FOOD IN WARTIME

Evening Star, Issue 22444, 15 September 1936, Page 12

FOOD IN WARTIME

A PLAN FOR BRITAIN IMPORTANCE OF FORESIGHT CATERING FOR NEEDS During the critical years 1915-1919 much experience was gained in the production of food under war-time conditions, writes Sir John Russell, director of Rothamsted Experimental Station, in the ‘ Morning Post.’ Part of this was recorded by Sir Thomas Middleton in his admirable monograph | Food Production in War,’ published in 1923 under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; part is recorded in the files of the old Food Production Department of. the Ministry of Agriculture; and much of it still survives in the counties among those who had to do with the War-time Agricultural Committees. One of the most important lessons of the war was the need for adaptability on the part of the farmer. When food production came under control many farmers were called upon to change; their cropping. It was not that their farming had been bad; often, indeed, it had been better than the proposed system, but it did not yield the particular products needed, and so it had to go. Great indignation was often aroused in the countryside at the loss of technical efficiency resulting from the ploughing up of good grass land to convert it into inferior arable land or in the selection by inexpert committees of one area of land tor ploughing when another would have been much better. Tales still survive of the adventures of persistent farmers who appealed against an order and went to London to interview first one official and then another. The details vary according to the man and the occasion, but the common element is the invariable lack of knowledge of agriculture on the part of the officials. COST WAS VERY HIGH. Although the nation got through, the margin was at times perilously narrow, and the cost was extremely high. If ever the occasion arose again the same result could be achieved much more easily if the results of the past experience were utilised.' The agricultural conditions, both on the administrative and the technical sides, are more favourable than they were. The farmers of the country are now represented by a great union, the National Farmers’ Onion. The workers’ interests are watched by the National Union of Agricultural Workers and the agricultural section of the Transport and General Workers’ Union; and both farmers and workers are represented on the • Agricultural Wages Boards. ' On the technical side the position is vastly better than it was. Farmers have been schooled to change by the vast upheavals of the last 20 years, and they have developed a mental alertness and a power of adaptation that would surprise people who do not know them. Each county now has a competent agricultural organiser, often with one or more assistants, and these officers are linked up with specialist advisers, who in turn are associated with the Agricultural Research Stations and the Universities. The chain is complete from the Research Station to the farm, and the connection is steadily improving. Any plan that commended itself to the community as being agriculturally sound could be carried through much more smoothly and economically than in 1916. But, of course, the plan would need very careful preparation, fior British agriculture is exceedingly complex and is not amenable to any one simple treatment. ON A WAR FOOTING, There are several ways in which food production can be organised m relation to defence. The most _ complete, but also the most is that adopted in several of the Uontinontal countries, and is well illustrated in Italy and Russia. Food production in peace time is put on to a war footing. The nation is made completely self-supporting in all essential foods, and whatever cannot be produced at home must be replaced by something that is physiologically as_ effective. . , The actual work of producing the food is done by peasants_ and their families, and the organisation is such that if the men of military age were called away the work would still go on. Full opportunity for practice in replacement is afforded by the calling up of men for a period of military service in peace time. The Russian system is so good that nothing short of a peasant revolution could ever reduce Russia to starvation, no matter how

long a war should last or how many fighting men should be taken away. The problem is simplified by the wide range of conditions from arctic to subtropical, which allows northern crops like rye, and tropical crops like tea, cotton, and rubber producing plants, to grow within the ring fence of the Soviet Union. Italy had a much harder task, but under Mussolini has now accomplished it. When he began, Italy was a wheat-importing country dependent on outside centres for part of its food. The Duce set about adding to its area by reclaiming great stretches of waste land and intensifying regions previously under-cultivated, with the result that Italy has now become practically self-supporting. The standard of nutrition is not high, but it is accepted by the nation, and the food production is done by a peasant population which could spare a large part of its men of military age without serious loss of output of food. WOT LIKELY TO BE ADOPTED. It is improbable that so drastic a method would be adopted in this country. A simpler and, from my point of view, a more feasible course would be to leave agriculture on a peace time basis but to work out beforehand the changes that would be needed in the event of war and to make skeletal arrangements which could readily be expanded. The amount of food needed monthly for the nation is known; so also are the visible supplies. The demand that would be made on agriculture in war time can therefore be estimated and_ a plan worked out for satisfying this. The country (England' and Wales) is already divided up into 10 divisions, each with a co-ordinated advisory staff accustomed to work together. 11-epre-sentatives of these staffs, acting in conjunction with the experts of the central authority, could allocate to each division its share in the food production programme, and each divisional staff could subdivide its share among the counties. , No new staff would be needed for this part of the work—the machinery already exists. The county staffs would, however, need additional help for the next stage —the allocation of the county programme among the various farming regions of each county. Since 1919 a great amount of soil surveying has been done and these surveys would form the basis of the allocation. The surveyors could indicate areas of waste that could be reclaimed, though not to yield a profit; areas that could be drained and embanked so as to enable them to be cultivated; stretches of grass could advantageously be ploughed out, or areas of land where the farming could advantageously be intensified. Some of the grievous mistakes of 1917 and 1918 oould thereby , be avoided. Certain technical problems that arose in those days would again assume importance if war should break out. They were not satisfactorily solved in war time, and, although ways round were improvised, it would be far better to find an adequate solution in peace time, when they are relatively unimportant, than to wait till the need is upon us. These various problems could be assembled by the experts of the central authority and investigated. Meanwhile the local staffs would work out the implications of their parts of the programme —the quantities of fertiliser and feeding stuffs they would need- the implements, power units, and live stock required. They should also ascertain what steps could be taken for substituting labour and should study such possibilities as “ Hying labour corps,” like the “ shock brigades ” of the Russian farms. The results need only be on paper, but it would be more effective if the actual nucleus in each area oould be set up and kept in working order. Grants could be made to selected farmers, on the same principle as subsidies are paid to selected ships, on condition of willingness to undertake certain changes in production specified by the county experts. It oould be arranged for the necessary appliances to be kept in readiness, and the farm staff to know how to use them. Experiments would be made to ascertain the best substitutes for the farm materials that would cease to be available in war time. The usual fertilisers and feeding stuffs, if needed for munitions, could be replaced by others which, while less convenient in time of peace, might not be much less effective. Experiments could be made on tho utilisation as food—for men or for animals—of things such as excess potatoes, plant products not commonly used, and for the agricultural utilisation of the by-products of munitions or other industries that would expand in war time. Some of the land reclamation schemes could be carried out, not for the purpose of profit, but to give areas of new land on which wheat could be grown without displacing existing crops. QUICKLY IN OPERATION. A skeleton programme of this kind properly worked out could at once be ! set in operation if the need arose, and

it would he capable of rapid expansion if the need continued. It would lead to no war mongering; the countryman is the last man to clamour for war, as he hates being shaken out of his peaceful routine. On the other hand, a widespread feeling of security about food supplies would ensure that the public kept its head in time of crisis, and so long. as the British public does that its political sagacity generally- leads it to a sound decision. But a fear of shortage might easily stampede the community into a course of action that it would never in its quieter moments have approved, and which, indeed, might prove quite unwise. Even if there were no desire to put a defence programme into action there is much to be said for drawing one up, if only for the purpose of ensuring that the technical information, wanted for its execution should be* fully available if unhappily the need should ever arise.