POLICE FORCE

Evening Star, Issue 20138, 1 April 1929, Page 10

POLICE FORCE

TENURE OF OFFICE POSITION DEFINED iMPOKTANT DECI3 10X. An important decision bearing on the tenure of office held by members of the Police Force in Xew Zealand was given by the Court of Appeal recently (and reported by telegram only briefly)- It was held that there was no contract between a police constable and the Crown, and that a constable could bo dismissed at any time without having the right to proceed against the Crown for damages for wrongful dismissal. The court laid it down that a constable is bound to servo the King, but the King is not bound to cmolov a constable-

The case was an appeal from the decision of Ah- .In.-lif-e (Filer, who decided that Michael Power, an ex-police constable who was di>mi.v'cd by tbo Commissioner, had cause of action rqain-L the Crown.

Tim respondent Power was a police constable, who was dismissed from (Inforce by the Commi-sioncr of police on March “S. lugs T'ho respondent then commenced legal proceedings against the Crown to i-'covcr damages for wrongful dismiss.d. In the course of the judgment, delivered by Mr Justice MacGregor on behalf of the court, it was stated that tin case raised.au important question of law regarding the tenure of office by police constables in Xew Zealand. “Ihe lirst and fundamental question of law to be determined is whether Power’s dismissal by the Commissioner of Police gave rise to any cause of action by Power lor damages for wrongful dismissal.” said His Honour. “ The answer to that question depends, of course, upon the terms on which Power held his office as police constable. In Xew Zealand all poliee officers are servants of the Crown, Now, it is clear law that, except where it is otherwise provided by Statute, all public officers and servants of the Crown in England hold their Appointments at the pleasure of the Crown, and all, in general, arc subject to dismissal at any time without cause assigned; nor will an action for wrongful dismissal he entertained. That this is also the law in Xew Zealand has been determined. The question remains whether it has been in this case ‘ otherwise provided by Statute ’ in Now Zealand.” His Honour went on to refer to the various Acts dealing with the control of the Police Force, and proceeded: “It would appear that white any superintendent or inspector has authority to punish a constable for his misconduct or neglect of duty, the Commissioner himself exercises the absolute power of dismissing a constable whenever ‘ in the opinion of the Commissioner ’ he is unfit to remain in the force. . . . IT this construction of

the relevant statutory provisions he correct, it is in our opinion obvious that the respondent in the present ease can have no cause of action against the Crown, inasmuch as his dismissal under

section 9 was justified by the express terms of the statute. It was contended for the respondent that this construction should not he followed, because to adopt it would mean that the respondent had been punished twice for the same offence. How, then, do matters stand in this respectf For an act of misconduct, the respondent was fined by an inspector the sum of ,to- He was subsequently dismissed from the force by the Conimislsioner of Police. Wc do not think that in these circumstances it can be affirmed that ho has been ‘ punished ’ more than once. The fine of was no doubt indicted, as. a punishment. But the power of dismissal vested in the Commissioner, by section 9 was not to act as a judicial officer in conducting inquiries and hearing proot ol charges and inflicting punishment therefor, but to act summarily in a high administrative capacity in order to keep the whole service disciplined and efficient by removing unfit constables therelrom. . . -I* or these reasons wc think that on the tree construction of the Police Force Act, 19l:j (as amended in 19-1), the .dismissal of the respondent by ihe ( oinmissioncr gave rise to no cause ol action by him lor damages against the Crown. NO COXTKACT. “ V\’e think, moreover, that the. same rcouit in law must be arrived at if t.ue nuil.ter be looked at Irom a slightly different angle. The present action has been brought by the respondent for damages as on a breach ul contract by the Crown. If there ho no contract made by the Crown with the respondent, then it is obvious that, . he can possess no right of action against the Crown in these proceedings. in this ease, in our judgment, no contract was ever made by the Crown with the respondent The constable is bound to serve the King, but the King is not bound to employ the constable, but may dismiss him at his pleasure and at any lime. On his dismissal the agreement is at once determined. If lie is su dismissed from office,. as his only tenure of that office is during the pleasure of the Crown, an action will not tie for wrongful dismissal against the Crown, . . The Commissioner

himself is apparently not entitled to any preliminary iminify, or indeed to bo heard in self-defence, but may be .summarily dismissed. Yet a police constable, if the argument for the respondent is sound, cannot be dismissed from the force in any way, unless lie is charged with misconduct or breach of duty, and until a superintendent or inspector after inquiry finds that charge to bo proved and recommends his dismissal. tn other words, if the construction of tho statute arrived at by Mr Justice. Ostler be the true one, tire Commissioner of Police fn Kew # Zealand has a much less secure tenure of his office than an ordinary police constable. Wo are convinced that tills is not tho true meaning or effect of the Acts in question.” The appeal was upheld, and the question of costs referred to tho Supreme Court.