The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, THURSDAY, JULY 20, 1939. INTERNATIONAL UNREST

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 19994, 20 July 1939, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, THURSDAY, JULY 20, 1939. INTERNATIONAL UNREST

The sudden revival this week ol interest in the Danzig problem serves to show just how inflammable is the international situation generally. Danzig is only one of the centres of interest, and is, perhaps, a comparatively minor one upon which attention is being focussed in order to distract notice from other spheres. Britain, for instance, is at the moment engaged in diplomatic negotiations in both Moscow and Tokio and is engaged in concerting military activities in Poland. Germany and Italy have been acting in concert in regard to the Tyrol and Trieste. French diplomacy, of course, is bound up with tiiat oi Britain, and, in addition, she has problems of her own. On the other side of the world, the United States is still qpgaged in a political controversy retarding the part she should play in the event of an outbreak of war. None of these developments can effectively he separated from the other; to some extent they are all inter-related and part of a concerted plan. There can he little question, for instance, that Germany, as Sir George Paish slates to-day, is using Japan as a means for involving Britain in troubles in the Far East, and it seems equally clear that, at the other end of the axis, Ilorr Hitler is taking great pains to increase his influence over Italy. What the outcome of these moves will be no one dare predict. At the moment, Danzig is the ostensible storm centre. Germany has filled the city with supporters of the Nazi regime and has staged pro-Ger-'man demonstrations. She is deterred from direct action only by the clear knowledge that any attempt to stage a coup would involve her in conflict, not only with Poland, hut also with Britain and France. That she has so far stayed her hand can be accepted as evidence of the effectiveness of the principle of collective security, even though it is applied only in a limited form. Whether it will remain- effective will largely de-

pend upon what contributions may be made to the principle in the future. If Russia joins the anti-aggression bloc, for instance, it will provide a further strong deterrent against expansion in Eastern Europe, while should the United States repeal, or seriously modify, the neutrality laws, the deterrent effect would he more general. For the time being, it would seem that Germany is pausing to feel the pulse ot the world; if the pulse weakens she may he templed to stage another coup, but to the extent that it is strengthened so will the possibilities of further aggression he reduced. The essential thing at the moment, therefore, is that there should he no weakening on the part of those countries which oppose expansion by force. In this connection, the utmost in-

tc-rest attaches to the protracted negotiations with the Soviet. The prospects of agreement here appear to diminish with the passage of time and there is at least a suspicion that as Britain and France give way on one point a fresh one is immediately raised by Russia. The difficulties of an aercement between these countries is

apparent, and it is possible that the divergence of basic principles is so great that blame cannot be attached to any party in particular. It has already been revealed that difficulty arose out of the neutrality of the smaller Baltic States, which Russia did not desire to respect, and now another point of conflict is revealed in the statement that Britain will not agree that a large neighbour should be allowed to exercise sway in the internal politics of smaller neighbours. How could she, since the object of the

agreement is to restrain aggression and there is little difference in principle between military and political aggression? In the meantime, the failure to reach an agreement is undoubtedly doing harm to the allied

cause and the question arises as to whether it would not be advisable to abandon the discussions and act on the assumption that, since all the

countries concerned have a common cause, they will automatically act in concert in the event of an outbreak of war.

While the absence of agreement with Russia might seem to be a handicap to the democracies, there is not lacking evidence that the axis is not altogether a happy family. It can well be understood that Italy has little desire to fight on behalf of Danzig, or. for that matter, to give Germany any other conquest in the east unless she can be assured of some return for herself. Up till now she has received none of the spoils, and there are indications that she is to be shorn of some of her own territory, notably the Tyrol and part of Trieste. Japan is in a similarly unenviable position because she cannot hope to make any material gain from her part in the axis and for this reason has

refused to join in a military alliance. Her desire for protection against Communist aggression can be understood, but what would' she profit by joining an aggressive alliance? Her aims are all centred in China and the South Seas and in neither of these spheres can Germany or Italy be of much assistance to her; indeed, everything suggests that Germany is giving material aid to China. This lack of unity of purpose among the axis Powers may provide some hope for the maintenance of peace, but too much reliance should not be placed on it and it must still be realised that the only effective guarantee is the strength of those Powers who are determined to restrain aggression.