THE POSITION IN SYRIA

Evening Star, Issue 23696, 2 October 1940, Page 8

THE POSITION IN SYRIA

MEANING OF ITALIAN DEMANDS THREAT TO SUEZ CANAL CARDS IN BRITAIN'S HAND [By Sf.xkx.] The latest Fascist demands on pinioned France, reported from Cairo, point to the development of an Italian plan to use Syria for the purpose of aiding the attack on Egypt and also making an air and sea attack on Palestine. The reported demands include the handing over of Tripoli as a naval base, the grounding of the French military aircraft now in Syria at Rhodes, in the Dodecanese Islands, which the Italians hold; the granting of two air bases in Syria and Lebanon, and the demobilisation of what French force remains in Syria. It will be recalled that after the fall of Prance there were first signs that the' garrison in Syria, which was extremely powerful, would continue to resist Germany and Italy. These signs proved misleading, the morale of the men was impaired, and a visit by General Weygand was sufficient to make the commanding officers follow the directions of the Vichy Government. But though this was so and though Italian officers arrived in Syria to watch certain measures being carried out, there remain unsettling factors. One of these undoubtedly is the British Government’s determination to defend Syria against any such move as that now mooted. If the Italians are to take over naval, air, and military establishments in Syria and Lebanon they would need to do it quickly and as a coup. Forces would have to be rushed from the nearest available points to present the British with a fait accompli, and even then the move would have to be carried out with the utmost despatch. Consequently the publication of these new demands may be a mortal blow to the Italian plan. That the Fascists have been meditating some such move has been known for some time past. The real purpose of the Italian military commission in Syria was seen to be to make a survey of the possibilities of the place for operations against Britain, The plan then studied was an occupation on the lines of the German occupation of the French western seaboard, to bo carried out by “legal” methods and, if possible, with the goodwill of the local French residents.

A foothold in Syria would obviously be of the greatest value to the Italian General Staff. From Tripoli, which is about 40 miles north of Beirut, and must not be confused with a port of the same name in Libya, naval operations could be conducted against Palestine and Egypt, and from the adjacent air bases Haifa, of great importance as an oil port and a source of supply to the Royal Navy, could be systematically attacked, Tripoli, which provided safe anchorage even before it had any harbour works, would give the Italian ships a haven inside the British-held bastion of Cyprus. Air bases in the same locality would almost halve the present flying distance for Italian bombers from Rhodes to Egyptian vital points. At the same time there would be a possible reversal of the famous British plan of the World War, the march on Damascus. Italian armoured units might make an attack from Syria on Palestine and ultimately on the isthmus of Suez. The rapid seizure of this, timed to the possible capture of Gibraltar, might imprison the British Fleet, and it could then be hunted down.

That is the Axis strategy. Moreover, it is obviously the best war plan available. It would, at a stroke, restore communications with Ethiopia, now isolated from the centre of the Italian Empire, it would obtain oil supplies, or at least deny an important source to the British, and it would “ free ” the Mediterranean, which would then become an Axis preserve. The reduction of Turkey, either by diplomatic or mili»tary means, would be easy to accomplish thereafter.

A few weeks ago the French still had a force of 250,000 troops in Syria. But recent despatches indicate that the country is torn between two allegiances —one to the Vichy Government, the other to the cause of French freedom. No one knows what would be the result if Britain suddenly moved into the country. Hundreds of French officers have already deserted to Palestine to continue the struggle under General de Gaulle. The troops who could bo trusted to obey Vichy are the Algerian, Moroccan. Tunisian, and Sengalese regiments. It appears that some at least of these are being maintained there, while the endeavour has been to demobilise other units.

Further complications of the situation, however, come from two direcions. One of these is the Arab community, which has not yet abandoned hope of an Arab Empire, a hope which the Italians themselves did something to foster in pre-war propaganda. The other is Turkey, which has a vital interest in Syria, her next-door neighbour, and also owns ambitions to possess Aleppo. The Turks know what having the Italians in occupation of adjacent territory would mean to them and how much likelihood there is of Mussolini ever leaving it. The Dodecanese Islands were supposed to have been “temporarily ” occupied by Italy, which was bound to surrender thein to Greece 20 years ago. But the Fascists are still there.

Recent reports from Syria to the ißritish Press'indicate that the feeling of the local population*is pronouncedly nnti-Ttnlian. Members of the Italian mission were manhandled. The Moslems, especially, remember the way in which the Fascists have behaved to the native peoples of North Africa. ProBritish sentiments are helped hy the fact that Syrian money based on the franc, is worthless abroad and that economic gains are seen from a policy in co-operation with Britain. “ The British are rich and therefore we like them,” said one Arab recently.