The Gisborne Herald. WITS WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, THURSDAY, AUG. 24, 1929. THE RED BOMBSHELL

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20024, 24 August 1939, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITS WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, THURSDAY, AUG. 24, 1929. THE RED BOMBSHELL

The dramatic announcement that Germany and Russia had arranged to conclude a non-aggression pact is reported to have fallen like a bombshell in Britain, France and Poland. What must have accentuated, the widespread surprise—and, to some extent, alarm—is the fact that, within only the last few months, Britain and France had had two different types of missions in Moscow in an endeavour to draw Russia into an Anglo-French-Soviet military alliance and that, whilst Germany was secretly hatching her pact with the Soviet, British and French military missions (which had superseded diplomatic missions) were (and still are) on Russian soil. But, after all, perhaps the projected GermanoSoviet pact does not represent such a momentous agreement as may, at first, have been feared in London, Paris and Warsaw. What it contains has not, as yet, been officially divulged and, as a consequence, guesswork tends to run riot. The full facts may not become known until after it has been signed. What might safely be predicted, however, is that the pact is not likely to place Russia under any obligation to enter ipto war. After all, a non-aggression pact is not a military alliance; it may include farreaching and very heavy commitments or, on the other hand, the reverse may be the case. History has shown, however, that that particular type of pact may, like pie crust, easily be broken. What effect the intended pact may have upon the Russo •AngloFrench negotiations remains to be seen. In this connection, it is of interest to note that the impression which appears to prevail in Soviet diplomatic circles in Britain is that the negotiations in question need not necessarily be abruptly terminated!

In due course, when the wave of astonishment that has been occasioned subsides, it is certain to be followed by a flood of caustic comments touching upon the fickleness of some races and, in particular, upon the extraordinary reversal of international outlook that has been displayed by both Germany and Russia. It seems but only a few months ago when Germany was loudly calling upon her neighbours to bear witness that she alone represented the great bulwark which was preventing the tide of Bolshevism from inundating Europe. On their part, the Soviet authorities made an open secret of the

fact that they reckoned Germany their Potential Enemy No. 1. Now both have quietly agreed to overlook each other’s previously most dangerous ideology! Japan, the third partner to the Fascist axis, is, doubtless, more perturbed than she carer, to express over Germany’s action in turning to her (Japan’s) most hateful neighbour for friendship and it need not occasion surprise if a complete change of heart takes place on the part of Japan towards Britain. It is much less difficult to account for Germany’s volte face than for Russia’s. Plainly, Germany decided to enter upon a mild flirtation with Russia merely because she was piqued owing to Britain and France having taken steps to thwart her territorial (and political) ambitions. But the Russian attitude is enigmatical and it really does seem that there is some ground for the belief that the Soviet has two Foreign Office policies—one a short range policy and the other a long range policy. In this regard, it may be recalled that, some time back, the official Soviet Foreign Office displayed considerable interest in, and much sympathy with, the Anglo-French efforts to discover whether a general peace settlement in Europe was attainable. On the other hand, the socalled “Second Soviet Foreign Office” (really the Communist Internationale) was, at the same time, engaged spreading propaganda denouncing the AngloFrench policy in its entirety and demanding a policy of “no compromise" with the Fascist nations. To-day the latter body is conspicuous on account of its silence with reference to the arranged, but as yet unsigned, GermanoSoviet pact.

It is certain that the bulk of the students of the international situation to-day have their attention rivetted upon the question as to what effecl the pact is likely to have upon the Polish problem. They will have in mind what the German and the Italian press claim that their side has been strengthened as a result of the agreement. It may be true that Britain, France and Poland may be somewhat handicapped on account of Germany’s action, but only if it should be considered by any of the smaller nations that Germany has, in some way, won a moral victory. What should not be overlooked, however, is this: That Britain and France had had no offer of help from Russia when they gave their guarantees to Poland and that no such offer has since been received. Wrong it would be for anyone to suggest, therefore, that the upholders of Poland’s rights will suffer any loss of promised military strength if Russia should abstain from assisting them in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. Then, again, surely Germany’s appeal to Russia for a non-aggression pact amounts to proof that she had begun to fear that she might not fare so well in another titanic struggle as her earlier boastings had intended to convey. What the immediate future holds in store is far from clear. It is, at any rate, not credible that Russia would agree to aid Germany and Italy in a war of aggression. Summed up, the outlook would appear to be that war will now be avoidable only if Poland decides to yield to Germany’s intimidatory tactics or if Germany refrains from taking aggressive action against her.