ABYSSINIAN ROUT

Evening Star, Issue 22451, 23 September 1936, Page 7

ABYSSINIAN ROUT

SOME INNER HISTORY ESPIONAGE AND PROPAGANDA Wehib Pasha, the Turkish general who was chief of staff of the Abyssinian southern army, has been making shrewd comments on the Italo-Abyssinian, war in interviews here, writes the Cairo correspondent of the ‘ Manchester Guardian.’ But he had nothing but admiration for the Negus, who was on a plane above any of his countrymen. Flight was the only thing possible in the face of the open Jjebeliion. The use of gas by the Italians, he said, may have been a contributory cause for the rout in the north, but lack of food and war material, Italian espionage, propaganda, and money were the downfall of the Abyssinians on both fronts. _ Gas undoubtedly had a demoralising effect, but actually it was not so effective as in France, owing to the nature of the country: it hung in the valleys, and troops could escape by moving up the hills. In the same way all bombing had little effect. The general said that sometimes for days on end the Italians sent over countless planes, dropping tons of bombs, but there were no proper buildings to bomb, and no real damage was done. The troops became so indifferent that it was only with difficulty that they could be forced to take cover. But espionage was the deciding factor. SPIES IN STATE SERVICE. Despite the Abyssinians’ inherent suspicion of foreigners, the Government service was full of spies in the pay of the Italians, so that every movement of troops was conveyed to the enemy, in many cases by the aid of wireless. In this way the Abyssinians were outevery turn. Nevertheless, Wehib Pasha was anxious to point out that in his generalisation he did not include the Swedish officers attached to the Emperor. He said that they all gave of their best, and many of them distinguished themselves with remarkable feats of bravery. Speaking particularly of the southern front, Wehib Pasha could not withhold a compliment to General Graziani, the Italian commander-in-chief. He said that from the first he advanced cautiously, always making sure of his lines of communication and never leaving a loophole for the Abyssinians to attack. But as he was kept fully informed by spies of the disposition of the Abyssinian forces, he always had a great advantage. Moreover, General Graziani made full use of his Askaris ™i. native troops (of whom Wehib Pasha was not a great admirer) so that, apart from Italian officers’ white troops were rarely seen. In the last stages of the fighting on the southern front the Italians suffered heavy casualties among their native troops, and detachments of white troops were brought up as reinforcements. majority of his own forces Wehib Pasha spoke highly. In the circumstances,- they gave a very creditable performance. For days they marched on nothing more than a.handful of meal, and towards the end of the war, when food supplies became still more scarce and irregular, they often went for days without any food at all and sucked pebbles to remove the pangs of thirst. Of their equipment Wehib Pasha could only speak with disgust. He said that"the majority were in possession of at least half a dozen different sorts of rifles and a similar number of kinds of ammunitiqn. Consequently, when they did receive fresh supplies of ammunition it was found to be unsuitable for the many antiquated rifles in the possession of the troops. The Abyssinian Imperial Guard, from which great things had been expected, proved a disappointment. They had been trained, said Wehib Pasha, how to shoulder a rifle and march in step on the parade ground, but had been robbed in the process of their natural fighting qualities. In battle they were not to be relied upon like the untrained irregulars, and their hasty flights in the face of the enemy were infectious. TREACHEROUS TROOPS. Then the Italian agents got to work with a liberal supply of money among the petty chiefs and discontented troops, so that one morning Wehib Pasha and other members of his staff woke to find that the troops they had posted overnight had disappeared. They had mutinied and made off to the capital or to their native villages. It_ was not disloyalty to the Emperor, said Wehib Pasha, but merely a question of hungry and ill-equipped troops passing to the highest bidder.

But Wehib Pasha had a moral to draw from the war which deserves more than a passing consideration from all those interested in the Italian adventure in Africa. He believes that for the moment Italian bribery has triumphed over half the country, but there still remains another half unconquered and no thoughts anywhere of allegiance to the Italians. Moreover, despite the supposed collapse of the Abyssinian Empire, the Abyssinians still remain, in his opinion (and Wehib Pasha has had considerable fighting experience), some of the finest natural soldiers in the world. It only remains for them to be equipped with modern weapons and led by _ white officers to provide an army which no one could afford to despise. Wehib Pasha is convinced that within a few years Italy can raise an army which would be a menace not only to Egypt and the Sudan, but to all the surrounding countries.