GERMAN ARMY

Evening Star, Issue 23370, 13 September 1939, Page 10

GERMAN ARMY

GRAVE DEFECTS SEEN HUNGARIAN'S ESTIMATE TRAINED MAN-POWER FRANCE’S LONG LEAD. In these early days of Britain’s second war with Germany, the peoples of the Empire have not been made any less resolute by the common belief that Germany ipossesses an army and air force of great strength and efficiency. In vowing to “ stop Hitler ” they have not indulged in comforting thoughts that the Gorman military machine may be much less formidable than it is made out to be. Everyday opinion seems to go no further than that Germany cannot win a short war and is ill-prepared for a long one. Those who take such a conservative view will be tempted to feel a good deal more hopeful after reading a remarkable little book which was published at Budapest early in July by a Hungarian university professor and historian, Dr Ivan Lajos. Within a week of its appearance 30 ; 000 copies had been sold, and an English translation was brought out almost immediately in London under the title ‘ Germany’s War Chances, as Pictured in German Official Literature.’ “ HORROR AND DESPAIR.” “ With ever-increasing despair,” writes Dr Lajos in his introduction, “ I see how part of our Press—not to say the larger part of our Press—is engaged in a masterly preparation of our public opinion for our participation in an eventual war at the side of Germany. - . “ I have been watching this phenomenon for a long time. I, too, have heard the tales of the -50,000 aeroplanes and other wonders, but I could not see how to reconcile all this with the resignation of important German generals, either before a coup (Blomberg, Fritsch, etc.), or immediately after one (Beck); and above all with the fact that the 1 Epoque,’ the organ of the French General Staff, was always in firmest opposition to any idea of a settlement, proclaiming that it would he better to bear the sacrifice entailed by a war, because a war would only result in a victory for the Western Powers “ I turned my attention to the German technical Press, and it was then that horror and despair seized me. That is the reason why I now teel that I must publish my findings.” A LIGHTNING WAR. The author then sets out to review every problem facing Germany in the event of a large-scale war on land—the fighting forces, food, armaments, raw materials, finance, national morale, and the possibility of American participation. In every case his findings, based on those of German military, economic, financial, and even political experts, are wholly against •her chances of success. ... .. Possibly the chapter of most interest at this moment is one in which Dr Lajos estimates the real military strength of the Reich and the hopes of winning a “ lightning war.” On good authority he rules out Russia as an object of siiddeu, or even deliberate, attack, on account of her military preparedness and her vast size, which makes the effective use of aircraft almost impossible. He quotes the recently published opinion of the German General Metsch that she is “ unconquerable anyway.” “Let us now turn to the West, the author continues. “We shall find that there also the prospects of a lightning war are poor. France, in comparison with the situation in 1914, lias decisive advantages; in the first place, as regards Germany in the enormous line of defence all along her eastern frontier, which cannot be compared with the fortifications which she possessed in 1914; but, above all, in the fact that ever since the war she has continued without interruption the system of conscription.” DEFICIENCY IN TWO-YEAR SOLDIERS. In Germany, he points out, general conscription was not reintroduced until 1935, and .to remedy this lack the earlier classes have been hastily given short courses of training. He presents official figures in support of an estimate that, in addition to the standing Reichswehr, training and administrative personnel, the Reich has 'at its disposal scarcely more than 1,500,000' men who have taken part in a thorough two-year training, in comparison with the 5,000,000 which France possesses. On the significance of this he quotes General Metsch, who considers two years the minimum: “It is startling what a rich harvest death can reap among, half-trained soldiers, even if they are of the most superb courage. It is ■ incomprehensible how a superficially trained mob can be expected to achieve results nowadays in the complicated conditions of a war conducted with modern weapons.” NOT ENOUGH OFFICERS. Dr Lajos brings forward abundant statistics to show that the army Tacks the absolutely neoevssary number of officers and non-commissioned officers for the essential cadres, or unit organisations. This is an especially important factor for the German arm.y, he points out, because the German is an excellent soldier, but for the full development of his fighting qualities he needs a solid and competent cadre. For the present establishment, at least 45,000 officers are needed, hut in spite of all efforts, including the commissioning of 8,000 non-commissioned officers of the old (Reichswehr, the number to-day is not over 34,000. Moreover, in the event of mobilisation, only 62,000 reserve officers are available. wherCas to reach the 1914 standard of 120 infantry and 11 cavalry divisions it would, be necessary to have at least 150,000 more reserve officers and 600,000 reserve non-commissioned officers. While there is a surplus of 22 generals over minimum requirements, colonels are 100 short, lieutenantcolonels do not reach the required number, and there is a deficiency of 300 or 400 majors. For a mobilised army of 100 divisions, at least 5,000 •general and staff officers are needed, but the present figure is about 3,850. FALLACY OF A SHORT WAR. Even these results can only have been obtained by the most hasty methods, for official returns show some abnormally rapid promotions. For example, of 323 colonels in August, 1936. 70 had held the rank of captain in January, 1933. _ln the lower ranks the phenomenon is even more marked, and the author’s conclusion is that these shortcomings cannot be without their deleterious effect upon the fighting qualities of the German army. After discussing other factors, such as the neglected mechanical condition of the German railways, the need of civil man-power in war. and the shortage of gold and credit, the author quotes the following dictum from n

semi-official 1936 military annual: " Our mistalken attitude to the question of a short war has once already caused our ruin, and for that reason we must not let ourselves be led into wishful thinking about a short war in this age -of swarms of tanks and aeroplanes." ______________