SPANISH MOROCCO

Evening Star, Issue 22447, 18 September 1936, Page 11

SPANISH MOROCCO

WHERE THE REVOLT STARTED Vice-Admiral C. V. Osborne, 0.8., C.M.G., writes in the London ‘ Sunday Time«.’ In the year A.D. 710 a small force of Arabs and Berbers, under Tarif the Berber, assisted by Julian the Christian, crossed the Straits of Gibraltar from Ceata, and landing at or near Tarifa, conquered the whole of Spain. The world is now waiting to see if the moment has come for history to repeat itself. Right down the ages Morocco has been a perpetual thorn in Spain’s side, and from the time when Ferdinand and Isabella ejected the Moors from the Peninsula and took Melilla, countless Spaniards have left their bones in that troublous land. It would be ironical if an expedition starting from exactly the same spot as Tarif should achieve the conquest of Spain in the face of the “ Front Populaire ” Government. No better place than Ceuta could have been chosen by the army as the cradle of a revolutionary movement, for here military power is supreme. The administration of Spanish Morocco js peculiar. It has as basis the Spanish Colonies of Ceuta and Melilla, to which must be added the small islands of Alhuecemas, Penon de Velez, and the Chafarines. Ceuta is by far the most important. Running out into the Straits opposite Gibraltar, and very similar to it in size and shape, only not so high, it is strongly fortified, and ought to be impregnable against any Spanish naval force. Last winter, during a long visit for the purpose of studying the French and Spanish conquest of Morocco, I was permitted to roam all over Ceuta. The guns, thoroughly modern and concealed from the sea by earthworks, seemed more numerous and powerful than those of Gibraltar. Without doubt they could carry right across the Straits. The harbour has been brought up-to-date at great cost, and can accommodate warships or liners up to 20,000 tons. Melilla, far away to the east, is another miltary stronghold. Between and beyond these colonies the Spanish protected zone stretches from the sea to the Riff mountains, where it adjoins the French. In fact, except for the small internationally administered zone surrounding Tangier, the whole of the north coast of Morocco is in Spanish hands. Nominally the Calipha rules, representing the Sultan, and having his seat of Government at Tetuan, but actually the Spanish High Commissioner, a

civilian, governs the land. Until the conquest was complete the post was a military one, and great names such as Benenguer, Jordana, and Prime de Rivera_ figure on the roll of High Commissioners, but just as Marshal Lyautey was replaced by a civilian as Resi-dent-General of the French zone in 1926, so Spain has followed a similar policy which asserts, albeit with a voice becoming less emphatic as the war . clouds grow nearer, that “ government is a civil function.” Directly under the civil High Commissioner comes the Commander-in-Chief of the military forces in Morocco, ■who commands not only the army but also the police; thus the High Commissioner is entirely dependent on his subordinate for the maintenance of that order and tranquillity in which alone his civil administration, can function., FORMIDABLE TASK. At the slightest breath of disaffection on the part of the array the civil High Commissioner becomes a cipher. Even if he is lucky enough to get messages through to Madrid which bring the navy post-haste to the Straits, the capture of Ceuta is a task far more formidable than that accomplished by Rooke in the taking of Gibraltar. It may be assumed, then, that General Franco has the whole of Spanish Morocco in his grip. Taking my figures from the Armaments Year Book, the army maintained! on the Spanish Peninsula amounts to about 114,000 men,, while there are in Morocco some 33,500, of whom 8,900 are native troops. There is, in addition, a police force of several thousands, and the Moroccan army is a self-contained force, capable of powerful action, always provided it is prepared to obey its 'officers. But will it obey them? This is the crux of the matter. In the obscurity which still surrounds the rebellion several pointers obtrude themselves. We have the reported Government decree relieving all_ officers of their authority and placing the regiments under the command of their sergeantmajors. If this be true it confirms the general impression that the conspiracy, whether Fascist or Monarchist, owes its origin to the officers. In that case the men arc more likely to follow them in Morocco, where they are removed from the political influences of home life, than in Spain, where Communists surround them. The native troops under Spanish officers would probably have no scruples about fighting against Spaniards, and would do so for the sheer joy of fighting. while the Foreign Legion, or “ Tercio di Marruecos,” the backbone of the Spanish army in Morocco, with its strong esprit de corps and high sense of discipline, might be expected to follow its officers to the death, especially as the greatest care has been

