COMMENT and REFLECTIONS

Evening Star, Issue 23699, 5 October 1940, Page 11

COMMENT and REFLECTIONS

If a moment of clairvoyance, like a flash of lightning, could expose to us Hitler s mind, it would certainly reveal a terrible landscape, riven no less by doubts and fears than by storms of malice and hatred. For, disguise it as he and his entourage may, the fact is carven for all to see that Britain in the month of September successfully challenged his invincibility, routed his Luftwaffe with humiliating thoroughness, twisted all his invasion plans awry by those forestalling offensives upon embarkation points along the French and Flemish coasts, delayed the simultaneous movement on Egypt that was to march in line with that invasion, and reduced the Nazis to a hurried search for further allies to create an alternative diversion. These reverses cannot be ivholly concealed from the German people, nor concealed at all from the conquered peoples surrounding the Reich. All German metropolitans can see the flames kindled over Berlin by our bombers, and the conquered vassals see nightly, with secret glee, the great columns of smoke, shot with lurid glare, that arise from docks and factories on their coastline, and feel the earth tremors that announce destruction. The fact of Hitler s daily defeat by Britain is being so thunderously declaimed that there is nothing the Goebbels lie machine can invent to explain it away. And Hitler cannot afford to get abroad even a whisper of failure, let alone this swelling murmur. It is said that the alpine avalanches are sometimes brought down upon the climber through the mere stirring of the air by a whisper. Perhaps the whisper is already abroad that will swell to a ululation for revenge, and bring the apalariche down upon Hitler; and then no more of this man, so deeply imbrued in blood; no more of his regime; but (let us hope) a perpetual restraint upon a nation whose centuriesold pertinacity in national malice, bullying, and cruel aggression entitles its treatment bytthe world as recidivist. . It is not possible yet to put finger on the hidden two and two fluff constitute the correct four of Hitlers revised plans, but it seems certain that the Mediterranean area is to be the cockpit of the next phase. This may involve not only a vigorous prosecution of the Italian advance into Egypt, but also a land attack on Gibraltar with the object of sealing the Western Mediterranean entrance. But this latter venture requires the active co-operation of Franco, and, judging by cable reports of Suner’s Berlin mission, the Spanish leader is not proving so compliant as the Axis expected. If Spain does come in it will be because she thinks that, if she keeps the peace, the place she wants will be snatched from under her nose by the Axis. If she decides, on the other hand, to stay out, it will mean that the events of September in the battle of Britain have disillusioned her earlier belief in the quick success (or any success at all) of her potential partners. The capture of Gibraltar and the seizure of Alexandria and the. Suez would, of course, bottle the British Fleet, lay Palestine and Syria open to the invader, and threaten Britain's oil life-line. But we are a long way from having to < contemplate such an eventuality. The first pre-requisite is the defeat of our Army and Air Force in Egypt. Graziani’s cohorts covered 100 miles on the desert roads to Mersa Matruh, where the first considerable British forces are awaiting the moment to counter-attack in strength. There appears to be little doubt that he is on the eve of an offensive on grand scale by land and air. Italy’s spearpoint has recently been strengthened by squadrons of Germany’s singleengined dive-bombers (Stukas), which achieved, such grim success in Poland and France. Their chief function is to wipe out the resistance of enemy front-line troops. It is to be noted, however, that their trial in Britain was brief; they proved easy victims for British fighters; and since our Air Force in the Middle East has lately been reinforced with the latest equipment, the success of these bombers is likely to be no greater than that achieved against England,

On the whole we can viciv the Egyptian situation with confidence, if not complacency. Once the main armies are engaged the invaders must depend upon a single vulnerable line of communication for every bullet, every plane part, and every pint of water. Failure to get< supplies through day by day, will be disastrous to morale in that country and climate; and harrying tactics and the immense difficulties of desert ivarfare may check the Italian levies at an early stage of the campaign.

Nor will the enemy's air communications be sufficiently safe to ensure constant reinforcement and the replacing of equipment. Enemy plcines can be flown safely from Sicily at night only, whereas Britain, with undisputed command of the Mediterranean can reinforce the R.A.F. with comparative ease. Britain, moreover, is able to draw on reserves in Palestine, Iraq, and Aden; and the reinforcement route from India is also safe unless Italy can gain a footing in Syria.

It has been a good month for Britain and her well-wishers, and one of sufficient ill-boding for the enemy as (God be thanked) to stop his constant “ yammering ” about what horrid fate awaits us in his hour of (postponed) victory. Perhaps he has been reading and digesting in the light of his recent reverses those words in the first Book of Samuel: —“ Talk no more so exceedingly proudly; let not arrogancy come out of your mouth. . . . The bows of the mighty men are broken, and they that stumbled are girded ivith strength."