THE BATTLESHIP

Evening Star, Issue 21746, 14 June 1934, Page 12

THE BATTLESHIP

HOW BIG SHOULD IT BE 7 Sir Herbert Russell gave expression to the opinion of all practical-mindcd people in Britain and elsewhere when ho wrote the other day that “ disarmament is as dead as mutton” (says a London writer). The British Government, it is true, is not yet inclined to admit failure in its efforts “ to promote reason among the nations,” but even Sir John Simon, notwithstanding his confirmed optimism, admitted recently that “ the sands are fast running out.” So far as the principal navies of the world are concerned it is clear that the sands will-have run out when the London Treaty limiting tonnage construction expires next year. And then what? Speaking for his own country, supposedly the least militaristic of all, President Roosevelt has declared that after, 19:50 the United States will possess the most powerful and modern battle fleet in existence. It is plain, at all events, from the enthusiasm with which the House of Representatives has greeted the £15,000,000 building programme submitted by the chairman of the Navy Committee that America has no more use for the Disarmament Conference. “ Ambassador ” Davis will probably lie seen no more at Geneva. _ This circumstance considered in relation to Japan’s known fear and jealousy of America s naval power, may throw the whole treaty into the melting pot,' for if the Americans and the Japanese are determined to vie with one another in building ships, how is Britain to define her policy for the future? The question is especially important from the viewpoint of capital ships, in which department Britain is for the moment supreme. It is a question which is causing anxiety in Admiralty circles, where, judging by what one can hear, there are two opposing schools of thought. One of these is strongly advocating a reversion to battleships with a maximum displacement of 25,000 tons and a 12in armament (or, at the outside, a 13.5 in armament); the other believes implicitly in “ the biggest ships and guns possible,” should battleship construction be resumed if and when the London agreement goes.by the board. “ SEA ENDURANCE.” Alluding to certain probable developments, the ‘Naval and Military'Record ’ in an editorial states: — “ We do not contemplate entering into rivalry with the United States cn the assumption that our battleships may ever have to match themselves against her battleships. Japan lies cn the other side of the world, and if we consider the possibility of ever unfortunately finding ourselves in conflict with her we must visualise the practical certainty of having to carry the war into the zone of her choice, which implies the necessity lor a very large sea-keeping endurance, not indeed to reach Singapore, but to bo able to operate from that base over the wide tract of waters which lie between Malaya and Japan.” This factor of “ sea endurance ” then would appear to be vital when' the design of the capital ship of the future is being considered, and there is good reason to believe it is already receiving weighty attention from the Admiralty, despite any difficulty it may have encountered up to the present in establishing a standard. It has been definitely demonstrated bv German naval designers that “ senkeeping endurance ” is not necessarily a matter of f.he size of a vessel. They have proved that a relatively small ship of 10,000 tons, such as the pocket battleship Deutschland, for example, can cover more than twice the distance of which the 42,000-ton battle cruiser

Hood is capable, the “ economic speed of both vessels being much about the same. It is the Deutschland, more than any other fighting unit afloat, which has given rise to so much heart-search-ing among British naval experts, and they accordingly watch her performances with unremitting interest. SUCCESS OF DEUTSCHLAND.. Contrary to what has been asserted by some, ill-informed writers, the Deutschland has been an unqualified success. There is the most reliable and authentic authority for saying, that her Diesel propelling machinery has given consistently good results ever since she was passed into service. True, there was some preliminary trouble with the lighter motors driving the auxiliary engines, particularly the electric dynamos, but these defects, have been overcome, and, so far as can be gathered, there have never been any defects in the main engines. To naval designers this fact is, of course, most important, for it is almost certain to have a direct influence on the whole question of the future capital ship type, the four;main considerations for which must inevitably be reliability, speed, gun power, and protection. _ In its present mood the Admiralty is disinclined to substitute anything for the geared turbine and water-tube boiler, which have been brought to a pitch of wonderful efficiency, but it naturally cannot stand out if there is positive proof that some form of internal combustion machinery is better and more economical. With regard to the size of . a capital ship, the British Navy, having grown accustomed to vessels averaging about 30.000 tons, is unlikely to take kindly to vessels of smaller tonnage. Certainly the big ship has many advantages. She is more comfortable, she provides, a steadier fighting platform, and she is presumably capable of withstanding a heavier bombardment in action. Her disadvantages are that she is tremendously costly to build, maintain, and propel. Indeed, now that the public has been taught to believe that the modern battleship is no longer immune from air attack the nation may well frown upon any future replacement programme which would contemplate, say, the laying down of two £7,000,000 vessels a year. Even experts are at variance in discussing this problem of size. They only agree on the point that, whatever happens, Britain must evolve a battleship type , that can “ stay the struggle,” whether the type be big or small. It should not be forgotten in this regard that experience has shown, that the race is not always to the storing nor the battle to the swift. At Jutland enemy ships of 20.000 tons with llin guns opposed our ships of 30,000 tons with 15in guns, and neither side, when the light was over, could claim a “ knock'-out.”