SUCCESS AND FAILURE.

Evening Star, Issue 21752, 21 June 1934, Page 8

SUCCESS AND FAILURE.

,A very small feather for the cap of the League of Nations, at a time when it could do with more of them, has been won by its successful settlement of what is known as the Leticia dispute between Colombia and Peru. The dispute was petty in the first place, but if such a body as the League bad not existed to provide prompt mediation the Chaco War at one end of the South American continent might have been balanced by an equally fierce struggle at the other. On September 1, 1932, Peruvian civilians seized the Colombian River port of Leticia, on the Upper Amazon, about 2,500 miles from the Atlantic Ocean, which had been ceded to Colombia five years earlier under a boundary treaty. The first result of the seizure was a flaming up of the spirit in both countries, with enlistment of volunteers, purchase of supplies and armaments, raising of patriotic loans and special war taxes, formation of Red Crois units, and the like. There was some concentration of forces, and a few shots were fired, and then, on the League of Nations intervening, the two States agreed to give orders to cease hostilities. If warfare had developed further there would have been grave danger of Brazil and Ecuador being drawn into the fray. The disputed zone was placed under control of a League of Nations Commission, which has ruled it for a year. The two States were called upon to appoint representatives to meet together, under a neutral chairman, and adjust their differences, and now, after various alarms of a resumption of the war, an agreement has been reached. The “ jungle village ” has been restored to Colombia with the acquiescence of Peru. The League has failed so far in its attempt to make an end of the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia. “ One of the most senseless wars humanity has ever known ” was how its commission described that struggle. And the League has not got very far in its endeavour to set restrictions on the private manufacture and export of arms on which such wars depend. Early in the course of the Leticia dispute there was discussion of the practicability of cutting off supplies of arms to the belligerents, and Great Britain and France at once agreed to embargoes. It was urged, however, that unless there was worldwide application of prohibitions they were useless, and if they were directed at both belligerents they actually favoured the one best prepared before the outbreak of hostilities—probably the most warlike. An objection to an American embargo at that time was that it needed the endorsement of Congress. That has been obtained, for the purpose of denying munitions to Paraguay and Bolivia in their Chaco conflict, but the world-wide agreement which is really necessary is still difficult to secure. Captain Eden has just explained to the House of Commons that the Governments of thirty-four countries have announced that in principle they are prepared to agree to the imposition of a Paraguay-Bolivian embargo. The Italian Government has, however, made its agreement conditional on agreement by the Japanese Government. The latter has not yet given a formal agreement, though it has explained that no export of arms has in fact been sent from Japan to Bolivia or Paraguay. The formal coming into force of the embargo is accordingly for the moment delayed. The British Government is continuing to hold up the issuing of licenses dor the export of arras to the two belligerents, but it is not prepared to give an undertaking that this unilateral action will be pursued indefinitely and in all circumstances.

In a better world there would be no private armament firms. But in the present conditions no country can afford to abolish that business, not knowing when they may be required for its own defence. And they would not exist, as a needed means of supply, when aggression had to be faced if, between times, they were prevented from selling arms even to countries as far away as South America, removing the risk of the arms being some day used against the suppliers’ own State. In Britain there is some control of the traffic, and a section of the League is seeking to make that control international, applying to all countries, so that at least there may be knowledge of where arms are going to assist intervention when it is required. That is not much to aim for, but it seems to be all that is practicable at the present time.