GERMANY’S NEW FLEET

Evening Star, Issue 22145, 27 September 1935, Page 12

GERMANY’S NEW FLEET

INFLUENCE OF THE PACT The recent . Anglo'-German naval agreement has exercised a disturbing influence on the naval situation, and the prospect of drafting a scheme or limitation satisfactory to all the naval Powers, including France and Italy, before the Washington Treaty expires next year, is not good. In spite ot the explanations of British Ministers, the French regard the Anglo-German Naval Tact as a menace to their security (writes Sir Archibald Hurd in the •‘Sydney Morning Herald’). ~^ ieir contention is that Germany, with a fleet 35 per cent, of the- strength ot the British Navy, will be able to concentrate all her forces in the North Sea and the Baltic, whereas France has distant territories, as well as far-flung trade, routes to defend. This involves I a wide dispersion of men-ot-war. _ liie balance of French naval power is already undergoing a radical change, since it is felt that the centre of possible disturbance of peace is not the Mediterranean, but the North Sea. ihe movement of naval forces from the Southern Sea has been made easier by the rapprochement between France and Italy, which is based an their mutual colonial responsibilities in Africa. Bat, in spite of the more friendly relations with the Italians, the French are nervous of the effect of the, Anglo-German agreement. , , 1} . Their contention that a German-Bu-4ish ratio of 35-100 will leave the French fleet in a position of weakness has been supported by so high an authority as Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond. In his opinion, comparative strengths, as all British Governments before that of 1931 conceded, are measnreable only in those forces which are effective fighting units in those concentrations of forces which are called “ fleets.” In “ battleships,” in which at all times hitherto the relative strengths of the maritime Towers have been, computed, the agreement does not give France a superiority of 43 per CBTit., but ns lie contends, a slight inferioritv—33 1-3 per cent, to 35 per cent. The greater total tonnage of the French Navy is made up of vessels whtch can play no part m the decisive issue—the battle— though they may be affective against the lines of communication of ii Power dependent upon the trade routes of supply. ENERGETIC BUILDING POLICY. The promptitude with which the German Admiralty has begun to carry out its plan for the re-establishment of the German Fleet has caused surprise. The construction proposals for the current year embrace men-of-war of 107,500 tons. It is apparent that before the signatures had ipeen. affixed to jthe agreement in London designs had been already prepared and preliminary arrangements made with the shipyards in which the keels will be laid. Ihe, programme comprises:— Two battleships of 26,000 tons each, with llin guns; two light cruisers ot dO,OOO tons each, with 7.8 m guns; 10 destroyers of 1,620 tons each, with 4.9 in guns: 20-submarines of 250 tons, «ix submarines of 500 tons, and two submarines of 750 tons. , , The decision to mount 11m instead ef 13.5 in or even 16in guns in the new battleships is due, it is reported, to an improvement in the power ot weapons as a result of the research which has been in progress since the end of the Great Warfar as destroyers and submarines are concerned, it is apparent that the Germans intend to lose no time in completing flotillas of the full strength provided for in the agreement. It is noticeable that the destroyers are to be large vessels of ihe seagoing type, which will have a great radius of action. On the other hand the temptation to follow the example of France and Italy, and even the British naval authorities, in building submarines of from 1,500 to 2,000 tone, and in some cases even larger displacement, has been resisted. The Germans have always held that the monster submersible vessel is a mistake, since the value of such craft lies in the element of surprise and the ability to move in compartively shallow waters. So the Germans, for the present at least, will be content with submarines of moderate size which, are well suited to the “ Narrow Seas,” and within a year or so half the allotted strength of this type will be in service. By the end of 1937 Germany, in addition to her present fleet, with its appropriate complement® of cruisers and destroyers, will have the nucleus of a new navy in commission, consisting of the ships of the recently-announced programme, together with four “ pocket battleships ” so cleverly designed as to conform to the Treaty of Versailles, all the armament clauses of which are now dead. ACTIVITY IN FRENCH DOCKYARDS. That France, is about to enter upon , a policy of active new construction as 1 a reply to the Anglo-German agreement is beyond doubt. So studiously careful an observer of tendencies and events as the Paris correspondent of the ‘ Engineer ’ has recently • stated that questions of armament limitations will be left entirely in the background until France is assured of security. The French will maintain at all costs their naval supremacy over Germany in view of the fixed relative strengths of /British and German navies. The programme of naval construction is being pushed forward rapidly. This year will see the launching or completion of six 10,000-ton cruisers. These cruisers, which are being constructed in a series, are to a considerable extent electrically welded, and have thick armoured belts. Each will carry one or two seaplanes, discharged by catapult. Their contract speed is from 32 to 33 knots. The French regard their light fighting ships as fully equal to those of any other navy, but the deficiency in battleships is to be remedied the construction of three ships of 35,000 tons, one of which is to be laid down early next year, and the Minister of Marine affirms that no time will be lost in completing the two others that have already been authorised by Parliament. Meanwhile the reconditioned battleships Lorraine, Provence, and Bretagne, built before the Great War ? are rendering good service. Details of the proposals of the Italian Government are not yet available. NERVOUSNESS IN THE BALTIC. The Anglo-German agreement has caused consternation in the Baltic. Ever since the end of the Great War the Scandivanian. States have enjoyed a sense of peace which had not existed before. On the one hand, the Russian Navy had become of negligible importance, and, on the other, the size of the Gorman Navy had been strictly limited by the terms of the Peace Treaty. Moreover, they regarded Russia’s and Germany’s accession to the League of Nations as contributing to the security of the status quo in the Baltic, since under the Covenant they were protected from aggression. Now the situation has changed, as they believe, to their disadvantage. Germany has broken away from ice League of

Nations, has ignored the arms clauses of the Versailles Treaty, and, with the consent of the British Government, is building up a fleet ot modern men-of-war which will render her once more the dominant Power in the Baltic. A factor which will hinder any agreement for the limitation of naval armaments in several countries, and notably in Germany, France, the United States, and Japan, is the urgent need to find employment in order to check the growth of discontent. . The construction of men-of-war is justified on the plea that it provides work for men and women,in a wide range of industries, who would otherwise be idle. It is contended that the taxpayer is little worse off in pocket, since the unemployed have no longer to be supported in idleness, while ho gains an increased sense of security, and national prestige is raised. It is urged that any reduction of navies means an increase in unemployment, and that, as a matter of political expediency, the voters, among the unemployed who are not necessarily taxpayers, must be kept contented. The vast expenditure on their armies, navies, and air forces by tfie most financially embarrassed countries in the world is due in large j measure to these new ideas. So, in spite of all the work which has been attempted at Geneva, Washington, and London, the cost of armaments everywhere continues to rise, emphasis being laid on the contention that practically all. the money spent by the State is expended in wages within its own borders. This new uneconomic theory finds further justification in the fears and suspicions under which so many countries are living. It is therefore claimed that the expenditure on naval armaments can be defended on three grounds—employment, social contentment, and increased security.