DECIDING BATTLE

Evening Star, Issue 24330, 20 October 1942, Page 2

DECIDING BATTLE

THE SOLOMONS ARENA NAVAL SUPREMACY OF PACIFIC THE PRIZE (N.ZiP.A. Special Aust. Correspondent) SYDNEY, October 10. In tho obscurity of official reticence and the confusion of conflicting opinion .among the world's war news analysts one prime fact stands out in the battle for the Solomons. It is that the Japanese are intent upon pouring into this “ war crucible ” the maximum strength of ships, planes, and men they are able to muster. Anything less than complete victory for Japan will c.irry the tacit implication of eventual defeat in the Pacific war. It will he an admission that Japan's power by sea and air is no longer capable of sustaining, still less expanding, her Pacific empire. In her efforts to win back the Solomons Japan has withdrawn strength from her main bases in the central Pacific, probably from the Netherlands East indies, and apparently from New Guinea. That she is nimble to maintain her New Guinea offensive while preparing for a .Solomons blow is in itself an admission of comparative weakness. There have been few war observers who believed that the American grip on the South-eastern Solomons was complete and secure. It lias been widely held that Japan could retake the islands—if she was prepared to [lay a price sufficiently' high. The gravest danger to the A Wes’ broad Pacific strategy is perhaps less that the island may be retaken than that the price of' their recapture will he not sufficiently high in irreplaceable ships and aircraft. A decisive victory for the Allies in a naval battle, which if not already joined is almost certainly looming, would mark the real start of the much-talked-of island - hopping offensive against Japan. By taking the Southern Solomons the Americans merely put themselves in a position for such an offensive. JAPAN’S HEAVY SEA LOSSES. While Japan may have won local air supremacy in the Solomons (although this is still in dispute), it has been gained only at the expense of other theatres. On the broader Pacific front air superiority now lies with the United Nations. Ja))an’s sea losses in this war of attrition have been heavy and may well be tho eventual decisive factor. Among 368 Japanese vessels claimed as sunk during the war. Air William Fleisher, the. former editor of the ‘ Japanese Advertiser.’ lists six aircraft carriers, 24 cruisers, 45 destroyers, 29 submarines. 93 transports. 12 supply ships, and 99 merchant ships. Further heavy losses in a Solomons naval battle, ’ unless these were compensated for by the crippling defeat of the American fleet, would put Japan definitely on the defensive. ALLIED SUPPLY LINE.

The first aim in the double strategy motivating American occupation of the South-eastern Solomons was to break the keystone of Japanese encirclement in the South-west Pacific and protect the Allied supply line. The second was to draw the Japanese navy into a position where its valuable units would become vulnerable to attack by Allied ships and aircraft.' “At the moment the second objective seems to have been too successful,” according to a .war, commentator in the ‘ Christian Science Monitor,’ “ but not until word comes from the silent United States fleet will it be possible to tell whether the Japanese have run into a trap or whether their naval striking force has again been underestimated.”

The correspondent adds that the appearance of Japanese battleships off the Solomons has given rise to the question : “ Where are the big United States battle wagons?” Two factors affect the answer. United States naval men still believe that a full-dress engagement between capital ships is a distinct possibility, and thus American ships must remain where they may best serve for such an .event. Alternatively, knowing the Japanese penchant for economy of force, the United States may have decided that the Solomons could be defended and reinforced by heavy cruisers alone. But there is no reason to suppose United States reinforcement by cajpital ship strength is impossible. SUDDEN UPSETS LIABLE.

Air supremacy, perhaps depending on American ability to hold Guadalcanal airfield and maintain it in commission, is likely to influence the outcome of any major naval battle. But it is this battle which will decide the whole future course of the Pacific war, and until the question of Pacific naval supremacy has been deckled the course of war in this theatre must remain incalculable and liable •to sudden upsets. .