JAPAN’S INTERESTS

Evening Star, Issue 23700, 7 October 1940, Page 6

JAPAN’S INTERESTS

FAR EAST SITUATION VIEWPOINT AT SINGAPORE SOURCE OF SUPPLY Tho Singapore correspondent of * The Times ’ (London) points out that the Japanese have their own definition of the phrase “ South Seas,” or Nanyo. A booklet published a few months ago 1 by the Japanese South Sea Association and pimporting to discuss economic and cultural problems included within its orbit the following countries: The Philippines, French Indo-China, Thailand, British Malaya, British North (Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei, the Netherlaud Indies, Portuguese Timor, Hainan Island, and the Japanese mandated islands, which are more legitimately described as in the South Sea zone. A wider definition of the area was given by Mr Masanori Ito, the Japanese pub- ■ li'eist, in an article two or three years ago in the ‘Japan Times.’ He said: The region cannot be dearly defined as are America and Asia. There are varying terms for the zone, such as the Front and Back South Seas, the Outer and Inner South Seas, etc. The South Seas as interpreted in connection with (Japanese) economic statistics mean the so-called Front South Seas, which cover a sphere including Thailand, the Netherland Indies, French Indo-China, the Straits Settlements, and the Philippines. This area embraces 110,000,000 square miles, or five times that of Japan. In a sense it may be proper that these regions should include New Guinea and tho Solomon Islands. . . . Taken in a wider sense the South Seas include India, Australia, and even Africa. THE NAVAL SPHERE. It will he seen that the orbit of the Japanese South Seas policy can be made to expand or contract at will. In the minds of Japanese in the countries affected it embraces all that region whose trade routes the Japanese navy claims the ability to police should Japanese economic interests , bo threatened. The Japanese in Singapore will explain that, whereas their army has a responsibility toward Continental East Asia, meaning China, their navy is concerned with “ Advance to the South ” aspirations. Though increased attention has been given the problem in recent years Mr Jto contends that Great Britain, Franco, and the Netherlands entertained suspicions about Japanese intentions in tho Fast Indies even before 1914. To-day with a formidable task on her hands in China it is reasonable to suppose that Japan will he satisfied if her economic interests in the South Seas can ho secured. Provided there is no deliberate effort to pick a quarrel there need be no inconsistency between the clearly understood desire of Japan to consolidate her economic position in the South Seas and her frequent affirmation that she has no territorial ambitions in this region. Any determined attempt to secure “ economic mastery ” of the region such as some Tokio extremists have urged would provoke serious reactions ; but, since the South Seas is pre-eminently an area from which all the industrial countries of the world, the United States no less than European nations, must buy raw materials, it ought not to be beyond the capacity of statesmen to find a solution calculated to meet the legitimate requirements of all concerned. Various arguments have been put forward in support of Japan’s intense interest in the South Sea countries, but the real justification for the Japanese interest in that the region is the natural source of raw materials which Japan requires. Some Japanese feel that, while they can secure all or almost all they require in this region, at some future time restrictions might be imposed which would have a serious effect on their national economy. There has never been any serious likelihood of this, and Japan’s purchases in Netherland Indies and Malaya, for example, have been restricted only by the countries’ ability to meet Japanese orders. Moreover, few obstacles have.been put in the way of Japanese companies sharing in the development of these areas. All the iron mines in Malaya are owned and operated by Japanese, and last, year produced some 2,000,000 tons of high-grade iron ore, which was exported to Japan, equal to nearly 50 per cent, of her total iron ore imports. Also, there are many Japanese-owned rubber estates in Malaya, and the Japanese fishing industry operates from many Malayan ports. Figures, published by the South Sea Association, put Japanese investments there at about £20,000,000, most of which is invested in agricultural enterprises and the rest in forestry, fisheries, mining, commerce, and industry. The Japanese say, however, that this figure represents lees than 3 per cent, of the total foreign capital invested in the South Sea countries. A LIFE LINE. Japan claims that the South Seas constitute one of her vital “ life lines,” a phrase which might in certain circumstances he used to justify strong action. For the present she need have no fear of interference with this “ life line,” and tho recent declarations on the maintenance of the status quo in the Netherland Indies and French Indo-China, together with the treaties signed by Great Britain, France, and Japan with Thailand, which guarantee the integrity and future independence of that important buffer State in East Asia, are hopeful signs for the future. The special correspondent of a Japanese newspaper who arrived in Singapore recently after an extended stay in Java implied that Japan is satisfied that her legitimate aspirations in the Dutch colony will be met and that there is

no justification for any fears. A further indication of the common desire of the Japanese and Dutch authorities to agree on outstanding points may be seen in a statement made a few days ago. According to the spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office, the Netherland Indies Government will not take any measures which would prevent those commodities of the Netherland Indies essential to Japan from being exported to Japan. This is taken to mean that agreement has been reached in principle between the two Governments. The Netherland Indies authorities are anxious to sell as much as they can of their, surplus export products, but, since the Netherlands and her colonies are at war, it is not unnatural that the Dutch should put first the economic requirements of the fight against Germany. The Far East should not he seriously affected by any economic changes brought about by the war, unless Russia plays a bigger part as a supplier of essentia] commodities to Germany. Some months ago it was admitted that there had been leakages in the blockade owing to the Soviet Government allowing the transit of tin, rubber, and other'Yvar materials to Germany from the Far East. Fortunately there is no reason to believe, for the present at any rate, that Japan intends to sell war materials to Germany in this way. Her policy appears to be prompted moro by her own requirements. Analysed in relation to the immediate situation, this policy may be seen as a desire to lessen Japanese dependence upon supplies from the United States, particularly of petroleum. Japan’s shortage of oil resources is a fundamental weakness in her economy. At present she can buy in the Netherland Indies, and any precipitate action in the Far East likelv to extend the scope of hostilities would probably result in cutting off her supplies of oil from the United States as well as from the Indies.