The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, MONDAY, JURY 31, 1939. AN AMERICAN GESTURE

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20003, 31 July 1939, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, MONDAY, JURY 31, 1939. AN AMERICAN GESTURE

With the dramatic suddenness that nowadays seems to be characteristic ot American methods, the United States Government last week gave notice of its intention to abrogate the treaty of friendship and commerce with Japan. Whatever the terminology of the official statement there is little room for doubt as to the real meaning and real motive of the American move; it can only be interpreted as a gesture of disapproval of the Japanese policy in China. As a gesture it is significant and not unimportant, but it would be foolish to exaggerate the possible implications or effects. If newspaper comment is any criterion of public opinion, and it generally is, there is a feeling throughout the United States, as, indeed, in other countries, that it is time that a halt was called to Japanese aggrestion and Japanese intolerance of the rights of third parties. That is a stepping-off point, but the question then arises as to how far the United States Government is either capable or willing to give expression to public opinion; it is one thing to condemn a policy or a practice and quite another thing to put a stop to it, and while America and Americans might talk with a loud voice—and that is almost a national habit—it is certain that they will not go to war in the East in defence either of their principles or the rights of their subjects. For some years now there has been an apparent inclination for the United States to speak loudly on international affairs, but when it comes to deeds, instead of mere words, there is not the same disposition towards action. It is particularly easy for America to talk, and especially so in regard to the Far East. On most international issues there is a fairly substantial cleavage of opinion in the United States, but Japan provides a fairly common enemy to all shades of thought. In the first place, Japan has few friends in America and she has been making more and more enemies through her disregard of American mission and trade interests in China. Officially and privately, therefore, she can afford to be condemnatory without raising unwelcome internal issues. But, beyond the usual spate of words, what is she likely to do about it? True, she has given notice of her in-

tention to abrogate the treaty of friendship, but it will be six months before the notice takes effect, and in six months anything might happen. Had the United States been really determined to take some action to restrain Japanese aggression she could easily have invoked the Nine-Power Treaty under which she is pledged to preserve the territorial integrity of China, but the method adopted is a much more easy, and must less dangerous, approach.

In some quarters, the American move has been interpreted as an encouragement to Great Britain to take a stronger stand in her attitude to the Far East, and it may have this effect, but there is a vast difference between the position of Great Britain and that of the United States. Whatever Ame-

rica might say or do in the present situation it will be “short of war,” so that if war should come in the Far East it will be Britain who will be

left, in American parlance, to carry the baby. In this respect, therefore, the United States is incurring no risk, but the contrast goes much further. America has no foreign commitments,

so that in any measures she might lake against Japan she has not got to take account of obligations in other widely-scattered spheres, as has Great Britain. Nor is there any other great Power sitting on the American doorstep and awaiting an opportunity, when she is preoccupied elsewhere, to strike at the security of America itself. This, then, is the vital difference between America and Britain. War in the East would inevitably involve Britain in war in Europe and

at home, but there is not the slightest reason to suppose that it would involve America in war at all. In

these circumstances, it is easy for the United States to sit on the fence and pull faces.

Despite this somewhat cynical opinion of American foreign policy—and it is justified by experience—the fact still remains that her gesture towards Japan is a valuable one, particularly at a time when Great Britain is engaged in delicate negotiations in Tokio. It is probably true, as one American commentator says, that it will bring new hope to China and convey some warning to Japan, but it would require a vivid imagination to agree with the statement that it is a notification to Britain that if she adopts a stronger policy in the face of Japanese pressure she will not stand alone. In fact, the same com-

mentator makes this very point, because he adds that the United States will use any influence “short of war.” That is the weakness of the whole American attitude, that even while she is breathing fire she is giving assurances- that nobody need fear that she will risk a fight. There remains, however, the possibility of economic pressure, of which hints have been dropped in some American quarters. If the United States would come out boldly and offer to co-operate with Britain in a naval blockade of Japan something might be achieved, but to be content with dropping vague hints us to what she might do in six months time —qualified with an assurance that she will not do anything really drastic —can hardly be regarded as greatly helpful to the British cause.