that it has become necessary on account of the fact that “the war in Poland has now assumed a wide and menacing character.” Russia’s action in this regard would seem to be open to several very different interpretations. That which it is to be trusted is the most improbable is that she also intends to attack Poland. In view of the so recently made Russo-German non-aggression;

pact, it is difficult to believe that she aims at attacking Germany. However, owing to Germany’s invasion of Poland, it might only have been expected that Russia would decide to man her western frontier on the chance —and let it be hoped that it may never happen—that sections of the Polish armies might be forced to take refuge in Russia, in which event large Soviet forces would, of course, be required to carry out their internment.