EGYPT FIRM

Evening Star, Issue 23680, 13 September 1940, Page 12

EGYPT FIRM

HAZARDS OF ITALIAN INVASION CHECK TO FASCIST PROPAGANDA By its firm and explicit declaration of readiness to go to war alongside Britain if Italy’s forces were to launch an invasion, the Egyptian Government has materially clarified the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, and given an effective check to the anti-British influence of Italian agents, spies, and propagandists (says the ‘ Melbourne Age ’). There are reckoned to be some 60,000 Italians in Egypt, and since the British abandonment of Somaliland the more active and vocal have redoubled their efforts to induce Egypt to maintain a merely passive attitude. Evidences of British initiative, such as the naval bombardment of Italian concentrations near Fort Capuzzo and Bardia, and repeated R.A.F. attacks on Italian bases, stores, harbours, and transports, were, doubtless, also factors that led to the declaration. With a realist view of the value of Mussolini’s promises, the Egyptian Government broke off diplomatic relations with Italy soon after his declaration that he did not intend to drag Egypt into the conflict. Many Italians, suspected of subversive activities, were rounded up and interned. Egypt has now a National Coalition Ministry, led by Hassan Pasha Sabry, who has shown evidences of friendliness to Britain, and whose policy is one of faithful allegiance to the obligations assumed by Egypt tinder the Anglo-Egyp-tian Treaty. ITALY’S LIBYAN FORCES. The defection of Franco and of French North African armies meant that considerable Italian forces on the Libya-Tuuisia border were released for other purposes. Estimates of the strength of Italy’s troops in Libya place the total at 250,000, including 80,000 to 100,000 Europeans, of whom some are Germans. The naval and air attacks on Fort Capuzzo struck at the source of Italian preparations to invade Egypt, and afforded an impressive demonstration that sea power is still a vita! factor in this region. Despite the presence of the entire Italian navy in the Mediterranean, events since Mussolini’s declaration of war over two months ago show that the British Fleet, based on Alexandria, controls the whole Eastern Mediterranean. Over a strip about 150 miles within the Egyptian border, facing Libya, modem communications are lacking, and the zone presents an unattractive “ buffer ” to any invasion. The main outer strongpost, Mersa Matruh, is the railhead from Cairo, but a French explorer described the intervening region towards Libya as “ the most desert-like desert in Africa.”

Obstacles have been placed along tbe narrow coastal track that runs between the plateau and the Mediterranean. These are designed to impede any Italian columns that venture into Egypt, and to cause the maximum disorganisation and delay to invaders at points where British naval guns could be brought to bear. ' The devastation worked near Fort Capuzzo, and R.A.F. achievements over military targets in Libya, as well as against Italian bombers and fighters, have given Marshal Graziani a foretaste of what his force may have to contend with if he orders an advance along the coast roads toward Mersa Matruh. MUSSOLINI AND VIOLENCE.

In tracing tlie origins of the long series of aggressions that have made the present an age of violence without parallel in history, many observers have seen in Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 the beginning of the whole tragic process which destroyed the system of collective security and postponed indefinitely realisation of the ideals of the League of Nations. But others go back to 1923, and fasten the prime responsibility on Mussolini for his seizure of the Greek island of Corfu in that year. The Italian delegate for the delimitation of the Albanian frontier, General Tellini, was assassinated, and although there was no proof that the assassins were Greek, Mussolini declared that the Greek Government was responsible. He sent Italian warships to Corfu, which bombarded the town, killing a number of people, and made claims against Greece, which, after consideration by The Hague Court, resulted in payment of a substantial indemnity to Italy. This precedent of 1923 was remembered by Mussolini when he decided to launch his Abyssinian campaign in 1935. The episode is by many regarded as the real start of aggression, the first example, after the last war, of reliance on brute force by the so-called “ have not” Powers, preparing the way for the long string of invasions and seizures that occurred since. BRITAIN AND GREECE, It was Mussolini’s seizure of Albania at Easter last year in violation of solemn pledges that led Britain to give to Greece a guarantee of assistance in the event of its territorial integrity being violated. The Italian dictator was then widely suspected of having designs on Corfu, which, because of its strategic position, near the entrance to the Adriatic Sea, was known to be coveted by him. If the Belgrade report be well based —that Italy is now demanding of the Metaxas Government that it renounce the British guarantee—it would imply that Mussolini wishes to reduce his neighbour’s powers of resistance to the utmost. Should Greece refuse the demand and Italy launch aggressive action, the use of Greek harbours, bases, and islands would doubtless be promptly placed at the disposal of the British Navy. NAZI “ BLOCKADE ” BOAST. Official figures heavily discount the Nazi boast of a “ total blockade ” of Britain. During a recent week, while violent Nazi air attacks were being made, the British Coastal Command provided 155 air escorts for convoys. In 10 weeks to August 3, 9,930,555 tons of various products were successfully landed in British ports. These included 1,692.004 tons of cereals, 984,219 tons of other foods, 2,886,022 tons of oil fuel, and 2,212,736 tons of minerals. From the start of the war to noon, August 14, 31,981 ships had been escorted in convoy, and only 80 had been lost. In addition to cargoes earned in convoys, large supplies are brought by fast merchantmen sailing independently. The total amount imported during the past fortnight has been nearly 2,000,000 t0 Enemy mercantile losses, including German, Italian, and unfriendly vessels of occupied countries totalled 1,212,000 tons up to August 17. The British total war shipping casualties to the same date was 1,384,565 tons. Merchant vessels under construction in the United King-

dom at August 10 totalled 1,003,000 gross tons. The total Allied tonnage in use today is between 6,000,000 and 7,000,000 toils, some of which is chartered by the British Government. the french navy. According to American observers of the British naval action off Oran in July, to prevent major units of the French fleet from falling into German and Italian hands, the resudt of this and other measures was to put out of action 84 per cent, of France’s battleship strength, 48 per cent, of cruiser strength, all aircraft carriers, at least 16 per cent, of destroyers, 14 per cent, of submarines, and at least 50 per cent, of submarine chasers and other light craft. Of capital ships, the percentage accounted for would be increased by the exploit of Lieutenant-commander R. H. Bristowe at Dakar in disabling the 35.000-ton battleship Richelieu with a group of depth charges at the stern. After further action by aircraft the Richelieu settled down in shallow water surrounded by oil patches.