The Evening Star WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1940. PROBLEMS OF FRANCE.

Evening Star, Issue 23702, 9 October 1940, Page 6

The Evening Star WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1940. PROBLEMS OF FRANCE.

The statement of the French ConsulGeneral in Austi’alia, M. Tremoulct, that he represents the Retain. Government, “ the only French Government,” and his condemnation of French people in the Pacific who have declared for General de Gaulle are not very cheerful reminders of the difficulties that have been forced on Great Britain’s ally through the Vichy Government’s complete capitulation to the Nazi conquerors. At the moment it is impossible to forecast a diplomatic formula for the adjustment of Anglo-French relations on the old scale, but one thing which should be abundantly clear is that no good purpose will be served by indulgence in recriminations, which, after all, would only have the effect of widening the broach. It would appear that Britain, quite properly, is maintaining an attitude as indulgent as is compatible with vigorous prosecution of her struggle against Germany, and that her counsellors still have in mind the amazing sequence of obstacles that faced the French High Command from the moment the war on the Continent assumed major proportions. The full story of the disaster to the republic remains to be written in accurate detail, but already some progress lias been made in the pursuit of reliable information. An organisation known as the Imperial Policy Group, for instance, strikes a convincing note in a report which it issued on the collapse. It claims that when the highest possible industrial output was necessary for the life of France the country was plunged into a series of deplorable disputes and strikes from which it never recovered. Throughout all the vicissitudes of domestic politics a small group of intellectuals and diplomatists steadily maintained the country’s foreign commitments, irrespective of its military strength. The General Staff, it is stated, found itself unable to do more than prepare for the defence of the French frontier when the treaty obligations demanded a willingness to undertake an offensive.

Rather a startling explanation of Munich is given in the statement that the French public were most unwilling to go to war over Czecho-Slovakia. “ The whole world believes that Mr Chamberlain was driven to Munich by the unpreparedness qf Britain.” says the report. “ Although this was an important factor, it was not the only decisive one. We had no obligation to the Czechs outside the League of Nations, to which body no appeal was ever made. It was only in the very middle of the crisis that it became apparent that France had not the slightest intention of carrying out her obligations. . . . We were obliged to

assume that, although she had gone through difficulties, her recovery was only a matter of time. It was of vital importance that we should save her prestige and honour at any reasonable cost. It was this, as much as anything else, which led Great Britain to insist on a proper diplomatic settlement of the dispute.” In the light of what has occurred since Munich, particularly the evidence of the inability of France to defend her frontiers, apart altogether from lundertaking a war of offence, this explanation rings true. The saving of Czecho-Slovakia by military force was a sheer impossibility.

It is now only too clear that when war broke out over Poland the Germans had every reason to be confident of success on the land. The Nazis’ passive policy in the west was deliberately calculated to undermine the morale of France. Grumbling in the army grew to alarming proportions, and the authorities could not arrest the defeatists fast enough. The Germans, in their unscrupulous fashion, concentrated Nazi propaganda among the employer classes and spread Communistic propaganda among the masses. The “ fifth column ” grew' to enormous proportions. The report from which we have taken extracts says it was estimated by observers that 90 per cent, of the women of France were ready for peace at almost any price. The Gormans, too, started the story that France had gone to war under British pressure, whereas it was to honour a French alliance that Great Britain had marched. Much was made of the smallness of the British Army, and at this criticism many Frenchmen wore only too anxious to grasp. The total inadequacy of the French air force was conveniently forgotten. The fact was also overlooked that the French army itself was far from being the efficient fighting machine the world had been led to believe, the expensive Maginot Lino apparently being expected to do everything by way of saving the country. For France the year 1940 is one of tragic humiliation, brought about in the first place not by the people as a whole but by disordered and mischievous politics. Those Britons who treasure good relations with the French will take care not to judge them too harshly, for in doing so nothing would be gained. General dc Gaulle will win more support if lie is able to show proof of Britain’s tolerant understanding- of the position.