ITALY’S PROBLEM
ABYSSINIAN OPERATIONS DIFFICULTIES EXPLAINED A special correspondent from “ a Mediterranean port” contributes to tho London 4 Spectator ’_ a description of the task facing Italian forces in Abyssinia. Assuming (he _writes) that the League machinery is not used against Italy, the issue will be decided by Ethiopian against Italian finances, arms, bravery, strategy, knowledge, of the country, organisation, staying power. The parallel of Manchukuo at once strikes the imagination, and can teach .a few military lessons, especially the occupation of Jehol. First, ono must be quite clear that Manchuria is not on all fours with Ethiopia. Tho Ethiopians are one of the bravest races under the sun, the Chinese who garrisoned Manchuria one of the most complacently, pacific. The Ethiopians will be fighting for their country, while it w r as always, possible for the Chinese to retire to theirs. Tho Chinese, Manchus, and Japanese are of a colour, but Ethiopia is the last African empire to bo invaded by a white Power, when,feeling against the colour bar is rising all over Africa. The war, therefore, which is necessary for the subjugation of Ethiopia, may well light a fire throughout the African bush. Behind the Smo-Japanese conflict, on tho other band, there was always looming the potential unity of the Eastern peoples. Else why does China swoon so softly into the arras of Japan, while the Ethiopians are sharpening up their swords and confusedly wondering why their Emperor offers concessions to the Western Powers? TWO LINES OF ATTACK. But thei'e are points in which the war may take the Manchurian line. It will be a colonial war, and here Manchukuo is the latest pattern. It will be a war between a Power strong in material but vulnerable in the matter of communications and supply, against a Power of whom the reverse is true if it fights sagaciously. In the occupation of Jehol the Japanese aeroplanes went first scattering leaflets over towns (which was useless) and bombs over artillery (which was highly effective). Next came the mechanised army, tanks, and armoured cars, and, finally, the Japanese infantry followed in motor lorries over the frozen terrain, for Japanese G.H.Q. carefully chose the time when it would be easiest to travel speedily. Jehol was thus vanquished in a month, if one can use the term, for hardly a mouse resisted. The job took even a month solely because the Japanese were careful and consolidated every fresh advance; in fact, they used their mechanised forces tactically rather than strategically. They thus provide Italy with a model—wherever possible, aeroplanes, mechanised armoured vehicles, mechanised mobile infantry, in that order. The Italian forces may not bo so effective as the Japanese, nor the Ethiopians so impotent as the Chinese. But do the tactics suit the country F In the case of Somaliland, where Italy faces tho broad waterless and scrubby south-eastern side of Abyssinia, one can answer unreservedly, yes. In the ease of Eritrea, where Italy has to march up against the mountain bastions of Tigre, Gojjam, and Amhara, which are the real heart of Ethiopia, one can say as clearly, no. In the north aeroplanes cannot find their targets, tanks cannot move -except through valleys which the Ethiopians never use, and valleys therefore which are dense with bush and during the rains (which last till September) are seamed with fierce rivers. There are no roads in northern Abyssinia; when the Ethiopian travels 'he goes by narrow mule track along the mountain tops, shunning the fever-stricken valleys. When he must cross a valley his mule dives straight down the mountain side and struggles straight up the opposite mountain. During the rains ho can never do that, for he cannot cross the river in between.
It is on the Somaliland side that Italy can really advance quite soon. Between Wahval, which she now occupies, and Harrar, which is the Emperor’s rich and easternmost province, there stretch 300 miles of Somaliland bush, parched in the dry season, but in the rains offering fair grazing and occasional wells. The country rises gently from 3,000 ft to 6,000 ft, and presents no natural obstacles. Why, before the rains end, should the Italians not advance to Harrar and occupy that prosperous town? _ The presence of their commander-in-chief, General Graziani, in Somaliland suggests that the first blow may come from there. So does the position and value of Harrar, which is only 35 miles from Dire-Dawa, the chief station on the Franco-Ethiopian railway from Djibouti to Addis Ababa. Once that line is occupied by Italy she can cut Addis off from the Red Sea, and her own advance upon Addis is easy. The Ethiopians hate fighting in the hot lowlands between Walwal and Harrar; with only the indigenous Somali to brush aside, Italy should find Jehol tactics easily adaptable to Somaliland in the rainy season.
ETHIOPIANS’ CHANCES. On the assumption, _ therefore, that the initiative remains with the Italians, it is possible for_ them to occupy the capital of Ethiopia -without much difficulty. But once they are there, and if their opponents fight intelligently, the Italians are trapped. On the one side, both from Addis Ababa and from Eritrea, they must fight over a rugged mountain zone larger than Morocco in order to crush the Ethiopians; and Morocco took 19 years for a far greater _ Power, with sound finances, a trained colonial army, and the towering leader Lyautey, to conquer. On the other side, the communications of the Southern Italian army, which has occupied Addis from Somaliland, become unbelievably difficult to maintain (for France will have removed all the rolling stock from the Franco-Ethiopian railway, in deference to a clause in its statutes which makes it over to the Emperor’s possession if foreign troops move upon it). Then, unless all the Italian air force are used for supply—and even they will not be enough for the immense Italian land force—Abyssinian mounted riflemen in guerrilla commandoes will be able to starve them out from the south. And a wise direction of the northern Abyssinian forces would allow the Italians into the mountain zone from Eritrea, tangle them in the valleys, and then slaughter them piecemeal, as the Russians handled the French during the retreat _ from Moscow. Victory, eventual victory, will remain with the Ethiopian if he remembers one lesson—never to mass against mechanised forces, or when he is within air range from the Italian side. Bombs, or mustard gas on a massed Ethiopian army, like that which fought at Adowa, might break its heart and with it the resistance of Ethiopia. But if the Ethiopian forces scatter and retain their mobility, there is no reason why they should not wear down Italy, oven though Ethiopian armaments jjig grant# ami fiM-
fashioned. The Ethiopian knows how to use cover; he can shoot as. well as the Italian; he has far more natural courage ; he is fighting for his country, and he understands every mountain and precipice of it. If he does not defeat Italian armaments in the field lie can wait in commando until Italian finances crack or a European war intervenes. Then he may well recover all that ko has lost—perhaps piprfe
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Evening Star, Issue 22143, 25 September 1935, Page 9
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1,188ITALY’S PROBLEM Evening Star, Issue 22143, 25 September 1935, Page 9
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