The Evening Star SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1935. THE LEAGUE ACTS.

Evening Star, Issue 22146, 28 September 1935, Page 16

The Evening Star SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1935. THE LEAGUE ACTS.

“ One of the greatest decisions in history ” is the opinion, expressed by members of the League of Nations Council on its resolution invoking Article 15 of the Covenant in connection with the Abyssinian dispute. That is as the sequel may prove. There is nothing sensational or in itself conclusive about the actual decision. The question of sanctions has not yet arisen. The decision was no more than the inevitable next step in a routine if the Council was to do more than admit that it lacked the courage to deal according to its Constitution with the trouble that has arisen, throw up its hands in despair, and tell Italy, in effect, that brigandage was still permitted by the world’s government. The decision is momentous,' nevertheless. It leaves no escape from a further decision, or attempt at decision, impossible to be long delayed, that shall be conclusive either for Italy’s adventure or for the League’s existence. It is much that thirteen member States of the Council should hare been able to agree unanimously on a course that involves such implications. The wheels of the League grind 1 slowly; they are meant to do so. Wars are made naturally in hot blood, not in cold. The longer a desperate course, appealing to this or the other nation, can be delayed, and calm consideration enforced, the greater the chance is that it never will be proceeded with. The real test for the Council will come when it has to agree unanimously on the report, expected to be available within ten days, that will now bo prepared by its fuil committee. If unanimity is reached it will be for Italy to obey or not obey. In default of unanimity it will still, be required of Italy that she shall refrain from war for a period of three months, while all means' are taken to settle her difference peacefully.

Signor Mussolini, up to this- stage, must be said to have played his cards adroitly. H© has submitted to the League’s procedure, despite all the contempt with which he has treated it by continuing at the same time his preparations for war and in other ways. If, after this, the League disagrees it will still be open to him to comply with all its obligations before going to war. The case would be different with his pledge under the Kellogg Pact, which requires that war shall not he used as an instrument of national policy, and. with his treaties’with Abyssinia. Pull compliance with the requirements of the League, however, must still W a hard requirement—harder now that the rains in Abyssinia have ceased. There is no indication that the demands of Italy have been appreciably abated. Her less truculent attitude, in the last few days, seems to have been due to no more than belief on her part that, if the worst came to the worst, the States of the League would never agree to more than economic sanctions, which would take .time to embarrass her 'seriously. Mussolini’s war can only be made in the dry season of Ethiopia, which lasts for eight months. If it is to he made at all it is much to expect that he will delay it till January, when three months of that season for the present year will have passed. 1 But his war, to be decisive, must be a long business. Whatever accumulations have been made beforehand it would require, very soon, constant replenishments of provisions of every kind, which Italy, from her own resources, could hardly be expected to provide. Even economic sanctions might be fatal to the sword arm. The seriousness of. such sanctions from the League’s viewpoint is that at any ' moment ’ they may become synonymous with war. As Mr Downie Stewart, quoting Mr Baldwin, has said,: “ The moment they were up against sanctions they were up against they adopted the principle of sanctions they must always be ready for war, and if they adopted sanctions without being ready for war they were not honest trustees of the nation.’’ The League is in a weak position with the militarists, and also the extreme pacifists (in the sense of non-resisters under any circumstances) against it, ranged for all. effectual purposes in the same camp. But the extreme pacifists are not likely to be numerous enough to make any final obstacle to world peace. The greatest surprise to Italy, causing most resentment, seems to have been that the League should deal so seriously with hex* threatened violation of its Cotenant when a like offence, by Japan was allowed to pass with the equivalent of a vote of censure. There is a great difference, however, between the threat of Italy and Japan’s action. Manchuria was a no-man’s land; China was incapable of governing it. Japan gave it a Government following a quick campaign in which hardly a life was lost. Materially the high-handed act has had, and is likely to have, nothing but benefits for Manchuria. Abyssinia, on the other hand, has some claims to have been a nation before Rome, whose widest Empire never included it,* was known outside of Italy. It is primitive still, but an enlightened Emperor has been doing his best to civilise it, and is willing to accept all disinterested assistance to that end. The three Great Powers that were directly concerned with Manchuria, as Mr Downie Stewart has recalled, were Britain, Russia, and the United States, of whom two were not members of the League. Italy’s threatened campaign qgainst Abyssinia has possibilities of far-reaching complications that did not apply to Manchuria, and there is another point to be considered. The authority of the League could bo flouted once and the League survive. For such defiances to become a habit would mean the end of the greatest concerted effort to keep the world in peace and osderikies? that has. yet been