THE NEW LOCARNO

Evening Star, Issue 22452, 24 September 1936, Page 18

THE NEW LOCARNO

WHY GERMANY CAME iH INFLUENCE BY ITALIANS The attitude of the British Government towards a “ new Locarno ” was defined by tbo Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony 'Eden, during the three-Powor conversations that took place in Loudon on July 23 (writes “ Augur ” from London to the ‘ New York Times ’). When the text of the communique issued that day had been finally approved by the British, French, and Belgian conferees Mr Eden said that “ this is the final test of the sincerity of the intentions of Germany to work for the peace of Europe.” Then Viscount Halifax, Lord Privy Seal, proposed the immediate communication in Berlin by the ambassadors of the three Powers of an invitation to Germany to attend a new five-Power conference. The British Government is under no illusion as to the gravity of the situation. It has firmly decided to prosecute the attempt at conciliation ot Germany while the slightest hope remains of reaching an agreement. If obliged to admit failure, it will proceed to transform the present consultations among the General Starts of Britain, France, and Belgium into a permanent military committee, as promised last March, when the Powers met in London to discuss the situation created by the German reoccupation of the demilitarised zone on the Rhine. TO TRY EVERY COURSE. The British Ministers consider it necessary to carry the attempt at conciliation to the utmost limit, not only because they are sincerely peace-loving, but also because they desire to educate public opinion, pi'oving to it that everything humanly possible has been done to avoid forcible action. They are confirmed in this policy by the discovery that the French Government is even more anxious for peace than they themselves. Germany’s acceptance of the invitation to attend a five-Power conference was received here with satisfaction. But the satisfaction was tempered with a coolness caused by the fact that the assent bad been qualified-by the condition of preliminary diplomatic negotiation, which at best means a long period of haggling and possibly a breakdown before the meeting takes place. London is certain that one of the principal reasons that prompted Chancellor Adolf Hitler to accept the invitation was that Rome had informed him of its decision to delay acceptance no longer. If Italv had come alone, joining the front of Western Powers, Germany would have been loft very much in the cold. Evidently, too, German diplomacy relies upon past experience again to obtain from Britain and Franco farreaching concessions by dangling in front of them the menace of constantlyincreasing . armaments. The British Ministers recognise that the repeated successes of this method encourage Hitler to pursue the well-tried policy of “ grab what you can without shooting.” THE CHIEF DIFFICULTY. The British Government knows now, however, exactly where is the chief difficulty in concluding a satisfactory new Locarno Treaty. The Germans wish to limit it strictly _ to the group of Western Powers, without lotting themselves be tied in any way to other parts of Europe, where they desire to remain free to pursue a policy of political expansion by force if necessary. _ Yet a Western Pact is useless if it is not accompanied by an agreement to limit armaments. Now that navies cease to play the leading part, _ air armaments come first if limitation is to be real. But the Germans always have refused to accept a British or French yardstick for the air, arguing that they must bo prepared to meet the menace of the ever-growing fleet of Russian war aeroplanes. There is sound reason why Russia must be brought into any agreement, and then, too, Little Entente Powers—Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania —cannot be neglected. Even if a pact, to please the Germans, were drawn up without the participation of Moscow, it could not become operative without Russia’s adhering to its terms. The history of the naval agreements now being negotiated with Germany and Russia is a good example of how these two countries interlock in Europe. . When they were in London, President Leon Blum and Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos of France proposed, and the British Ministers endorsed, the principle that a Western Pact could not be allowed to increase danger to peace in the rest of Europe. In other words, the British and French agreed to consider Europe as a whole for the purposes of a general settlement, it is difficult to see how the British Government can now throw over this decision, although it is technically possible that- a Western Pact may be negotiated first, provided an established general agreement must follow. THE COLONIES ISSUE.. Further complication is caused by the question of colonies. The German demand in this respect is categorical and undisguised. In September, 1935, Sir Samuel Hoare, in a speech at Geneva, indicated clearly the direction of the wind when he said the British Government admitted the necessity of discussing free access to raw materials. The meaning of this definite statement at the time was not enough considered —that Britain refuses to discuss the return of territorial sovereignty lost by Germany in 1918. Mr Eden, in a recent speech in the House of Commons, pointedly referred to the impossibility of discussing a transfer of mandates. Therefore,- in spite of propaganda, it can he taken for granted that if Germany demands a return of her old colonies she will receive, as a leading personage put it to this writer, “ the raspberry.” It is now seen here that optimism over the possibility of a meeting of a new Locarno Conference before September was unwarranted. Mr Eden hoped to have the Five Powers meet before the Assembly of the League of Nations met at Geneva, thus leaving the road clear for discussion of reform of the League Covenant. Since Berlin desires carefully to prepare ' for the conference by means of ordinary diplomatic conversations beforehand, it is impossible to expect that anything useful could have been achieved by meeting in August, even if this were technically possible. It is timely hero to warn against attaching undue importance to the visit to Berlin of Sir Robert Vansittart, Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who went there to attend the Olympic Gaines, for which he reserved a- seat long ago. It categorically may bo asserted Sir Robert had no mission to discuss the problem of a now Locarno with the German Government. No doubt he met representatives of tho German Foreign Office, and probably members of ,tho Government, but this contact was not intended to take the form of a discussion ot stops for a Locarno settlement.