taken to preserve it from the insidious doctrines of Communism. RIFFIAN VETERANS. This famous corps, although quite modern, having been founded only in 1920 in imitation of the French, is magnificent alike in physique and bravery. It has two headquarters— Riffieri, near Ceuta, and Melilla. At each there should be, at the present time, about 3,300 men. Some 18 per cent, are foreigners—Germans, Argentines, Cubans, and so on—and the remainder Spaniards, but all are veterans who hold their lives cheaply and have been wounded many times in Riffian struggles. I believe that if the Foreign Legion were persuaded that their cause was a just one they would form so strong a nucleus that the rest of Spain’s armies would crumble before them. It was with pride in his eyes that the Spanish Minister at Tangier invited me to visit the Legion’s barracks; he little guessed that a few months later they would be heading the revolt against the government he represented. Of the other Spanish troops I have not so high an opinion. That they are slovenly to a degree means little. French colonial regiments, notably tirailleurs, though they look like nothing on earth on the march, light like tigers. But the Spanish_ soldiers have not so good a record. Incidents of the Riff war, in particular the defeat of Anual when 20,000 Spaniards were annihilated or driven into the sea, make sad reading. Out for a walk near Tetuan only a few months ago, and approaching the foothills, I heard a rifle-shot, and saw a bullet splash on the road some 20yds ahead. A wounded dog hobbled away. Looking round, I perceived that from a small white blockhouse in the hills above me, three or four soldiers were amusing themselves by potting at the unfortunate cur. It was a sign of the lax discipline that prevailed. However that may be, troops from Ceuta have been landed at Algeciras and are still ■ fighting there. Seldom has a revolutionary movement had so favourable a start. We read of naval battles in the Straits. The transport of staunch troops to Spain must be the heart of the rebel leaders’ problem, and this is doubtless why the navy or that part of it which is loyal to the Government, is concentrating its efforts on denying passage to the invading armies, and is being bombed in consequence by the rebels. IMPORTANCE OP THE SEA. With General Mola commanding a strong revolutionary army in the north and General Franco holding the Moroccan army based on its impregnable fortress in the south, the Madrid Government must have a difficult problem to solve, especially if its loyal regiments are really commanded by sergeants! The immediate result must, I think, depend on two factors, whether the rebel soldiers in Spain will obey their officers, and whether the navy will succeed in denying the Straits to tbe invading legionaries. As usual, command of the sea is vitally important, and the struggle for the control of the warships, whose officers seem all to be under arrest, may decide the issue. I read that the native tribesmen had offered their help to the rebels, but cannot take this seriously, except as applying to the regular Spanish native regiments. The Moroccan tribesmen are inveterate fighters, hating their subjection to the race they despise, although it may bring them bread. At a hint of Spanish weakness, once they could smuggle in the necessary arras, they would rise to a man, and make a bid for freedom and the old-time anarchy. The Anjera tribe surrounding Ceuta was in revolt 10 years ago. The El Ha us and Beni Hozmar which enclose Tetuan between them only await their opportunity. It is not long since it was impossible for a Spanish soldier to Wave the precincts of the historic town without being attacked. The Djebalas, away to the west, led of old by the now almost legendary Raisuii, have fought Spain for centuries. Between Ceuta and Melilla dwell a hundred thousand warriors who still remember the triumphs of 1925. Spain knows this well, and will take care, if she is wise, not to let the rift within her body spread to her protectorate. It were better that it should be controlled wholly by one side or the other, while the issue is fought out in the homeland. '