The Evening Star THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1936. THE EMPIRE’S SEA ROUTES.

Evening Star, Issue 22452, 24 September 1936, Page 10

The Evening Star THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1936. THE EMPIRE’S SEA ROUTES.

Britain’s defence plans are clear and definite. .They can be crystallised in the statement that the aim. is to bring the defences into proportion with the obligations and risks. That is an object to which the most convinced pacifist could hot reasonably take exception. It is being pursued steadfastly and expeditiously at the moment, recent events having impressed British statesmen with the danger of delay. Sir Thomas Inskip, Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, is pressing forward with the plans that have been evolved, and Sir Samuel Hoare has just returned to London from a tour of the Mediterranean, which is a vital link in the Empire chain of defence. As First Lord of the Admiralty, this Minister is directly concerned in the naval problems that have been presented and are so far-reaching and so widespread in character. As • a writer in the ‘ Round Table ’ points out, the Imperial defence system must stand as a single whole. If it fails at one point it is gravely weakened throughout. For example, the essential lines of economic communication in the Empire cannot be secured against all contingencies unless the naval and air services can at one and the same time defend the eastern front line from Singapore to New Zealand, protect shipping in the Mediterranean and the English Channel, ward off surface and submarine commerce-raiders on the high seas, put up a defence against the bombing of ports, and,' if necessary, retaliate in kind against such air bombardment. It is a tremendous task indeed, and the time factor is vital, for if, say, Italy could destroy Malta and Alexandria by bombing, even at great loss of planes and men, without the British forces being able to render immediately any effective retort or adequate defence, British naval power in the Mediterranean would be crippled, which would be as disastrous to the dominions and India as to the Mother Land itself. In a statement on his return to London, Sir Samuel Hoare made it clear that, far from abandoning British stations in the Mediterranean, it was intended to strengthen their defences. The most valuable, apart from Gibraltar, is Malta, which is an important naval base and coaling station with an extensive dockyard and arsenal. This small island, which has been a British possession for over a hundred years, is a key position in the Mediterranean, and extensive plans have been prepared for the strengthening of its defences. It is also indicated that considerable developments are contemplated in Cyprus, which likewise has strategic advantages. Sir Samuel Hoare emphasises that these precautions, the necessity of which is obvious, are not meant as a threat against any Power* Britain’s

desire is to live in friendship with all nations, but reciprocity in this matter cannot- be regarded as a certainty in the face of what has transpired in the last year or two. Authoritative Italian circles, it is said, are not ready to accept Sir Samuel Hoare’s assurances, and profess to see Machiavellian designs in British policy. This attitude is absurd, for in international relations consistency in efforts to keep the peace has been a feature of successive Administrations in London. The employment of aircraft as a third arm in the fighting services has greatly affected the problems of defence, and the measures that are being taken to strengthen the Mediterranean bases are related to the new developments. There is no ground whatever for the professed Italian anxiety. If it arises from the dream of making the Mediterranean an Italian lake, the sooner Mussolini is disillusioned about such a vain hope the better. It can be safely concluded that France and Turkey, to name only two Powers directly concerned, would be behind Britain in discountenancing such an idea.