THE RUSSIAN ARMY

Evening Star, Issue 23379, 23 September 1939, Page 14

THE RUSSIAN ARMY

A FORMIDABLE FORGE [Tlie following article appeared iu the London ‘Times ’ a few days before the announcement of the Soviet-German treaty.] The Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, under Marshal Voroshiloff's command, is a formidable fighting force. In numbers it approaches the 2,000,000 mark in peace time, being composed of over 100 infantry divisions and at least 30 cavalry divisions. This large force of cavalry ie of particular utility in a country which is not well equipped with railways and roads, _ and of wliich large regions on the Asiatic frontiers consist of steppes, desert, and mountain. On the completion of mobilisation some 4,000,000 men would be under arms. There is compulsory military service for two years, which gives the country a reserve of trained men amounting to something like 12,000,000. Russia. thus has no lack of man-power for any campaign she might wish to undertake.

The latest expert information shows that the army is well equipped with the most modern weapons. The rank and file are acknowledged to be excellent fighting men, extremely brave, hardy, enthusiastic, and well instructed A tradition of German training has produced non-commissioned officers whose qualities of thoroughness are accompanied by a certain lack of initiative, and reluctance to take responsibility is a defect that becomes more pronounced the higher the rank. This is partly the effect of the “ purge,” which a year or two ago reduced ,-the efficiency, while it presumably strengthened the loyalty, of the fighting forces. It is perpetuated to some extent by the system’ of associating a political commissar with the commander of each unit,' but this appears more unpractical to Western than it does to Russian minds. KEEN COMMANDERS. The highest ranks largely consist of new men, who make up in keenness what they lack in experience, and the “ purge ” is now sufficiently far past for its effect to be wearing off. The army has, at any rate, had continuity of command under Marshal Voroshiloff, whose close association with the undisputed leader of the nation dates from their exploits in the civil wars. The Chief of Staff, Army Commander Shaposhnikoff, is another old campaigner who commanded a regiment under the Tsar.

History has shown that' this great force is more effective in defence than in attack. Communications in Russia are not what they are' in Western Europe, and rapidity of manoeuvre in the highly complex conditions of modern war is not to be expected. In defence of its own soil the army would undoubtedly be extremely formidable, the mere so as scarcity _of communications can be a worse hindrance to an invader than to the defender, as the Japanese are finding. The Russian army has shown, however, that it is capable of making a’ sudden effort which can seriously disconcert the most powerful enemy, and that it is also capable of undertaking offensive operations on a limited sbaje against a weak adversary. SOURCES OF STRENGTH. 5 .» Compared with 25 years ago, the military strength of the country has increased. The rank and file , are no longer illiterate. Factories have sprung up all over Soviet Russia, which now manufactures weapons, munitions, and supplies of all kinds for which Tsarist Russia was dependent on her western allies. Here again quantity is to some extent handicapped by insufficiency of transport. As regards one prime necessity of modern warfare Russia is perhaps better placed than any other Power except the United States; she is sure of petrol. Besides the world-famous Baku_ oilfields, there is the important oil region between the Volga and the Urals, known as- the “ second Baku,” which already produces 6,000 tons of petroleum daily, and two near neighbours, Iran and Iraq, are at hand with, further huge supplies. The fashion of building strong concrete underground defence lines has not been neglected. All the important points on the western frontiers are thus protected, and, in the Far East the more vital spots also have those lines., MILITARY OBJECTIVES. On the western frontier the tasks and objectives of the Russian army are various. Starting from the_ north, there is the great industrial city and port, of Leningrad .to be protected in case any of the Eastern Balkan States were likely to become the base of a hostile attack. The same applies to Murmansk, the Arctic harbour m the north-west. Then there is the possibility, in 00-operation with Poland and Lithuania, of attacking East Prussia. There is Poland herself, who might require assistance, and, lastly, it might bo a Russian objective to help defend the Rumanian oil wells. _ Anglo-French co-operation with Russian activities in Europe might be effected either by the Bosphorus or by Murmansk or by air. One of the obstacles to co-operation is the difference of gauge between the Russian and Polish railways, but this could, ( if useessary, be surmounted. It is thought that any attack on Russia would most likely take a northerly direction. It is regarded as significant that this year s army manoeuvres are to be held in the Leningrad area, as it is generally believed that any serious, threat to the independence of Estonia or Latvia would bring the Russian army over their frontiers. This belief accounts for the difficutly in the Moscow diplomatic negotiations of providing for the case of “ indirect aggression, the last outstanding question.