NEW ENTERPRISE ASSESSED

Evening Star, Issue 24285, 28 August 1942, Page 3

NEW ENTERPRISE ASSESSED

JAPS. MAY BE TRAPPED

(N.Z.P.A. Special Aust. Correspondent) (Rec. 1.55 p.m.) SYDNEY, August 28. The Japanese attempt to take Milne Bay cannot be divorced from the action in the Solomons (says the ‘ Sydney Morning Herald’s ’ war correspondent). “ If our forces in the Solomons go on to other successes and recapture the whole group, Milne Bay would be useless to the Japanese, and any garrison they might establish there would be cut off. On the other hand, if they successfully countered our move for the Solomons, Milne Bay would add tremendously to the strength of their grip in the South-west Pacific.” However, it is by no means certain that the enemy will succeed in taking Milne Bay. Even should, they gain an initial success they will have difficulty in holding it without strong - air protection. There are no topographical obstacles, excepting lakes and rivers between Milne Bay and Moresby along the Southern Now Guinea coast.

The scale of the land fighting at present taking place at Milne Bay is not known, but it is expected here that the next 48 hours will decide “ whether the Japanese have sent a boy to do a man’s job.” The general picture of the newest enemy expedition suggests that the restricted forces landing at Milne Bay might be intended to “soften” the area for a larger invasion force at a later date. The threat to Moresby, now emphasised, would then become grave. / , The difficulty of dislodging the Japanese once they landed was pointed out by the Sydney ‘ Telegraph,’ which says ; “Invariably, once they hit the cover of the jungle, the Japanese are difficult to root out. They have proved this iu the Kokoda area. Their Jimpetlike regard for even minor gains makes them hard even for a superior force to dislodge.” The advantages of Milne Bay to the enemy are assessed as being: Firstly, the gain in position for the Solomons struggle, which the .Japanese must expect to grow in intensity; secondly, to ensure control of the Torres Strait, discounting the protective value of Port Moresby to the Allies; thirdly, to place long-range enemy planes, both, land based and water craft, within close striking distance of the Australian main land.

“ Face ” is not the least important of Japan’s reasons for seeking a quick naval decision in the Solomons and for fresh offensive moves, declares Major Fielding Eliot, the ‘ New York, HeraldTribune ’ military commentator, in analysing Japan’s motives for counterattacking. Ho says our successful attack in the Solomons undoubtedly had a great effect on all Oriental people, among whom Japanese propaganda had been busy representing Japanese invincibility and superiority over all Westerners. Further, Japanese needs in other theatres, such as the contemplated attack on Russia and India, may call for a quick reversal of .the situation in the Solomons. “ The Japanese may feel our lodgment in the Solomons is obviously only the first step of an offensive directed against enemy bases in New Guinea and New Britain, and must bo eliminated before they have a free hand for a major effort elsewhere. If the Japanese have decided to risk the whole, or major part, of their fleet in an attempt to recover lost ground in the Solomons, their decision has been reached after carefully weighing all the factors.^