PLANE DESIGNS

Evening Star, Issue 24330, 20 October 1942, Page 3

PLANE DESIGNS

AMERICAN FIGHTERS INFERIOR AT HIGH ALTITUDES HEAVY BOMBERS UNSURPASSED Press Association—By Telegraph—Copyright (Rec. 11 a.m.) WASHINGTON, October 19. ' Warning America that in the coming mouths battles may be lost and crushing defeats suffered, the Office of War Information, in a 10,000 words report to the public, designed to dispel the fog of confusion concerning American planes, said: “The truth lies between the two extremes of adverse and favourable criticism.”

The report specifically said the Curtis P4O, the Bell P 39, the Airacobra Psl, and the Mustang standard fighters have many good points, but are definitely inferior to foreign types in high-altitude combat. Improved types are in production, but are not yet battle tested. The chief fault of the American fighter is the tardy and incomplete; development of the Allison liquid-cooled motor. For daylight precision bombing the Flying Fortress 817 and the Liberator 824 are unsurpassed.. Our medium bombers, the Mitchell 825, ! and the Martin 826, have no competitors. The latest navy fighter, dive-bomber, and torpedo types already in action are the beet carrier planes in the world. Other types of patrol, reconnaissance, cargo, transport, and fire-spotters are satisfactory in quality within' their own fields.

The report stressed! that only results in battle could provide a valid standard of criticism. No full appraisal was possible until the war was won. The alternate superiority of United States and Britain in various types gave the United Nations as a team a better choice of weapons than the enemy. The report declared that the United States aircraft industry and services were steadily developing specialised! aircraft of high, and in some cases sensational, promise of battle performance. The report cautioned that the recent air victories, especially in the southwestern Pacific, may have resulted primarily from specialised tactical situations, which will not always be so favourable. It warned of possible coming defeats, and said: “When we meet re 7 versals and! the pull to victory seems to grow long and hard Americans will do well to indulge to the full in their genius for critical self-analysis.” tfIGH-ALTITUDE FAULT. While asserting that America lagged in developing high-altitude fighter planes, the report said they were valuable weapons in Russia and in North. Africa, where they were needed at relatively low altitudes.' The report pointed out that in China the American Volunteer Group flew P4o’s, and with the aid of the excellent Chinese air-raid warning system, destroyed 218 Japanese planes with the loss of 84 American , but in the February raid on Darwin eight out of 10 P4o’s were shot down by the Japanese, mostly because of lack of warning. Likewise, in the Philippines army craft were hampered because the air-raid warning system was. disrupted by “ fifth columnists ” 'before it had once functioned. WARNING NECESSARY. Stressing the importance of an ade-' quate warning system to, the successful operation of combat planes, the report said: As the battle of the Philippines wore southward there' was often noneat all. Furthermore, the American fighter pilots lacked technical equip-' ment and detectors to prepare for the enemy’s approach. Often the first notice came when enemy planes were sighted. If our fighters were already in the air they had a fair chance of getting up and battling with the enemy, but more often they had to wait for the. enemy to, come down to them and then slugging it out.- The air-raid warning system employed in China by Chenuault’s Flying Tigers was one of the finest in the world. The report added that-it must be repeated all the credit would go not to to the pilots and planes. A great part was due to the warning system. Palling back continuously on inadequate fields with inadequate facilities, all through the Japanese drive, to, the south-west Pacific, the P4o’e performance was decidedly less than standard. In the vital European theatre appraisal of P 39 and P 49 compels the conclusion that they are not right for Operation under to-day’s high-altitude tactics. ; In England two newer fighter types,_ the twin-engined Lockheed, P3B, the Lightning, and the single-engined Republic, P 47, and the Thunderbolt are in production ' an'd show _ great promise as high-altitude pursuit planes. Yet the public should be warned that neither plane is a complete answer to the fighter problem, and probably no plane ever will be. SUPREMACY OF FORTRESSES. Discussing the supremacy within its own fields of the Flying Fortresses, and Liberator bombers, the report disputes the claims for superiority sometimes made for the Lancaster bomber, which carries a heavier bomb-load, because it it designed to fly lower and carry less gasoline. The American planes, stripped for the same job, could easily increase their bomb-load.

While American air-cooled engines generally are regarded as world peers,! the report said the only liquid-cooled engine of American design now in mass production and general military use is the Allison. Its development, starting late, was carried out under great difficulties, and it had not yet caught up with the opposite numbers—-Britain’s Rolls-Royce and Germany’s; Daimler Benz.

In reaching for the ideal air force the United States was hampered by the impossibility of anticipating the, specific demands of war. It also had! been hamstrung by disagreement in its own fighting services as to the weight and power to be wielded by air, power. Despite this the United States went to war with a well integrated air force, but not all distributed with maximum effect. The prime specification for United States aeroplanes was the defence of our shores. This, more than any other factor, explains our preoccupation with long-range bombers. This practically explains our failure to develop a good interceptor, capable of climbing rapidly at short notice. Our entry into the war without such valuable equipment is explicable only by failure to give consideration to the possibility of full American participation . in aerial warfare overseas. Subsidiary explanations are shortage of development funds in peace-time years, and the prevalent public * faith that . the United States could avoid the involvement in a foreign war. In the vast revision of design since the war began in Europe the United States owes a vast debt to the Allies, and particularly to the British and the lessons they brought to America from the battlefield*.