The Feilding Star TUESDAY, SEPT. 27, 1892. Legislative Council Appointments

Feilding Star, Volume XIV, Issue 43, 27 September 1892, Page 2

The Feilding Star TUESDAY, SEPT. 27, 1892. Legislative Council Appointments

. « The burning question of the day is the acceptance by the Gtoyernor of the recommendation of Ministers in regard to the filling of vacancies in the Legislative Council. It has been fiercely discussed in the press from various stand points, but in almost every case from a party aspect. The fact is, however, that it is not a party question at all, but one of constitutional principle. Extremists argue that the existence of a second chamber is at best but a necessary evil, after the famous epigram of Sieyes. " If a second chamber dissents from the first, it ia mischievous; if it agrees, it is superfluous." But the inexorable logic of facts nullifies this argument, inasmuch as the Legislative Council of New Zealand is an integral part of the constitutional machinery of the colony. Properly regarded it is not a rival House, but a revising chamber, and its concurrence in legislation, after full examination of the measures submitted, is an additional security against hasty legislation. It is an established political axiom that " the Crown can do no wrong, " because it shelters itself behind the advice of its responsible advisers, who are responsible in their turn to the people through Parliament. The Queen acts through her Ministers, and much of her success as a Sovereign is due to the fact that she does not venture to disregard their advice. Any colonial Governor who has the temerity to depart from the established constitutional practice is vainly endeavouring to revive a dead and dangerous precedent. Formerly Ministers were really the servants of the sovereign. They were appointed by him and were responsible to him alone. His policy was their policy. But the principle that now obtains was clearly laid down by Earl Grey as follows : "It is the distinguishing feature of Parliamentary Government that it requires the powers belonging to the Crown to be exercised through Ministers, who are held responsible for the manner in which they are used, and thus Ministers are entitled to hold office while they possess the confidence of Parliament, and more especially of the House of Commons," to which the General Assembly corresponds in this colony. Thus those who foolishly contend that the Ballauce Ministry ought to resign or go to the country because the Governor declined to accept their advice in regard to the nominations of members to fill vacancies in the Council, are " barking up the wrong tree." The Government has a majority in the House of Representatives, and public opinion is on its side. A dissolution and a general election would involve a needless waste of time and money, because it would only result in returning Ministers with a majority as strong as or stronger than that which they already possess. As to the dismissal of the Ministry by the Governor, it is a contingency which is not to be thought of. There is no instance on record of the dismissal of a whole Ministry until the reign of George 1., and that was due to the personal antipathy of the sovereign to the Ministry of his predecessor. The last case of the kind occurred during the short reign of William IV, but the Ministry which succeeded was defeated in the next general elections. In these days the sovereign— much less a colonial governor — would not dare to repeat that risky experiment. It is a favourite theory among vjonservatives that only the Liberals desire to maintain the equilibrium between the two Houses in order to carry their measures. But in 1711 the Tories swamped the House of Lords by the creation of peers, a proceeding which the Whigs strongly condemned; and in 1832, when the Whigs threatened to do the same thing in order to carry their Eeform Bill, the Tories professed to be horrified at the bare proposal. But apart from extreme party expedients the principle is thoroughly established that a Ministry having a majority in the popular chamber is entitled to protect its measures from mutilation or rejection by an adverse majority in the upper chamber by nominating a sufficient number of members to maintain the constitutional equilibrium. That principle was irrevocably established in the struggle over the Eeform Bill. During the previous fifty years the enemies of reform had filled the House Lord 3 with peers who were favourable to their policy. The Lords obstinately resisted the Eeform Bill, after it had been repeatedly passed by the Commons. The Ministry proposed to create ten or twenty new peers, but the King strenuously rejected their recommendations. Then a crisis occurred. It was a question whether Ministers should be compelled to retire from office with a majority at their back in the House of Commons, just as some people now erroneously contend that the Ballance Ministry is constitutionally bound to do. The House of Lords made a pretence of giving way on the second reading of the Bill, but afterwarJs attempted to shelve some of its most vital clauses. Ministers then recommended the creation of a sufficient number of peers to enable them to carry the measure unimpaired. Still the king was obdurate, and the House of Commons passed a resolution asking him to appoint to the House of Lords "such persons only as would carry into effect unimpaired in all its essential provisions the Bill for the representation of the people." Ultimately the king yielded, and the Bill was passed by the Lords by 106 to 22. The constitutional principle thus established has never been since seriously challenged. It would appear, however, that some colonial governors, acting on secret instructions from tfce Colonial Office, are endeavouring to rovive, out here exploded political doctrines, and to eat up

an authority outside Parliament and the people. To refer the question of £ filling vacancies in the Legislative Council to the Secretary of State for ] the colonies, is to entrust the decision < to an irresponsible person who does ' not represent a single elector in New Zealand. It is fundamentally subversive of self-government, and the principal of ministerial responsibility, and is calculated to indirectly involve j the crown, through one of its servants, > in a degree of personal responsibility of which it has long ago been divested. If Mr Ballance were to go to the country, it is probable he would come back with a majority, and the Governor would in the end have to accept his advice. If he were to resign, and be succeeded by another Ministry, he would »be able, with a majority at his back, to oust his successors, and reinstate himself as Premier. In either case the Governor must ultimately give way, or resign, and the latter course seems the more probable and feasible solution of the difficulty. c.o.m. [Since the above was in type a telegram has. been received by which we are informed that the Governor has been adyised by the Colonial Office to accede to the request of Ministers, and to call twelve members to the Upper House. |